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ABSTRACT
RITUALIZED RHETORIC AND HISTORICAL MEMORY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY
Sara A. Hoff
Old Dom inion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

Recent changes in German foreign policy behavior have led to questions about
Germany's European vocation. At th e center of this inquiry is Germany's struggle to
resolve th e intersection betw een historical m em ory and present day international
responsibility, especially in cases involving th e use o f force. This dissertation
examines how and when historical m em ory has influenced, shaped, and inform ed
contem porary Germ an foreign and security policy and rhetoric by exam ining cases
w ithin tw o policy areas: out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. Focusing
on th e case of Libya, this dissertation also considers the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Nuclear nonproliferation, a global policy issue, highlights Germ any's role as
an international actor by focusing on Germ any's voice and actions during th e
negotiations w ith Iran over its nuclear program . This dissertation hypothesizes th a t
G erm any has a ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determ ined by
historical memory. The argum ent is m ade th a t historical m em ory and ritualized rhetoric
is used depending on policy area, allowing Germ any to present reason, argum ent, and
justification to a variety of international security challenges, either to support or oppose
m ilitary involvem ent. This dissertation finds support fo r questions regarding Germ any's
European vocation. However, Germ any exercises self-interests precisely w ithin th e

institutions of th e European Union and th e North Atlantic Treaty Organization. W h a t has
changed is th a t Germ any is increasingly using rhetoric of m em ory and guilt in order to
obscure th a t it is actually acting in its self-interests. Germ an policy choices, as they
relate to the future use of force will be critically guided by this rhetoric.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. In both cases we are learning
to take account o f conscious o r unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion. In
both cases this selection, interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned. " 1

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is positioned w ithin the international relation and political
science literatures' continued focus on explanations o f Germ an foreign and security
policy, diplomacy, and political rhetoric. M o re than tw e n ty years a fte r the end of th e
Cold W ar and Germ an unification, and m ore than ten years after th e S eptem ber 11
attacks, theoretical fram ew orks and analyses struggle to fully explain Germ an foreign
policy choices, continuity and change, national interests, and the use o f pow er. Scholars
not only disagree over explanations o f Germ an policy behavior but fu rth e r diverge on
analyses of the current state o f Germ any's role in Europe and Germany's use of
institutional pow er. This research will address this gap in th e literature by using a
detailed analysis of the current Germ an foreign policy behavior and rhetorical action
used to achieve goals in tw o selected policy areas: out of area operations and th e use of
force and nonproliferation and m ultilateral negotiation. This research addresses tw o
im portant aspects of th e Germ an foreign policy debate: Germany's use o f pow er and
th e continued influence o f historical m em ory by connecting theoretical explanations to

1 Peter Burke, "History as Social M em ory," in History, Culture, and th e M in d , ed. Thomas Butler (N ew York:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 98.
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policy choices and ritualized rhetoric through evaluations o f positions em ployed by
German policy makers. Germany's recent behavior, to include the abstention from th e
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on m ilitary intervention, has called to
question Germany's role as a responsible actor w hile highlighting G erm any's continued
reluctance to use force, even in hum anitarian based interventions. G erm any's increased
power and continued foreign policy since unification has led to an ongoing theoretical
debate, seeking to understand and predict Germ any's policies. The 'G erm an question'
has resurfaced once more, focusing on Germ any's national and economic interests. This
study will analyze and detail these changes by exam ining how and w hen changes occur
and w hat variables shape and influence policy outcom es. Further, this dissertation
outlines which norms and interests are placed before th e interests o f th e European
Union (EU) in th e selected policy areas. This dissertation contributes to both th e
theoretical and policy geared literature on Germ any's foreign policy and th e use of
pow er as it focuses on recent policies and rhetorical action w hile considering the
continual path of Germany's foreign policy behavior despite changes in th e international
security environm ent.
The three theoretical fram ew orks selected fo r this research are structural
realism, utilitarian/liberalism , and constructivism; th e y are used in order to com bine
explanatory variables fo r case analysis in describing and understanding G erm an foreign
policy choices. Further, these theories will be used to categorize scholars w ho discuss
and analyze German foreign and security policy into com prehensive fram ew orks to
determ ine how contem porary Germ an foreign policy and rhetoric is studied. These
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theories, as w ell as fram eworks specifically geared tow ard explaining and understanding
Germany's foreign policy behavior, are outlined and discussed in chapter th re e o f this
dissertation, and eventually applied to th e case studies selected in the analysis portion
o f this dissertation within chapter six. Each case selected fo r this dissertation will be
analyzed in term s of Germany's foreign policy behavior based on fo u r selected variables
known to be pillars of German foreign policy: M u ltilateral alliance solidarity, historical
m em ory and W W II legacy, domestic influence, and national interests. The cases will be
analyzed by using primary and secondary source data. Prim ary sources include speeches
and statem ents, voting documents, parliam entary docum ents to include plenary
records, governm ent reports, and public opinion polls. Secondary data includes Germ an
and English language newspapers and oth er m edia, policy evaluations, and a w ideranging literature analysis including scholarly articles and books in both Germ an and
English. These sources w ere used to understand w hy rhetoric in Germ an foreign policy is
im portant, and w hat determ inants contribute to differences in rhetoric and action. This
will add to an overall understanding and interpretation o f patterns of Germ an foreign
policy behavior and will analyze cases in which G erm any is willing to lead and or to
shape and influence the international environm ent (Gestaltungswille).
Although past research has focused on the puzzle o f continuity and change in
German foreign policy, present research does not strategically analyze Germ any's
ritualized rhetoric within a foreign policy discursive fra m ew o rk with th e goal o f linking
continuous rhetoric to action and policies. Ritualized rhetoric based on W W II legacy will
be analyzed in o rder to understand when and how historical m em ory enters political
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debates in order to explain, justify, or excuse policy action. German foreign policy
rhetoric is highly politicized and rarely neutral, and used in an instrum ental w ay by both
governm ent officials and scholars. Therefore, research on how rhetoric is used to serve
and support policy goals poses an im p o rtan t inquiry fo r th e field of international
relations. M o re broadly, this research provides a unique perspective on th e current
state o f German foreign policy w hile taking into consideration the extensive research
accomplished during the tw o decades follow ing G erm an unification.

RESEARCH DESIGN
This dissertation will analyze th e relationship betw een Germ any's foreign policy
rhetoric and action based on an analysis o f historical and collective m em ory,
socialization, learning processes, dom estic interests and influence, and G erm any's role
concept, or the relationship of identities and social structures in relation to Germ any's
history. Scholarly analyses in th e past have focused on Germany's role concept of
civilian pow er and 'norm al' action. The goal and purpose of this dissertation is to
analyze which foreign policy roles em ployed by G erm any, or different modes o f action,
guide actual foreign policy behavior in each selected case and w hat factors explain
changes and continuity in rhetoric and action. Further, this study will analyze how
rhetoric and action has been perceived by Germ an security studies and how rhetoric
and historical m em ory has been used to m ake argum ents about Germ an foreign policy
behavior. The contribution to th e field o f international relations will include an
exam ination of the im portance of rhetoric and historical m em ory in G erm an foreign
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policy, the fram ew o rk in which this action, or /naction is interpreted, and how this
rhetoric is used to serve German scholars. The theoretical fram ew orks selected will aid
in describing patterns of behavior, especially th e use of th e constructivist notion th a t
patterns o f behavior can change by identifying rhetoric and action th a t appear to
diverge from previously observed continuous foreign policy behavior.
Germany's current foreign policy choices, rhetoric, and behavior, especially
those surrounding th e European financial crisis, have been viewed as a partial return to
great pow er politics. Taking a leadership position in Greece's bailout but refraining on
th e UN Security Council vote on m ilitary intervention in Libya, and opposing stronger
sanctions for Iran has posed questions about G erm any's current and fu tu re role in
Europe and in the international security environm ent. This recent behavior called into
question Germ any's role as a responsible actor and Germ any's prioritizing o f national
goals and interests over those o f th e EU. This puzzling observation, and o th e r breaks
w ith m ultilateralism in the past ten years, reaffirm s the difficulty in explaining current
German foreign policy choices; on the one hand Germ any's continued c o m m itm en t
both rhetorically and practically to antim ilitarism and indicators pointing to G erm any as
a civilian pow er, and in juxtaposition, foreign policy choices based on calculated pursuits
of national interests through th e use of institutional pow er. Has G erm an foreign policy
behavior changed and transform ed from a structured to an agency-based approach?
How then can Germany's use o f rhetoric be understood in influencing and prescribing
foreign policy choices? This dissertation will test and search fo r corroboration and
congruence of several overarching hypotheses th a t derive fro m the research question.
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Focusing on Germany's policy behavior and rhetoric w ithin th e last decade and
th e analyses by German scholars and media in regards to Germ any's use o f rhetorical
action, the research questions and hypotheses will be applied to tw o policy areas in
order to examine Germany's foreign and security policy and rhetoric and to d eterm ine
when or how change occurs. O ut o f area operations as a policy area will provide a
fram ew ork for understanding G erm any's continued behavior for cases involving th e use
of force as a regional, internal, and m ultilateral issue, and an im portant pillar o f Germ an
foreign policy. W hile the main focus is on Germ any's abstention from UNSC Resolution
1973 for Libya in 2011, an argum ent is m ade th a t places th e Libya case in a sequence
with three other cases within th e same policy area: Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This
span of cases provides for a linear inquiry into Germ any's foreign policy behavior and
covers international and internal periods of change to include different coalition
m ovements w hile allowing for a comparison o f influencing variables. The second policy
area under review, nuclear nonproliferation and Iran's nuclear program , provides an
insight into Germany's behavior internationally tow ards a global and structural issue.
W hile the influence of historical m em ory is th e focus o f this dissertation, the
independent variables selected fo r all cases provide a variation to account fo r causal
influences in each case. Finally, this study will analyze th e fram ew orks used to explain
Germ an foreign and security policy behavior w hile providing for a comparison of each
case.
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RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES
This dissertation will exam ine variation in policy behavior and d eterm in e how
Germany views, understands, and uses pow er. Currently, th e three pillars o f Germ an
foreign policy are economic interests, rethinking o f nuclear power, and continued
reluctance to use m ilitary force. An argum ent will be made o f the enduring im portance
of historical m em ory in all issue areas o f Germ an foreign policy and action. Historical
and collective m em ory is widely defined and is explained in depth in chapter tw o of this
dissertation. Conceptually, historical m em ory, in this study, refers to G erm any's W orld
W ar II (W W II) legacy as it relates to Germ any's culture o f restraint, c o m m itm en t to
antim ilitarism , and inability to project pow er. Thus, the research question th a t guided
this study is: does historical m em ory determ ine G erm an foreign policy behavior and
rhetoric? In order to concentrate on the gaps in analyses and literature previously
m entioned, this dissertation will exam ine under w h a t circumstances historical m em ory
influences German foreign policy and which expectations, or role concepts, ultim ately
guide Germany's behavior. Further, this study will determ in e w h eth er Germ an foreign
policy rhetoric aligns w ith Germ an policy action and w h at factors contribute to th e
process of change. As such, this dissertation includes a null hypothesis th a t analyzes the
influence of historical m em ory on contem porary G erm an foreign policy. This hypothesis
addresses the argum ent th a t G erm any has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric
determ ined by historical m em ory, w hile th e counter to th e null hypothesis in turn
supports an argum ent th at G erm any does not have a ritualized foreign policy and
rhetoric th a t is determ ined by historical m em ory. These hypotheses o ffer a descriptive

case study geared towards explaining th e use of policy and rhetoric based on historical
memory, norms, culture, and identity. The four variables, used for tw o policy areas and
w ithin five cases total, account for instances o f perceived change over tim e.
Additionally, this study will analyze which theoretical fram ew ork is used by
scholars to explain German foreign policy w hile highlighting in which policy areas
Germany is willing to lead and or shape th e international security environm ent. The
importance o f the concept of pow er in this study will be used to address how G erm any
understands and uses its pow er and w h e th e r G erm any's new foreign policy is m ore
'realist' than rhetoric lets us assume. This dissertation argues that G erm any's previous
foreign policy behavior involving out o f area operations can be seen as a pattern
consistent with German understanding o f power; showing a gradual rather than sudden
change, due to a reaction to th e external security environm ent. Further, this study does
not argue th a t historical m em ory informs Germ an foreign policy but rather examines
how and when historical m em ory influences norms, interests, and rhetoric. In which
fram ew ork are out of area operations discussed? W hich factors, norm ative or m aterial,
have the most influence and why? In o rder to theoretically understand th e context o f
this study and to support the argum ent th a t G erm any uses institutional p ow er to
strengthen th e environm ent in which policy decisions are m ade, a theoretical
comparison of fram eworks will be included in th e analysis portion o f this dissertation.

9

DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
The second chapter of this dissertation provides th e context fo r understanding
im portant factors and variables fo r th e analysis o f both issue areas: G erm any's role as a
participant in out of area operations, and as a negotiator w ith the international security
environm ent tow ards Iran's nuclear program . M o re specifically, chapter tw o will define
and explain historical memory, rhetoric, power, and identity in G erm an foreign policy.
Chapter three will address the theoretical debate about the validity of
international relations theories. Structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism are
outlined and defined, while a literature review on an application o f theories and
fram eworks to German foreign policy is used to highlight the difficulty in accounting for
Germany's continuity and change since unification. Further, chapter th re e will review
how interests, norms, contextual change, and transform ation com plicate theoretical
analyses of pow er and German foreign and security policy w hile exam ining th e current
state of theoretical debates within the field.
Chapter four then analyzes Germ any's foreign policy behavior during out of area
operations by first reviewing historical factors and concepts to explain Germ any's
difficulties for cases involving the use of force. Beginning w ith Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, this chapter details th e facts, policies, rhetoric, and consequences of
Germany's behavior, ending with th e abstention in th e case o f Libya. Similarly, chapter
five uses the same criteria to detail the facts surrounding Germ any's behavior during th e
negotiations towards Iran's nuclear program.
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Chapter six analyzes both policy areas and cases by applying th e variables,
detailing the findings, and providing a discussion o f the selected cases in order to
exam ine the process of change. Further, this chapter also compares and contrasts both
policy areas in order to account fo r variance in influential variables, outcom es, and
behavior by providing alternative explanations. The theoretical fram ew orks are then
applied to all five cases to analyze w h e th e r Germany's foreign policy behavior can be
explained and understood through theories, w hile accounting for change and continuity.
Finally, chapter seven includes a conclusion of th e study along w ith a discussion
detailing the limitations o f this dissertation w hile suggesting future research.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL MEMORY, RHETORIC, POWER, AND IDENTITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY

INTRODUCTION
The literature on German foreign policy, pow er, and identity is extensive and
points to several challenges when seeking to explain how security challenges are
discussed, handled, and m et. A fe w them es em erge, m ainly surrounding th e debate of
Germany's use and understanding over pow er, especially in regards to th e concept o f
'civilian pow er'. Germany's security culture is inevitably bound to its past; in o rd er to
understand how and when historical m em ory enters political debates, several concepts
have to be taken into consideration. Rhetoric, in G erm an foreign and security policy, is
used to explain, defend, and justify policy behavior, w hile norm ative values such as
culture, identity, and history, inform policy choices. Further, Germ any continues to
struggle w ith pow er and its use thereof. This chapter will provide the context fo r the
analysis o f the selected variables fo r this study in o rder to determ ine w h e th e r changes
in German foreign policy can be categorized as an adjustm ent to policy, a reconstruction
to policy, or a continuation of learned behavior and norms.

RHETORIC AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Political rhetoric has not been used prom inently by scholars of international
relations to explain or understand political phenom ena or behavior. Instead, rhetoric is

often treated as a secondary phenom enon w ith no causal influence itself, but
accompanied by a physical phenom enon. Political rhetoric, therefore, is view ed in
relation to material action, especially in regards to foreign and security policy. W ith the
rise o f constructivist approaches and analyses to international relations, the pow er o f
ideas, beliefs, and culture w ere included in contem porary arguments o f th e ir influence
on political outcomes. Some political scientists included analyses o f how m em ory and
ideas influence actors, w hile others included ideas and beliefs into foreign policy and
political change analyses.1 W hile m aterial pow er and resources dom inated theoretical
analyses o f foreign policy behavior, the continuation of pow er requires legitim acy
through rhetorical action.2 This rhetorical action serves as an explanation and
justification of political agendas and can aid in understanding policy behavior, directly
influencing political outcomes. In th e past, scholars w ithin th e rationalist school of
thought have pointed to th e outcomes in cases w h ere rhetorical prom ise was m et w ith
policy inaction, evident thought dom estic and international costs.3
In m ore recent analyses, and predom inately through European scholars,
persuasive political rhetoric is view ed as influencing and internalizing new beliefs
resulting in social constructs and norms. These scholars often refer to Jurgen Haberm as'
explanation o f 'communicative action' to exam ine the influence of rhetoric, or, more

1 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in In ternatio n al Politics (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton
University Press, 1976). Judith Goldstein and Robert. O Keohane, Ideas an d Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
2 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power or
Political Rhetoric," European Journal o f In ternatio n al Relations 13, no. 1 (2007).
3 Ibid.
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recently, Frank Schimmelfenig's analysis on 'rhetorical action'.4 According to
Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action "provides one w ay o f disentangling rational choice
and ontological materialism and theorizing the context conditions o f strategic action ".5
State actors in an international com m unity setting w ithin an institutional environm en t
can then use norms and values to strengthen com m unity identity in order to validate
"self-interest".6 It is im portant to note th a t actors' strategic behavior and choices may
be contained in the 'com m unity tra p ' as th e identification w ith ideas can lead to a
com m itm ent o f com m unity values and identity in order to ensure legitimacy and
credibility. Rhetoric, especially fo r Germ any, is at th e center or the roof o f politics, often
controversial and rarely one-sided. Germ any professes to stand fo r m any things;
showing rhetorical com m itm ent to its allies and international causes. On which issues is
Germ any willing to lead and follow up this rhetorical prom ise with realized policies and
action? For German foreign and security policy, rhetorical debates shape and influence
political outcomes by directly involving identity, ideas, and norms. Historical m em ory
directly plays into the rhetoric em ployed by policy makers in Germany; it is used to
justify and explain political action and behavior.

4 Ibid. For more on communicative action, see Jurgen Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action,
trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984). Thomas Risse, ""Let's Argue!": Communicative
Action in W orld Politics," International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000).
5 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Com m unity Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and th e Eastern
Enlargement o f th e European Union," ibid.55(2001): 77.
6 Ibid.
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HISTORICAL AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
How does our past inform our cultural identity? How is the past rem em bered ,
defined, analyzed, and shared? A differentiation betw een collective m em ory and history
must be made, w hereby th e collective m em ory "m anifests itself in th e actions and
statem ents of individuals" and is understood as a shared representation of th e past by a
given com m unity or group.7 M em ory, especially in conjunction w ith historical events,
differs from individual to individual; collective (historical) m em ory is then 'rem em b ered '
under the shared premise o f accepted versions o f history. The concept o f historical or
collective m em ory is certainly not unique to Germ any; disagreements o f rem em bering
or retelling the past exist in several forums: from small com m unities and villages, to
entire countries, and over global events. Entire journals, books, studies, and courses
have been dedicated to th e study o f collective m em ory, but historians or scholars of
collective m em ory generally use French sociologist M aurice Halbwachs' theoretical
argum ent to define collective m em ories as "collectively shared representations o f th e
past".8 W hile Halbwachs' general definition is w idely accepted, historians stress the
im portance of individual objectives and m em ory in shaping th e collective, an aspect th a t
was dismissed by Halbwachs. Instead, th e French sociologist argued th a t individual
m em ory was socially d eterm ined.9

7 W o lf Kansteiner, "Finding M eaning in M em ory: A M ethodological Critique of Collective M em o ry
Studies," History and Theory 41, no. 2 (2002): 180.
8 Ibid, 181. For more on M aurice Halbwachs, see Les Cadres sociaux de la mem oire (Paris: Alcan, 1925), or
a review on Halbwachs' work by Patrick Hutton, History as an A rt o f M e m o ry (Hanover, N.H.: University
Press of New England, 1993), 73-90.
9 Ibid.
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W u lf Kantsteiner explains th a t the unique com bination of social significance and
intellectual challenge gave rise to th e increase in th e study o f m em ory in th e hum anities
and social science, also referred to as 'popular consciousness'.10 An im p o rtan t aspect of
the study of historical and collective m em ory is th e voice o f the storyteller; traditionally
this voice belongs to the group or people in p ow er w hereby versions of th e story may
differ to prom ote agendas and interests o f th e pow er holder. A com m on th e m e
throughout most analyses and definitions o f th e concept is th e plea to collective
m em ory, by a com m unity or individual, during tim es o f crisis and insecurity. Historical
m em ory is especially analyzed in light o f W W II. Scholars have analyzed th e ways the
events o f W W II have been rem em bered, debated, negotiated, and given meaning.
Collective m em ory can be divided betw een com m unicated m em ory, which refers to
orally com municated m em ory, and cultural m em ory, which can be in th e form o f texts,
art, architecture, and symbols th a t w ere created to re m em b e r the past.11
The study of collective or historical m em ory is also referred to by scholars in
different term s, such as: "public m em ory", "national m em ory", "vernacular m em ory",
and "counterm em ory".12 A t the center stage o f th e study o f historical, collective, and
cultural m em ory is the nation-state, from which m em ory is produced, reproduced, and
constructed in the form o f language, architecture, and m onum ents. These productions
and m emories by the powerful class w ere used in ensuring th e survival o f th e nation

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 182
12 Ibid, 181
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state, ideologies, and traditions.13 Closely tied to the study o f cultural and collective
m em ory is the study of identity in the social science to include cultural identity and
political identity; yet literature discussing th e link betw een m em ory and identity is rare.
W hile most scholars agree th a t identity is influenced by historical or collective m em ory,
academics insist on proof and facts in historical studies w hile historical events and
representations of the past are rem em bered d ifferently by individuals and groups;
therefore, posing a theoretical challenge in analyzing th e relationship betw een history
and m em ory.14
W hile discussing traum atic experiences, such as the Holocaust, Kansteiner
argues th a t traum a and repression in collective m em ory by survivors only shapes
national m em ory "if their vision meets w ith com patible social or political objectives and
inclinations among other im portant social groups, fo r instance, political elites or
parties".15 In other words, historical (individual) pasts can only be rem em bered in a
group setting when negotiated w ith an agenda th a t fits current (political and social)
interests.16 Further, collective m em ory, especially historically-based m em ory, involves
agency by individuals in negotiating m eaning o f th e past through shared com m unicative
practices. Such agency can result in collective m em ory o f small groups, entire
communities, nations, or larger geographic a re a s .17

13 ibid, 183
14 Ibid, 184
15 Ibid, 187
16 See also:Yael Zerubavel and Robin W agner-Pacifici, "Recovered Roots: Collective M e m o ry and the
Making of Israeli National Tradition," The American jo u rn a l o f sociology. 102, no. 1 (1996).
17 Kansteiner, "Finding M eaning in M em ory: A M ethodological Critique o f Collective M e m o ry Studies,"
189. The author here gives the example of a "European collective m em ory", referring back to works about

Again, th e exam ple of th e shared experiences about the Holocaust and W W II are
frequent subjects in collective m em ory analysis, as these m em ories have 'survived' tim e
and have been shaped collectively through individual m em ory in varying degrees.
Therefore, the events and history o f W W II have becom e part of a global dialogue,
shaping the identity, world view, culture, m em ory, and rhetoric o f individuals w ho m ay
not actually have a direct personal relationship w ith th e events.18 As such, th e study of
collective or historical m em ory directly aids in understanding and analyzing social
change w hile also providing knowledge and insight about discursive form ations and
limits to historical m em ory which have form ed lasting, continuous paradigms. W ith in a
theoretical fram ew ork, historical m em ory study is most often analyzed through a
constructivist understanding of history, positioning collective m em ory as th e
independent variable, or object, of study.
W hen analyzing how or if historical m em ory can shape the m indset o f citizens,
and ultim ately influence foreign policy, constructivism outlines th at "state behaviour is
first and forem ost shaped by th e particular set of norm ative and cognitive beliefs which
a society and its leaders hold about the nation, its role in th e international system, and
th e utility o f m ilitary force in the realisation o f national goals".19 Although ultim ately
providing a different prediction, the realist and (neo)liberal schools o f international

th e validity o f this concept by Luisa Passerini, The Question o f European Identity: A Cultural Historical
Approach. (Florence: European History Institute, 1998) and several others.
18 Ibid, 190
19 Thomas Berger, "The Past in th e Present: Historical M em o ry and Germ an National Security Policy "
German Politics 6, no. 1 (1997): 41.
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relations both assume th a t foreign policy is influenced and driven by "rational
calculations of objective national interests", outlined by international structures; not by
values and beliefs as the constructivist school would argue.20 W hile realists focus on th e
distribution of capabilities (i.e. m ilitary capabilities), neoliberals place value on the
power of international institutions to influence foreign policy and pursue national
interests; w hereby both schools accept th e view th a t state behavior changes w hen th e
international system or structure changes.21
Unlike realists and neoliberalists, constructivists argue th a t th e political culture
o f a particular nation, to include th e paths chosen to reach national goals, is "reflective
of the broader collective consciousness o f a n a tio n " .22 This political culture stems from
an institutionalized, continuous process o f rem em bering, analyzing, interpreting, and
understanding history. For Germ any, W W II posed a decisive event, first changing foreign
and security policy following the w ar, w hile having a lasting influence and shadow on
policy makers th a t continues to this day. The collective historical m em ory o f W W II
resulted in th e rejection o f traditional views tow ards pow er, m ilitary force, defense, and
security. The next chapter will elaborate on th e th re e theories com m only used to
analyze German foreign policy, w hile also introducing other fram ew orks to understand
th e complexity of Germ an foreign policy. Further, chapter tw o of this dissertation will
explain and define th e key concepts of rhetoric, historical m em ory, and application o f
these concepts to the study of Germ an foreign and security policy.

20 Ibid.
21
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The study of the influence of historic m em ory on Germ an foreign and security
policy and rhetoric is not new. Scholars have analyzed th e 'shadow o f th e past' and its
pow er to influence contem porary Germ an policies and behavior w hile continuing to
define German culture, beliefs, society, and norms. This observation, or phenom enon, is
d ifferent from other countries' conceptions and behaviors surrounding historic m em ory
as the intersections o f guilt and responsibility are conceptualized, processed, and
presented differently in countries such as Japan, th e United States (U.S.), and Russia.
The historic m em ory about Germany's Nazi past directly shapes the Germ an mindset,
identity, and consciousness of not only th e Germ an people but the international
com m unity as a whole. W hen analyzing and discussing historical m em ory and G erm any,
th e issue areas most prom inently exam ined w ithin the academic debates surround
foreign policy, national security, out of area operations, and the use o f force. Germ any's
slow but evident changes since th e end of th e Cold W a r are viewed and analyzed in
term s of Germany becoming a 'norm al' actor. W hile realist and liberal scholars place no
value on the influence of historical m em ory on foreign policy, instead arguing th a t state
behavior changes with the changing structure, scholars w ithin the constructivist school
emphasize the im portance of norm ative beliefs on a state's and society's behavior.
Germany's defense and security culture can be separated into tw o , perhaps
three, distinctive periods, all m arked by changes w ithin the international system:
Germany's defense culture im m ediately follow ing W W II, Germany's defense culture
afte r th e Cold W ar, and perhaps th e defense culture observed after th e S eptem ber 11
attacks through the present. W hile subtle changes have occurred throughout these
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periods, scholars w ho do not focus th e ir analysis on th e impact o f historical m em ory
have instead attem pted to analyze, predict, and understand Germ an foreign policy
theoretically. These analyses have been grouped under th e puzzle o f 'change and
continuity', focusing on th e observation th a t aspects o f Germany's foreign and security
policy (and rhetoric) have rem ained the same as changes in the system occurred. W hile
this observation is partially correct, liberalism and realism fail to fully predict and explain
this puzzle by om itting the im portance of norms and historical m em ory. Thom as Berger
most prom inently discussed this im portance and argued th a t while observable changes
occurred in 1 989-1991, w ith an increased freed o m to shape and influence its
environm ent, G erm any has also staunchly preserved th e 'new ly' adapted m ilitary
culture values of the post W W II area to include m ultilateralism , antim ilitarism , and
aspects of civilian pow er w hile considering the influence o f Germ any's dom estic
society.23 Scholars th erefore argue th a t historical m em ory w ill continue to shape
German ideas and perceptions of th e international environm ent, and act and change
accordingly w hile defining its national interests.
Although the concept o f historical m em ory is som etim es used as a blanket
statem ent to account or explain Germ an behavior, the te rm 'historical m em ory' itself, in
scholarly debate and analyses and fo r this dissertation, directly corresponds to
Germany's adopted values and norms tow ards security and defense policy during th e
reconstruction period following W W II. These values and norms, initially articulated and
used in rhetoric, have entrenched them selves into th e G erm an m indset and have

23 Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical M em ory and Germ an National Security Policy " 56.
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become a socially learned norm shared am ong Germ an society and political actors. This
mindset extends to ideas about the expansion and reconstruction o f th e Bundeswehr
and Germany's security role abroad w hile considering Germany's responsibility to its
allies and obligation towards th e cause o f peace.24 Historically, G erm any foreign and
security policies have been greatly influence by Germ any's geopolitical position w ithin
Europe. After W W II, Germany's security policies und erw en t radical changes shaped by
m ultilateral cooperation, focused on economic grow th, and above all, a desire to show
the international com munity th a t G erm any had abandoned its Sonderweg. These
changes in policy are evident through th e core principles of 'never again', 'never alone',
and 'through peaceful means'; collectively comprising Germany's post W W II culture of
restraint. Perhaps most prom inently, 'never again' reflected Germ any's co m m itm en t to
pacifism and com plete rejection of th e m ilitarization o f its foreign policy. This principle
m eant no more war, no more genocide, and no m ore hum an rights abuses, and was
reflected through several legal, political and constitutional statues.25 Further, G erm any
relinquished acquisition of nuclear w eapons, joining the N onproliferation Treaty (NPT)
while also accepting further restriction on which conventional weapons could be
developed by Germany.
Germany's unilateral Nazi past, and rejection th ereo f, is reflected in th e 'never
alone' principle, pointing to a continued co m m itm en t to m ultilateralism and integration.
W hile Germany received sovereignty in 1955, the postw ar constraints placed upon th e

24 "The Past in the Present: Historical M em o ry and Germ an National Security Policy " 54.
25 Hanns Maull, "Germany and th e Use o f Force: Still a ’Civilian Pow er1?," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 66.
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German military simultaneously ensured an American security umbrella and a contained
W est German and Bundeswehr under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
com m and.26 The values and norms taken from 'n ever alone' further translate into a
com plete rejection of military interventions not sanctioned and legitim ized by
international institutions, such as the UNSC and NATO. 'Through peaceful means'
emphasizes Germany's focus on diplom atic approaches to foreign and security policy
and further points to Germany's opposition for m ilitary options and th e use o f force.
During the Cold W ar, this translated into a "delicate, highly complex and dynamic
strategy of war-avoidance through nuclear deterrence" w ith the Am erican-G erm an
security relationship.27 Through Germ an diplom atic efforts, such as Ostopolitik, tensions
betw een the blocs reduced. The th re e core principles have guided G erm any foreign and
security policies during the Cold W a r and continue to shape Germany's approach to
international relations. The values and norms articulated through these principles
influenced and defined Germany's interests, identity, and foreign and security policy
objectives. Historical memory, a t th e core o f these principles, points to the critical
intersection of guilt and th e projection of pow er, m em ory and responsibility, and
com m itm ent and practical ability.
Historical m em ory is view ed as deeply im bedded in G erm an culture and identity,
thus difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is ritualized and
perpetuated in German foreign and security policy. W hile historical or collective

26 "Germany and the Use o f Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 67.
27 "Germany and the Use o f Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 69.
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m em ory is sometimes used broadly w ithin contem porary analysis, scholars w ithin th e
field of international relations explain th a t using an approach based on cultural and
historical analysis will uncover the political reasoning th a t eventually led to constructing
th e behavior, beliefs, and institutions th a t contributed to Germany's antim ilitarist
culture emerging a fte r W W II and continuing into contem porary policy.28 Authors predict
th a t Germ any will continue to adhere to its already established pattern o f behavior
unless a "major shock", such as an ending o f Germany's alliance system, occurs;
however, even in such a case, Germ any's behavior w ould not align w ith th e structuralist
approach prediction of rational behavior.29
W hile also emphasizing the im portance o f history fo r Germany's foreign and
security policy, scholars argue th a t Germ an historical m em ory contributed to role
conflicts. Stepping away from th e norm alization debate about Germ any in international
relations, Germ any has placed "its rhetorical com m itm en t to exercising a leadership role
and its practical ability to deliver such, especially in term s of m ilitary in tervention ism ".30
The renunciation of the past m arked th e m ajority o f Germ any's post W W II
reconstructive period, em bedding itself into G erm an identity and culture. During this
period (1945-1989), Germany established much o f w h a t is now referred to th e as th e
'civilian pow er' concept, focusing on a "value-based" foreign policy m odel, w ith a strong
com m itm ent to m ultilateral approaches and national interests based m ainly on an

28 Thomas Berger, Cultures o f Antim ilitarism : N a tio n a l Security in G erm any and Japan (Baltim ore: Johns
Hopkins, 1998), 7.
29 "The Past in the Present: Historical M em ory and German National Security Policy " 56.
30 Steve Marsh, "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade o f Post-Cold W a r Germ an
Foreign and Security Policy 1," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3, no. 3 (2002): 389.
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overall acceptance of its allies and international com m unity.31 M ost prom inently, th e
concepts of 'never alone' and 'never again' paved the way fo r norms-based approaches
to out o f area operations and m ilitary actions, w hile an emphasis on collective identity,
rather than national identity, allow ed G erm any to align its interests w ith those o f
Europe.
These "historically socialized" principles and preferences of G erm an foreign
policy no longer com pletely aligned w ith G erm an national interests a fte r the end o f the
Cold W ar, yet the rhetoric continued to be based on com m itm ents to m ultilateral
approaches.32 Subtle changes w ere observed in th e late 1990s with Chancellor
Schroder's statem ents about Germ any's national self-interests and in th e economic
realm, but ultim ately Germany's overall foreign policies rem ained tru e to its initially
reconstructed principles. Scholars detail how these traditional values continued past the
structural changes of the end o f th e Cold W a r by analyzing Germ any's key post-Cold
W a r relationships and its checkbook policy and role. The disjuncture betw een
Germany's adherence to its norm -based approaches in th e past, and th e changing
climate of the international system, became evident w ith Germany's refusal to use force
and participate as a responsible actor and exporter of security alongside NATO, th e EU,
and the U.S. Germany's involvem ent in Kosovo was view ed as Germany's change

31 "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade o f Post-Cold W a r German Foreign and Security
Policy 1," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3, no. 3 (2002): 391.
32 "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade o f Post-Cold W a r German Foreign and Security
Policy 1," 394.
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towards a 'norm al' actor, and analyses by scholars w ithin th e field o f international
relations began the norm alization debates.
Perhaps the initial and radical change observed in Germ any's foreign and
security policy in the Kosovo case, which also critically reinterpreted Germany's
attachm ent to th e 'never again w ar' concept, enabled scholars and politicians to
question Germany's role as an international actor. The changes and policies expected of
Germany following Kosovo simply did not align w ith Germany's continuous guidance by
historical m em ory, therefore allowing som ew hat 'inconsistent policies'. Further, the
im portance and impact o f historical m em ory was certainly placed upon G erm any by the
international com munity im m ediately follow ing reunification, generally in rhetorical
discussions by the international com m unity m arked by undertones o f mistrust and
m ention o f th e 'German Q uestion'.33 Furtherm ore, w hile historical m em ory shapes
German foreign policy, and Germany's fu tu re path and place in Europe; domestic
politics w ere and continue to be highly influenced by history. Specifically, th e 1998
Walser-Bubis debate and the 1999 Ostermarsche, both events directly corresponding to
th e intersections of guilt, rem em brance, and normalcy, can be seen as an exam ple of
th e continued influence o f historical m e m o ry.34 The red-green governm ent's break fro m
Cold W a r policies, along w ith rhetorical breaks from Germ any's international and
national interests, resulted in push backs from scholars as w ell as th e international
com m unity; responses which can be contributed to historical legacies and m em ories. It

33 Ibid, 405.
34 Ibid, 406.
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is th erefore evident th a t historical and collective m em ory has an im pact on both
Germ any as a nation, inclusive of its dom estic culture and outw ard foreign policies, as
well as th e international com m unity's view of G erm any and reaction to Germ any's
behavior following unification.
The expectations of G erm any by th e international com m unity a fte r unification to
contribute and com m it to m ultilateral efforts beyond FRG's checkbook diplom acy and
Germany's national interests at th e tim e produced a dilem m a and responsibility which
Germ any was unable to fulfill, thus impacting Germ any's credibility.35 Scholars
contributing to this debate also detail Germ any's Bundeswehr reform , specifically th e
von Weizsacker Commission report and initial post-Cold W a r interventionism as
examples of observed changes. Despite th e possibility of these reform s to change
Germany's participation and com m itm en t in m ultilateral approaches, historical m em ory
severely influenced such progress in term s o f "defense expenditure, th e mismatch
betw een promises and com m itm ents, and th e nature o f th e reforms them selves".36
Similarly, John Duffield, discussing structural realists' prediction and advocacy of
building nuclear weapons, argues th a t historical m em ory prevents any rejection of
institutionally learned principles and desire to civilize the Bundeswehr.37
W hile the use o f force analysis a fte r Germ any's involvem ent in Kosovo
dom inated the academic debates, th e past tw e n ty years prove th a t no substantial shifts

35 Ibid, 407.
36 Ibid, 408. Defense budged halved from 1990 to 2 0 0 0 to around 1.4 percent o f th e GDP
37 John S. Duffield, "German Security Policy a fte r Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint,"
Contemporary Security Policy 15, no. 3 (1994): 179.
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in Germany's attitude tow ards the use o f force have occurred. "M oral im perative"
continues to trum p national interests in policies regarding out of area operations as well
as constitutional constraints, dom estic influence, and continuous rhetorical references
to th e past.38 Germany's progress has been influenced and dictated by historical
m em ory and socially learned norms; policies adopted during the Federal Republic of
Germ any (FRG) have transcended well beyond unification.39 Germany's past has
em erged in contem porary policies and rhetoric, both fro m w ithin G erm any as w ell as
th e international com munity, often using history as a stark rem inder fo r controversial
policy areas. W hile Germany's national interests have changed, from Germ any's
traditional relationship and alliances to global orientations and especially Germ any's
trade relationships, Germany's foreign policy rhetoric has rem ained mostly the same.
Expectations o f Germ any w ere not m et w ith increased responsibility physically, but
rather history and historic m em ory have proven to be a burden in Germ any's progress
tow ards change, while reminders o f Germ any's troublesom e past continue to be used
for and against Germany and G erm an foreign and security policy.40
Combing aspects of the norm alization debate surrounding th e concept o f pow er
in German foreign policy w hile viewing change through a historical m em ory lens,

38 Marsh, "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade o f Post-Cold W a r Germ an Foreign and
Security Policy 1," 412.
39 W hile FRG remains th e official name o f G erm any since 1949, th e abbreviation is commonly used to
describe Germany's history as W est Germany, from 1949 until 1990.
40 Ibid, 414. The author, quoting P.V. Jakobsen explains th a t th e international com m unity rem ained
unwilling to bestow 'norm al' status upon Germany, instead realizing th a t "Beating Germ any over th e head
with her past or questioning her loyalty to th e W est w ith Drang nach Osten rhetoric worked well....w hen
they wanted to persuade her to back down from policies they disliked" For more, see P.V. Jakobsen,
'M yth-m aking and Germany's Unilateral Recognition o f Croatia and Slovenia', European Security 4 (1995):
411
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Markovits and Reich examine the im pact o f collective m em ory on Germ an foreign policy
by providing a detailed m em ory m ap containing 'm em ory clusters', or historically
separated events. These clusters are m ore prom inently analyzed a fte r 1945 and detail
how m em ory, culture, and identity e n te r th e foreign policy arena. The authors argue
th at a principal collective m em ory exists in contem porary Germ any which continues to
influence and shape in which fra m ew o rk policies are fo rm u lated .41 As discussed earlier,
this is a general challenge, or contestation, to structural approaches which focus on the
influence o f pow er relations. The norm alization debate, which is separate from scholars
discussing change and continuity in G erm an foreign and security policy, enters analyses
about the influence of historical m em ory w hen exam ining th e changes from th e Bonn to
th e Berlin Republic. W hile G erm any was 'not norm al' im m ediately in 1989, analysts
began to debate and examine Germ an behavior parallel to norm al action in the early
1990s in light of Bundeswehr reform and G erm an troop deploym ent.42
The early 1990s w ere marked by changes tow ards a more capable, responsible
Germany, evident by statem ents o f Germ any's Foreign M inister Klaus Kinkel w ho
explained, "Making Germany a p artner capable o f assuming a full range o f duties is a
priority task aimed at providing fo r th e futu re. O ur citizens understand th a t the tim e
when we w ere in an exceptional situation is over. W e have no need to dem onstrate our
ability for norm ality both at home and abroad if w e do not w an t to sustain severe

41 Andrei S. Markovits et al., "The Contem porary Power o f M em ory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign
Policy," Communication Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 89.
42 "The Contemporary Power of Mem ory: The Dilemmas fo r German Foreign Policy," Communication
Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 91.
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political dam age."43 As Germ any was becom ing m ore norm al, scholars argued th a t
Germ an leaders should th erefore act according to realist assumptions.44 The academic
debate, at this tim e, was dom inated by questions as to Germany's potential future
trajectory and use of power, w hile fe w took into consideration the im portance o f th e
historical m em ory-identity-foreign policy nexus.45 Historical or collective m em ory, which
also informs ideology, contributes to understanding and explaining Germ an foreign
policy choices. The norms and values, inform ed by historical m em ory, w ere
institutionalized by Germany, thus creating a social learning process which changed
societal m em ory and practices and contributed to Germ an national identity.

POWER AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
In order to put into context Germ any's foreign and security behavior, th e use of
pow er has to be analyzed as w ell. Especially a fte r Kosovo, scholars began to deb ate
Germany's status as a normal actor w ithin a civilian pow er fram ew ork, most
prom inently outlined by Hanns M aull. Germ any's identity as a 'civilian pow er' m ean t a
continuous prom otion of m ultilateralism , integration, institution building, and to
contain th e use of force by advocating international law and norms.46 G erm any, as a
'tam ed pow er' though institutional constraints has aligned its interests and developed

43 Ibid, 91. Klaus Kinkel (1993). Responsibility, realism: Providing fo r the future German foreign policy in a
world undergoing a process of restructuring. S tatem ents an d Speeches, XVI, 5. New York: Germ an
Inform ation Center.
44 At the tim e these arguments w ere first m ade in 1997, this was not th e case. W h e th e r G erm any is acting
"m ore realist" in its current foreign policy choices is a central debate of this dissertation
45 Markovits e t al., "The Contemporary Power o f M em ory: The Dilemmas fo r German Foreign Policy."
46 M aull, "Germany and th e Use o f Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 56.

its political identity parallel to the integration o f Europe. W hile G erm any participated in
th e Kosovo W ar, which sparked scholarly debate over Germ any's status as a 'civilian
power', analysts argue th a t Germany's behavior and policies during th e arm ed conflict
reflected the principles o f a civilian pow er state, emphasizing Germ any's involvem ent
based on hum anitarian assistance. Throughout th e conflict, Germ any took in th e
m ajority of the refugees and led th e dialogues to reconstruct the area w hile
strengthening alliance solidarity.47 The 'norm alization' d e b ate about G erm any's use of
power and foreign and security policy began w ith G erm any's presumed change and shift
in policy and apparent deviation from previously held approaches.
Scholars in the field analyze Germ any's path tow ard normalcy by examining
w h ether Germany acts according to its level of pow er. Here, the assumption is th a t as
Germany's pow er has increased due to unification and changes in the system, changes
in Germany's national interests should follow . According to some scholars, due to the
restraints of responsibility, a lack o f understanding in defining its national interests, and
its power, Germ an foreign policy will not be 'n o rm a l'.48 Scholars also point to th e
rhetorical promises made by Germ any which w ere not m et w ith political action. Instead,
scholars point to Germany's use o f 'soft balancing' approaches in order to influence th e
international environm ent.

47 "Germany and th e Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian Pow er1?."
48 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpoiitik D er Bundesrepublik Deutschland: W eltm acht W ider Wilier? (Berlin,
Germany: Ullstein, 1997).
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Soft Balancing
Soft balancing is a relatively new addition to the balance o f p o w er theory,
defined by non-m ilitary forms of intervention or balancing evident since th e end of th e
Cold W ar, but more specifically since th e 2003 invasion of Iraq. W ithin th e literatu re
surrounding the balance o f pow er, soft balancing is discussed in connection w ith hard
balancing and bandwagoning. The concept itself has sparked a debate w ithin th e field in
term s o f its validity as an actual theory. Several political actions and policies by th e EU to
balance U.S. hegemonic pow er have been described as soft balancing practices;
however, other authors in the field have dismissed such claims stating th a t th e
reasoning behind certain policies are not m eant to balance th e U.S. as th e EU is
attem pting to build an alliance partnership.
T.V. Paul argues th a t since th e end o f the Cold W ar, second tie r m ajor powers
have pursued indirect balancing through diplom atic bargaining "intended to constrain
U.S. power" which constitutes soft balancing.49 O ne o f th e most pow erful tools is th e
veto pow er states hold in the UN Security Council which could deny legitim acy during
U.S. led interventions. The author also outlines specific conditions under w hich soft
balancing occurs:50
(1) the hegemon's power position and m ilitary behavior are o f growing concern
but do not yet pose a serious challenge to sovereignty of second tie r powers; (2)
the dom inant state is a m ajor source o f public goods in both th e econom ic and
security areas th at cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the d o m in an t state cannot

49 T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in th e Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 58.
50 These conditions w ere first introduced in T.V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms o f Balance of
Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevant,' in Paul, W irtz, and Fortmann, Balance o f Power, pp. 125.
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easily retaliate either because th e balancing efforts o f others are not overt or
because they do not directly challenge its pow er position w ith m ilitary means.
W hile pursuing soft balancing, second tie r states could engage th e hegem on and
develop institutional links w ith it to w ard o ff possible retaliatory actions.51
Soft balancing has become a strategy specifically observed during th e past ten
years when second tie r powers challenged th e legitimacy o f U.S. policies, not only
internationally but also by influencing U.S. dom estic public opinion. This also affects the
legitimacy of hum anitarian interventions as these missions w arrant the approval of th e
United Nations or other m ultilateral institutions. For exam ple, the invasion o f Iraq in
2 0 0 2 /3 can be seen as a soft-balancing e ffo rt. The veto stages during the U nited Nation
Security Council debates constitutes a soft balancing act at th e diplom atic level resulting
in th e invasion by the U.S. w ith o u t international approval and legitimacy. During the
events leading up to the invasion, France, Germ any, Russia, and China dem anded
additional tim e for the weapons inspections, and argued in fro n t of th e Security Council.
Germ any and France also used NATO to block the U.S.'s a tte m p t to use th e alliance in
th e invasion, therefo re engaging in soft balancing tactics. Throughout this process,
France and G erm any w ere the most outspoken, but France's position m irrored th a t o f
its own foreign policy w ith a goal of a m ultipolar system "in which Europe acts as a pole
to balance against th e U.S."52
According to scholars, Germ any has engaged in soft balancing measures by using
international institutions such as th e UN Security Council, NATO, and th e EU, to restrain
U.S. power. Despite m ajor opposition by second tie r m ajor powers, th e invasion o f Iraq

51 Paul, "Soft Balancing in th e Age o f U.S. Primacy."
52 Ibid, 67.
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by the U.S. did not result in hard balancing against the U.S.; how ever, th e soft balancing
practices employed Germany and oth er countries m ake it difficult fo r th e U.S. to gain
peacekeeping personnel and support. Soft balancing efforts resulted in a unanimous
approval of UN resolution 1 5 4 6 /2 0 0 4 which outlined th a t th e U.S. would end its
occupation o f Iraq before June 30, 2 0 0 4 .53 On th e other hand, other security scholars
directly question the concept o f soft balancing, stating th a t th e soft balancing argum ent
has "no traction".54
The soft balancing argum ent initially became known at the end o f th e 1990s
when scholars articulated the difference betw een the traditional balancing involving
m ilitary action and th e softer form s of balancing.55 W hile analyzing th e policies o f
Germ any, France, and Russia in regards to Iraq, proponents o f the soft balancing
approach argued th at the purpose was to "constrain Am erican pow er, now liberated
from the ropes of bipolarity."56 The soft balancing argum ent combines aspects of
Kenneth W altz's structural theory and Stephen W alt's theory, and, according to o ther
scholars, has to be linked to show a causal relationship to th e systemic pow er o f th e U.S.
Soft balancing measures should be aim ed at implicating U.S. capabilities ra th e r than
simply aggravating U.S. policies, otherw ise the argum ent itself becomes illogical. The

53 Ibid, 70.
54 Robert J. Art et al., "Striking th e Balance (Correspondence)," In ternatio n al Security 30, no. 3 (2005): 106.
O ther authors who have extensively discussed soft balancing and have been reviewed but not directly
included in this research paper are: Robert A. Pape "Soft Balancing: How States Pursue Security in a
Unipolar W orld", annual meeting of th e American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois,
September 5, 2004; Stephen M . W alt, "Keeping th e W orld O ff Balance," in Ikenberry, America Unrivaled
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
55 The authors cited early work byJoffe and W a lt which included Josef Joffe, "Defying History and Theory:
The United States as the 'Last Superpower,'" in Ikenberry, American Unrivaled.
56 Originally cited in Joffe, "Gulliver Unbouond."
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soft balancing argum ent is continuously placed, by all authors, into a greater debate
surrounding the application of balance o f pow er th eo ry and the current international
system. Authors w ho argue against th e validity o f the soft-balancing approach point to
the lack of transparency by governm ents in regards to decision making processes in
foreign policy m atters.57 The soft balancing argum ent has also been used to explain EU
defense cooperation and defense policies, yet th e increased EU m ilitary capability is also
due to the U.S.'s decreased presence in Europe. In regards to the invasion o f Iraq and
opposition by states to the U.S. position, some scholars argue that th e soft balancing
argum ent misinterprets and oversimplifies w h a t actually happened. According to some
authors, the positions taken by Germ any, France, Turkey, and Russia can be explained
based upon policy preferences and dom estic and European politics, not stem m ing from
th e power of the U.S. Further, an argum ent is m ade for th e Iraq case in regards to
bargaining, rather than soft balancing. A distinction has to be made betw een policy
bargaining and normal diplom atic friction; "Policy bargaining" refers to behavior
designed to obtain th e best outcom e fo r a state on a given issue or set of issues by
deploying the most effective m anner to th e pow er assets th a t the state currently
possesses. "Balancing" refers to behavior designed to create a b etter range o f outcom es
for state vis-a-vis another state or coalition o f states by adding to th e p ow er assets a t its
disposal, in an a tte m p t to offset or diminish th e advantages enjoyed by th a t o th e r state
or coalition.58 Assets include m ilitary forces, economic pow er, form al and inform al

57 Brooks & W ohlforth here refer to France, Russia, and China.
58 Art et al., "Striking the Balance (Correspondence)," 184.
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alliances, and voting and veto pow er in international organizations, w h ereb y th e first
three are considered hard assets and th e last tw o soft assets. Therefore, w hen th e first
three are used it constitutes hard balancing; the last tw o , soft balancing.

IDENTITY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND EU EXPANSION
German identity since the end of W W II was developed and constructed parallel
to European identity, as G erm any was the driving force behind integration; aligning its
national interests w ith the goals and interests o f Europe. This alignm ent has resulted in
Germany being called "The Good European" in scholarly analysis. Identity and culture
certainly influence domestic and international politics, and it is th e re fo re im portan t to
include identity construction and European identity in order to understand and explain
Germ an foreign policy choices.
First, a distinction has to be m ade fo r the term s "Europe" and "European Union".
W hen referring to "Europe" or "European", especially in the political sense, "Europe"
here implies a collective action by an organization, different from individual national
actions. The European Commission's m ap includes 34 European countries (not including
Turkey or the Ukraine) while the European Union consists of 27 m em ber states, some
other lists even count 40 states.59 Identities are ever changing with interests,
preferences, and loyalties, and can be view ed in relation to others as w ell as a sense of

59 James A. Caporaso, "The Possibilities o f a European Identity,” Brown Journal o f W orld A ffairs 12, no. 1
(2005).
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belonging to a society. This means th a t "identities are less concrete than interests but
m ore substantial than preferences" in th a t interests have no real existence separate
from our collective understanding o f th e m .60. Preferences differ from identity as
preferences can change quickly. Further, an individual can have several identities nested
w ithin another; fo r example "I am a Rhinelander, a G erm an, and a European " 61
In order to analyze identity w ithin a European context, the concept o f dem ocracy
has to be considered and analyzed. Further, a com m on identity am ong the governed is
necessary in order for democratic form s of governm ent to work; how ever, some
scholars argue th at democracy in all o f Europe is impossible as no 'tru e ' European
identity exists. Several factors contribute th e construction o f the 'n ew ' European
identity, to include the completion o f a single m arket and European M o n e ta ry Union
(EM U), the Single European Act, and th e M aastricht Treaty which resulted o f a
borderless union with freedom o f th e m ovem ent o f goods, services, and capital. Beyond
this, th e EU has a flag, symbol, m otto, and hymn. The question here rem ains w h e th e r
fu rth er integration requires a com mon European identity.
A nother common way to construct identity is by identifying "the o ther". Recent
debates within identity studies show th a t this 'o th er' is no longer th e Soviet Union, but
has become the U.S. Despite U.S. support of th e European project since th e end of
W W II, the U.S. has been an economic com petitor to the EU. Further, th e U.S. and th e EU

60 Ibid, 66. The author here uses th e theoretical fram ew ork used by Thom as Risse in "European
Institutions and Identity Change: W h at have we learned?" in Richard Herm ann, Thomas Risse, and M arylin
Brewer, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield,
2004), p. 148.
61 Caporaso, "The Possibilities o f a European Identity," 67.
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are different in m ilitary capabilities, political structures, and ideological opposition over
the International Criminal Court (ICC), capital punishm ent, th e Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the Kyoto Treaty, and th e Iraq w a r.62 Such differences have been particularly
evident since Septem ber 11th and the positions held by th e EU and th e U.S. in regards
to M iddle East policies surrounding Israel and Palestine.
W h at is Europe and who does th e EU claim to represent? These questions com e
up in conjunction w ith scholarly analysis about enlargem ent and integration. The most
recent EU enlargem ent has created a golden curtain divide betw een a W est o f "w ealth,
affluence, a large middle class, democracy, hope, progress, th e Enlightenm ent,
Christianity, human rights, and civilization" whereas to th e East in Russia, Ukraine, and
Central Asia lies "poverty, backwardness, authoritarianism , stagnation, grayness, lack of
hope, Orthodoxy, often dismal human rights record, and lack of civilization".63 Although
the EU m em bership criteria was laid out in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, it appears th a t
another crucial criteria has become an im portant aspect in enlargem ent policies:
culture, identity, and, essentially "Europeaness". How do w e define Europe? W h a t is
Europe and w ho is allowed to call themselves European? Scholars discuss th e question
of legitimacy and justification w ithin the EU's enlargem ent policy. From these analyses,
three different analytical reasons can be draw n to explain enlargem ent: pragmatic,

62 Ibid, 72.
63 Howard W iarda, "W here Does Europe End Now? Expanding Europe's Frontiers and th e Dilem mas of
Enlargement and Identity," Brown Journal o f W orld Affairs 12, no. 1 (2005): 90.Also adopted from Samuel
Huntington's Clash o f Civilizations
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ethical-political, and m oral.64 The pragm atic explanation here refers to th e approach
w here policy is justified by the result of expected outcom e (utility based calculations);
th e ethical-political approach relies on th e idea o f a "collective us" and the values
attributed to a given comm unity; the m oral approach w ould justify enlargem ent based
on universal standards of justice.65
W hen considering European identity and analyzing th e rhetoric used by
politicians in discussions tow ards EU m em bership applicants, arguments can be grouped
on either rights-based approaches, referring back to th e Copenhagen Criteria, or value
based approaches, referring to cultural and identity factors. This is particularly tru e in
th e case o f Turkey; cultural arguments brought forth against Turkish accession suggests
th a t due to religion, history, and tradition, Turkey does not pass as 'European'. The
Germ an Christian Democrats (CDU) and th e Austrians, along with several political
leaders in France, have argued fo r a privileged partnership agreem ent betw een th e EU
and Turkey instead. The British, to include a very outspoken Tony Blair, have been in
favor o f granting Turkey EU m em bership. The im portance o f identity as an explanatory
variable has been analyzed by scholars in both international relations as w ell as
psychology, and is interesting to consider when using G erm any as a case study. W hile
G erm an identity is certainly unique, Germ any has constructed its goals and interests in
line w ith those of the EU in the past. G erm an identity is fu rth e r complicated as patriotic
feelings have been suppressed and view ed negatively due to Germany's Nazi past.

64 Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand?: The Question o f Legitimacy and Justification in th e Eu's Enlargement
Policy.," Journal o f Common M a rk e t Studies 4 0 (2002).
65 Ibid, 494.
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Symbolisms of Germ an specific identity are th e re fo re difficult to pinpoint in present
times; flags, anthem s, and patriotic behavior most likely occur during sporting events
and are com pletely absent in daily activities. Despite this, identity has been used w idely
as a variable th a t influences foreign policy behavior.
Social Identity Theory (SIT) has been used to show th a t identity is th e most
im portant factor th a t influences policies which eith er oppose or support EU
enlargem ent. According to SIT, identity is th e explanatory variable in understanding
policy preferences tow ard applicant countries.66 M o re specifically, SIT has been applied
to analyze the mechanism of identity and rhetoric used by Germ any, France, and G reat
Britain in the case of Turkey. Here, decision makers' support for or against accession in
1999, 2002, and 2005 is exam ined. The study showed th a t th e traditional th e o ry of
rationalism currently used to explain EU expansion has not sufficiently addressed
enlargem ent comprehensively.67
In the literature, expansion is often explained by w ay of cost-benefit analysis
from economic standpoints. Some authors analyze EU enlargem ent from a m ore
constructivist standpoint o f m em ber states' understanding o f applicant states' identity
and how such applicant states fit into th e ir own identity. This debate has been coined
th e "great debate" within EU expansion as th e relationship betw een rhetorical action

66 Tyler M . Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3
(2009).The author also discusses other aspect o f social psychology and its focus on th e scientific study o f
human behavior. For more on this, see Michael A. Hogg and Daniel Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social
Psychology o f Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London: Routlege, 1988).
67 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 649.
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and identity is exam ined.68 According to th e SIT, individuals w ith a strong group identity
are inclined to oppose applicants based on "identity and likeness to the group" whereas
individuals with a w eak group identity are supportive o f allowing new applicants as long
as they m eet m em bership criteria.69 Using SIT to exam ine EU enlargem ent and
Germany's response and behavior, scholars a tte m p t to com bine th e shortcomings o f the
constructivist approach by supplem enting aspects o f th e rational approach and
emphasizing Alexander W endt's idea th a t "identities are th e basis o f interests" in
regards to EU enlargem ent and policy preferences.70
The rationalist approach tow ards assessing foreign policy choices assumes th a t
actions are taken in order to produce th e best outcom es, treading individuals as the
basic units of the analysis. W ithin rational choice theory, utility is defined in m aterial
term s, which would result in an argum ent th a t EU decision makers would prefer
candidates whose m em bership would bring th e most security and econom ic gains in the
future. The inclusion o f the identity variable in regards to foreign policy choices of
decision makers then allows for an analysis of motives and influence fo r EU
enlargem ent. W hen considering Germ any's behavior tow ards Turkey's EU m em bership
application in term s of national vs. group identity, differences from Britain's and
France's national identity are distinct.

68 Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and th e Eastern Enlargement
o f th e European Union.”
69 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 650.
70 Alexander W endt, "Anarchy Is W h at States M ake o f It: The Social Construction o f Pow er Politics,"
International Organization, no. 2 (1992): 398.
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Germany's national identity has been reconstructed to overcom e th e
nationalistic Nazi past of W W II. Germ any's new identity, however, is not necessarily a
direct result of EU integration, but rather com plem entary, overcoming "the other" and
"a failed past" w hile building a "civilian pow er" w ithin th e fram ew ork o f the EU.71 Policy
makers w ithin Germany have supported fu rth er integration, which has included support
of the single currency. For exam ple, w hen analyzing Germ any's position on Turkey's
membership application, rhetoric shows th a t Gerhard Schroder was strongly supportive
of granting membership in hopes o f creating a relationship th a t would overlook identity,
cultural, and religious differences betw een Turkey and Europe. Despite Angela M erkel's
ties to the German Christian Dem ocrats (CDU), which does not support accession
negotiations w ith Turkey, the Germ an Chancellor has stated th at she will continue EUTurkey talks.72 Germ an identity is based on a variety o f constructs, shaped and
influenced by historical m em ory. For over seventy years, Germ any has balanced the
delicate relationship betw een guilt and responsibility, especially in regards to foreign
policy. W hile portraying th e role of a security exporter on one hand, G erm any also held
on to its culture of restraint in both political rhetoric and action.

Summary
This chapter has outlined im portant concepts in o rd e r to understand Germ an
foreign and security policy. Political rhetoric in G erm any is an im portant instrum ent

71 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 658.
72 Ibid, 658. Curley also analyzes statem ents by Germ an foreign M inister Joschka Fischer in 2005.
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used to explain, justify, and show G erm any's actions, w hile historical m em ory form s the
basis of my argum ent in this dissertation. M o re specifically, the cases exam ined later
within this dissertation detail how and w hen historical m em ory enters Germ an rhetoric
w hile explaining in which ways historical m em ory shapes th e course of G erm an foreign
policy behavior. The im portance of pow er in international relations is a theoretical
given. The increase in Germany's pow er, both economically and w ithin an institutional
setting, especially after unification, shows th a t G erm any has not developed a distinct
political identity th at accounts fo r this increase in pow er. W hile Germ any's political
identity evolved parallel to EU enlargem ent, a distinctively complicated intersection of
power, guilt, and responsibility remains constant in Germ an foreign and security policy,
especially in light of Germany's changes in interests.
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CHAPTER III
EXPLAINING GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

INTRODUCTION
Before discussing specific theoretical applications and arguments to th e
exam ination and understanding o f Germ an foreign policy, it is im portant to define th e
three international relations theories used in th e analysis portion o f this dissertation to
understand German foreign and security policy: rhetoric, th e influence o f historical
m em ory, and the frameworks in which scholars position th e ir analyses and argum ents.
Structural realism or neorealism is used as a fram ew o rk o f analysis in order to provide a
systemic analysis of German foreign policy w ith a focus on pow er and m ilitary capability
to reach foreign policy goals. Liberalism, or Moravcsik's liberal theory o f international
politics, will aid in understanding how dom estic politics and institutions influence
foreign policy, w hile constructivism will provide a fra m ew o rk to incorporate and
emphasize how German foreign policy is shaped and constructed socially and
historically through identity, ideas, norms, and culture. Each theoretical fram ew o rk will
contribute to understanding and analyzing how or if historical m em ory influences
Germ an foreign policy choices and rhetoric during th e selected case studies and under
which lenses scholars analyze political culture in Germ any.
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Structural Realism
Kenneth W altz' theory o f neorealism focuses on international politics and
assumes th a t state behavior can be explained and understood by th e distribution of
pow er in the international system. Realism, a theory of international relations, makes
th ree major assumptions: 1. Actors are rational units w ithin an international structure of
anarchy; 2. State preferences are fixed and conflicting goals lead to continuous
bargaining among states;1 3. M a te rial capabilities influence state behavior.2 Neorealism
differs from classical realism, which is focused human nature, in th a t it is concerned
w ith the structure of th e international system. This structure is assumed to be anarchic
and perpetual conflicts among states exists. Further, pow er is measured in term s of
m ilitary and economic capabilities w hich determ ine the relationship am ong states.
In his influential article, Structural Realism a fte r the Cold W ar, th e author
defends the theory and addresses critics of th e theory w ho called fo r an end, or death,
o f realism. W altz stresses the im portance o f differentiating betw een "changes o f the
system" and "changes in th e system", w h ereby only th e fo rm e r would constitute an end
to realism.3 Changes in the international system are of particular im portance to th e
analysis of German foreign policy, as th e end of th e Cold W a r and G erm an unification
are both seen as changes w ithin th e system, which should then result in a changed
foreign policy objective or execution. Discussions on changes of the structure o f the
1 According to W altz, state "at a minimum, seek th eir own preservation and, at a m axim um , drive for
universal dom ination". Kenneth Neal W altz, Theory o f International Politics / Kenneth N. W altz (Boston,
Mass. : McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118.
2 Jeffrey W . Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security, no. 2 (1999):
14-18.
3 Kenneth N. W altz, "Structural Realism after th e Cold W ar," ibid.25, no. 1 (2000): 5.
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system versus changes at the unit level guide W altz' central questions in search of th e
factors th a t could change the international system and politics entirely, which,
according to the author, is unlikely despite influential factors such as th e spread of
democracy and international institutions. Realism, to W altz, remains th e "basic" theory
for international relations, accounting fo r both historic as w ell as current events, and
also predicting the future o f the international system. W altz structures his defense o f
realism by analyzing scholarly literature, com peting theories, and colleagues' claims,
while injecting historic facts and explanations. In regards to dem ocratic peace theory,
which assumes th a t democracies do not w age w ar against one another, W altz states
th a t it is easier to explain w ar than to analyze and understand the conditions under
which peace flourishes. Emphasizing th e changing international system which operates
w ith out guarantees of alliances (today's friend, to m o rro w 's enem y), W altz stands by his
early arguments of structural realism, which outline th e anarchic system and its survival
in the event of democratic states globally.4
W altz' criticism of dem ocratic peace theory, in support of structural realism,
continues when the author reviews th e effects o f interdependence, which he refers to
as "weak"; stating th a t "with zero interdependence, neither conflict nor w a r is possible.
W ith integration, international becomes national politics".5 This central argum ent
fu rth er sets up W altz' defense o f realism in conjunction w ith institutionalism and the
role of institutions in shaping international politics. Institutions, according to W altz,

4 Ibid, 10.
5 Ibid, 15
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have little effect on the international system. Using the case o f NATO, th e auth o r shows
th e difference in explaining international institutions and alliances through institutional
theory, differentiating betw een functions th a t fluctuate as structure changes. The end
of the cold w ar becomes part o f W altz' analysis, w hen he explains w hy institutions, such
as NATO, are still around despite the initial purpose fo r NATO appearing to be no longer
needed. Discussing the function o f NATO, and its purpose as a "vehicle fo r th e
application o f American pow er and vision to the security o rder in Europe", W altz
dismisses institutionalist interpretations and instead argues th a t "international
institutions serve prim arily national rather than international interests".6
One of th e central aspects o f realism, balance o f pow er theory, argues th a t
balancing against th e strongest state will occur eventually, although realist th e o ry is
unclear when such balancing will happen. W ith a focus on th e structure o f the
international system, W altz discusses th e potential of fu tu re great pow er candidates
such as Germ any and the EU, China, and Russia, adding th a t "for a country to choose
not to become a great power is a structural anom aly".7 Structural changes, such as th e
end of the Cold W ar, are then predicted to affect th e behavior of states and the foreign
policy choices m ade w ithout actually changing th e international system.8 A m ajo r fla w
of realist theory then is its ability to explain th e EU and how th e structural changes o f
going from a bipolar system to a m ultipolar system resulted in international institutions
and cooperation on the European continent. Similarly, realism cannot account fo r th e

6 Ibid, 20-21
7 Ibid, 33
8 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold W ar," 39.
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case of Germany: a great pow er econom ically but not in term s of m ilitary capability;
instead Germ any has adopted an anti-m ilitaristic political culture since th e end of
W W II.9 Critics of structural realism also point to th e absence o f balancing against th e
U.S. by European c o u n tries.10
Centrally positioned in neorealist theory is th e concept of anarchy and survival.
According to W altz, "In anarchy, security is th e highest end. Only if survival is assured
can states safely seek other goals as such as tranquility, profit, and p o w e r".11 Although
accepting W altz' system level theory, Keohane argues th a t th e structural definition o f
th e system itself excludes th e role institutions play in shaping and influencing th e
international system.12 O ther scholars also em phasize the shortcomings o f neorealism
and theory's ability to explain change in global politics, pointing to th e fallacy o f
presenting a theory as universally applicable. Reviewing and comparing neorealism and
historical materialism, scholars argue th a t both pay a tte n tio n to conflict w ith o u t
adequately including human practices.13 Overall, critics o f structural realism point to the
theory's denial o f the social basis and limits o f pow er, the lack of neorealism to account
for both change and continuity, and its failure to include history.

9 The case of Germany in regards to structural realism and theoretical applications will be fu rth e r
discussed within this chapter.
10 Although several scholars argue that balancing by European countries against th e U.S. has occurred
through soft balancing, such as Germany's and France's position during th e 2003 invasion o f Iraq.
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances o f Power " in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 127.
12 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 194.
13 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and W orld Orders " in Neorealism a n d Its Critics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 215.
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In a response to th e rising attractiveness o f institutional theories a fte r th e end of
th e Cold W ar, John M easheim er discusses and defines th e approach fo r th re e theories
th a t emphasize institutions as a crucial factor in prom oting word peace: liberal
institutionalism, collective security, and critical th e o ry .14 M earsheim er addresses th e
basis of disagreement betw een these approaches and realism, nam ely w h e th e r
institutions "affect the prospects o f international stability".15 Realists assume th a t
institutions are a reflection of th e distribution o f pow er, calculated by pow erful states,
and arise by calculated self-interest, w hereas institutionalists assume th a t institutions
can affect state behavior, are independent, and can directly influence w h e th e r states
pursue w ar.16 M earsheim er defines institutions as "a set o f rules th a t stipulate th e ways
in which states should cooperate and com pete w ith each other", outlining m utually
accepted and negotiated form s and laws of state behavior.17 To realists, th e
international environm ent is a continuous struggle fo r p ow er and security com petition,
therefore constraining cooperation b etw een states, w hereby the state is anarchic,
states have m ilitary capability and are uncertain about th e intentions o f o th e r states,
and state behavior is driven by a desire fo r survival.18 Realists assume th a t cooperation
is possible, but argue th a t states first weigh profits and gains by thinking in e ith er
absolute gains or relative gains, w hereby pow er balancing forces states to focus on
relative gains when contem plating cooperation. Scholars point to th e lim itations of
14 John J. Mearsheim er, "The False Promise o f International Institutions," International Security, no. 3
(1994).
15 Ibid, 7
16 Ibid
17 Ibid, 8
18 Ibid, 10
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cooperation, such as concerns o f cheating, before discussing cooperation in th e form of
alliances th at occurred historically, such as NATO.
Some realists argue that liberal institutionalism ignores security issues by
focusing on economic issues, pointing to flaws in Keohane's causal logic and analyzing
th e central th reat of cheating w hen states cooperate; the prisoner's d ile m m a .19 Some
scholars therefore partially dismiss this theory, noting relative-gains concerns before
offering several counter-argum ents in reviewing cases fo r institutionalism , but
essentially finding no evidence th a t liberal institutionalism succeeds in answering
central questions. Opponents of th e institutionalist approach conclude th a t th e theo ry
and its practical application is bound to fail, offering the league of nations as a historic
exam ple and the w ar in Bosnia as a recent exam ple.

Liberalism
Liberalism encompasses several schools o f thought, concepts, and theories
which generate several strands o f liberalism. International relations theorists
differentiate betw een four strands of post-w ar liberalism: Sociological Liberalism, which
focuses on transnational relations; Interdependence Liberalism, surrounding th e idea of
mutual dependence; Institutional Liberalism, a theory th a t outlines th e im portance and
impact o f international institutions on cooperation am ong states; and Republican
Liberalism, outlining the argum ent th a t liberal democracies are m ore peaceful and law -

19 ibid, 17
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abiding than non-democratic countries.20 The main concern liberalist theorists have w ith
realism is th a t although realism offers prediction into future state behavior (conflict),
th e theory does not outline "when, why, and under w h a t circumstances" such conflict
occurs.21 Unlike realism's focus on the distribution o f m aterial power and capabilities to
drive and influence state behavior, liberalism focuses on preferences, norms,
institutions, ideas, and perceptions to explain th e international system.
Although different form s of liberalism as they apply to the study o f Germ an
foreign policy will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, for th e purpose o f th e case
study analysis part o f this dissertation, Andrew Moravcsik's fram ew ork o f liberal th eo ry
o f international politics will applied. This fram ew ork outlines ways to explain and
understand state behavior based on th e argum ent th a t state behavior is directly
influenced by the relationship betw een states and the dom estic and transnational civil
society.22 According to liberal theory, state preferences have the most significant im pact
in world politics, w hereby Moravcsik's fram ew o rk fu rth er emphasizes how interests,
institutions, and societal ideas im pact state behavior by influencing state preferences
through three core assumptions of liberalism: 1. The prim ary actors in international
politics are individuals and private groups; 2. States represent domestic society; 3. The
pattern of interdependent state preferences establishes state behavior.23 This

20 Robert H. S0rensen Georg Jackson, Introduction to International R elation s: Theories an d Approaches
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
21 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," 27.
22 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,"
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513.
23 "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory o f International Politics," International Organization 51,
no. 4 (1997): 515-20.
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fram ew ork therefore seeks to show how state preferences are influenced by societal
interaction and change through "transnational social context".24 The liberalist
fram ew ork can explain units o f analysis th a t include foreign policy goals and choices of
individual actors but also the systemic results of interactions among states by focusing
on domestic theories of preferences. According to Moravcsik, liberal th eo ry suggests an
explanation for change in the international system based on historical circumstances,
such as the influence of global econom ic developm ent on social and political change.
State preferences are central to liberal analyses and differ greatly from strategies
em ployed by states. State preferences, when analyzed from a liberal fram ew ork, can be
studied through "decision-making documents, trustw orthy oral histories and m em ories,
patterns o f coalition support, and th e structure o f domestic institutions".25 Similarly,
Volker Rittberger outlines how utilitarian liberalism focuses on "subsystemic
determ inants o f foreign policy behavior" by examining how the preferences and
interests of domestic actors shape foreign policy choices.26 This is in line w ith the
overarching focus of liberalism o f citizens in global politics, due to interdependence
issues and technological advances, advancing the inquiry beyond the state, and instead
analyzing the relationship betw een groups, societies, and private individuals.27
In summary, liberalism, unlike neorealism, theoretically focuses on how th e
individual and groups of individuals, influence and shape state behavior and global

24 Ibid, 522
25 Ibid, 544
26 Volker Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories an d Case Studies (M anchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.
27 Jackson, Introduction to International R elation s: Theories an d Approaches, 111.
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politics. Further, the liberalist fra m ew o rk assumes th a t several concepts (such as conflict
and cooperation) have an impact on international relations w hereby a differentiation
betw een sociological, interdependence, institutional, and republican liberalism can be
made. W ithin the liberal fram ew ork, scholars m ay focus th e ir analyses on actorcentered inquiries, which examines how dom estic actors and their interests influence
foreign policy and state behavior, or th e structure-centered approach which emphasizes
how institutional aspects o f states influence international behavior.28

Constructivism
The constructivist fram ew ork prim arily seeks to show how core concepts of
international relations are socially constructed through a continuous process o f social
practice, learning, and interaction. Constructivism as such, provides a fram ew o rk to
analyze th e influence of non-structural variables on state behavior, such as identity,
ideas, norms, culture, and history. The basic assumption of constructivism is th a t actors
in the international system follow the logic o f appropriateness, a behavior shaped and
learned through social norms. International and societal norms are th e re fo re th e main
variable fo r foreign policy analysis w ithin the constructivist analysis.29 Perhaps most
prom inently, Alexander W e n d t argues "that th e structures o f human association are
determ ined prim arily by shared ideas rather than m aterial forces, and th a t th e identities

28 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, In ternatio n al Relations Theories. Discipline an d Diversity
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105.
29 For more on logic of appropriateness, refer to James G. M arch and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering
Institutions (N ew York, NY: New York: Free Press, 1989).
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and interests o f purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than
given by nature".30
Constructivist scholars generally critique th e focus on m aterial-based
assumptions o f international relations theory, instead focusing on how th e social
elem ents in world politics can aid in understanding change a t the international level.31
Responding to th e emphasis on structure-based analysis o f the realist school,
constructivists first used the concept of 'agency' in international relations analysis, w ith
an underlying argum ent th at world politics are "a w orld o f our m aking".32 The concept
o f rationality, which in realist theory is a function o f individual interests, is view ed by
constructivists as a utility o f legitimacy based on shared norms within social structures.33
As such, norms shape and constrain human behavior, and directly construct identities,
which then have the agency to influence th e ir environm ent.
Summing up the m ajor argum ents of social constructivism and th e debate
betw een structure and agency, Alexander W e n d t outlines how actors in social
relationships are dependent on and influenced by each other's choices and responses,
resulting in a m utually constituted environm ent.34 Although not dismissing th e emphasis
on interests in m ajor international relations theories, constructivists continuously tie the
predom inant concepts back to th e identity o f actors, as th e subjects, or objects, studied

30 Alexander W endt, Social Theory o f In ternatio n al Politics / Alexander W endt, Cambridge Studies in
International Relations: 67 (Cambridge, U K ; N ew York : Cambridge University Press, 1999., 1999), 1.
31 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline a n d Diversity, 168.
32 This idea was first brought forth by Nicholas Onuf. For m ore see: Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, W orld o f
Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory an d In ternatio n al Relations, Studies in International Relations
(Columbia, S.C.: University o f South Carolina Press, 1989).
33 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline an d Diversity, 170.
34 W endt, "Anarchy Is W hat States M ake o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics," 404.
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in international relations are constructed and given cultural, social, political, or historical
m eaning.35 The goal and main emphasis o f constructivism is to understand th e social
meaning of human reasoning and behavior, focusing on th e social (ra th e r than the
individual), encompassed in th e W eberian concept of Verstehen.36 Further,
constructivism focuses on the process o f interaction and language am ong actors in th e
international system based on legitimacy and social learning.

German Foreign Policy theories and Frameworks
The end of th e W W II changed Germ an identity fo re v er both nationally and
internationally. Since then, the G erm an governm ent has taken steps to repair Germ an
culture by advocating a foreign policy th a t is aligned w ith international law and norms.
Power politics, in its traditional sense, has th e re fo re been absent from policies, and
Germany's heavy involvem ent in European integration fu rth e r showed an overall
com m itm ent to com m unity goals. The unification o f G erm any in 1990 has raised several
questions by scholars as to the future role G erm any will play in Europe, and how
Germany will utilize pow er through foreign policy choices. In analyzing these questions,
James Sperling asks, "W h at is the best conceptual fra m ew o rk for explaining and
predicting the future trajectory of Germ an foreign policy?"37 The factors o f changes or

35 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline a n d Diversity, 171.
36 Ibid
37 James Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f th e Berlin Republic: The Very M odel of a Post-M odern M ajor
Power? A Review Essay " German Politics 12, no. 3 (2003): 2.
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continuity th a t have occurred since unification are im portant to analyze, w hile also
reflecting to w hat extent they affect Germ an foreign policy.
Reviewing Germany's foreign policy choices in 2003, Sperling investigates
scholars w ho have answered these questions by applying different theoretical
fram eworks, all concluding th a t G erm any acts as "som ething other than a realist
pow er"38,39. Further claims made by th e authors under review argue th a t Germ an
foreign policy has been marked by norm ative goals instead o f m aterial-based interest
goals, while others emphasize the issue o f continuity.40 Alm ost all authors under review
reject neorealist claims and predictions, to include argum ents brought fo rth by John
M earsheim er.41 Neorealist theory predicts th a t w ith th e change in th e balance o f pow er
th at occurred in 1989, changes in Germ an foreign policy would also be observed, which
has not been th e case. Neorealists th e re fo re ask how this change in relative pow er
presents th e opportunity fo r a m ore aggressive G erm an foreign policy th a t includes
(nationalized) changes to its security policy and w h e th e r a new defense identity will
decrease Germ an dependence on th e U.S. Scholars explain th a t in o rder to analyze
these questions, and the institutional and norm ative restrains placed on Germ an
autonom y, the environm ent th a t shaped G erm an foreign policy has to be carefully

38 Ibid.
39 The books m entioned here are Bulmer, Jeffery, and Paterson's Germany's European Diplomacy,
Harnisch and Maull's Germany as a Civilian Power, Hide-Price's Germ any & European Order, and
Rittberger's German Foreign Policy since Unification.
40 Sperling here mentions Schneider, Jopp, and Schmalz, Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik, Eberwein and
Kaiser's Germany's N ew Foreign Policy, and Newnham 's Deutsche M a rk Diplomacy.
41 John J. Mearsheim er, The Tragedy o f G reat Pow er Politics (N ew York: Norton, 2001).
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exam ined.42 Similarly, Beverly Craw ford explains th a t realist interpretations have view ed
policy decisions as an "exercise o f self-interested behavior", especially in regards to
m ilitary participation in Afghanistan, which is taken as a sign that th e fo rm e r unchanged
foreign policy vision o f Germ any has ended .43
Almost a decade later, W illiam Paterson asked, "Does Germ any still have a
European vocation?", referring to an observation o f stricter foreign policy choices by
Germ any th a t reflect national interests and uses institutional (and unintentional) pow er
to benefit Germany's goals.44 Debates w ithin scholarly circles in th e literature about
German foreign policy within th e past te n years show a transform ation from Germ any's
structured (and bound) post w a r policy choices, to a m ore agency-actor based approach
to national interests, w hereby Germ any's economic pow er and size play a m ajor role in
bargaining processes. Germany, often defined as th e "good European", aligning its
interests with European interests, has altered its trajectory and a "de-Europeanisation"
in policy and discourse has been observed.45

Contextual Change and Continuity
The authors included for th e review com pleted an outline of seven categories of
change th a t occurred in Germ an foreign policy. These changes are observed in th e
overall structure of the international system, in Germ any's status, in a geopolitical
42 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic: The Very M odel o f a Post-Modern M a jo r Power? A
Review Essay" 2.
43 Beverly Crawford, "The Norm ative Power o f a Normal S tate.Pow er and Revolutionary Vision in
Germanys Postwall Foreign Policy " German Politics and Society 95, no. 25 (2010): 168.
44 William Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," German Politics 19, no. 1 (2010).
45 Ibid, 51

57

context, in the rules th a t govern th e EU, in th e international economy, in th e ongoing
relationship w ith the U.S., and in political restraints th a t translated to change in
domestic policy.46 Overall, one o f th e strongest changes could be seen in Germ any's
status w hile the contextual change th a t occurred due to th e m odified relationship w ith
both the EU and the U.S., specifically in regards to EU enlargem ent and th e lack o f a
security th re a t by th e Soviet Union, resulted in strong changes that, according to
neorealist theory, should have caused a change in Germ an foreign policy.47
W hile them atically analyzing change and its potential effects on G erm an foreign
policy, scholars address G erm any as a relative pow er in Europe and reject th e claim th at
Germ any is a realist state. Rather, G erm any is view ed as a post-m odern state. According
to Robert Cooper, post-modern states integrate w ith o th er states and are m arked by
th e orderly and voluntarily erosion o f sovereignty w hile a decline in th e collective is
observed as the state is liberated and th e nation-state becomes less o f an identity.48
Post-modern states practice neutral interference in foreign policy and openness,
transparency, and th e rule of law are crucial attributes. Such states advocate human
rights and support organizations such as th e ICC. In regards to foreign policy, post
modern states act on behalf of the greater good rather than acting fo r national

46 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic: The Very M odel o f a Post-Modern M a jo r Power? A
Review Essay" 2.
47 W hile discussing th e change th a t occurred due to th e im pact o f th e domestic political process, Sperling
addresses th e addition o f the five eastern Lander and th e notion th a t th e change in governm ent from th e
Kohl era to th e newly form ed red-green alliance "promised" foreign policy choices th a t w ere not as bound
to Westbindung and more towards national interest goals th a t includes economic partners in th e east (p.

6)
48 M ary N. Hampton, "Living in a W orld o f Dangers and Strangers," Germ an Politics an d Society 29, no. 3
( 2011 ).

58

interests. The concept of civilian pow er aligns w ith th e attributes o f th e post-m odern
state: conflicts are resolved peacefully and the use o f force is not an option in regards to
foreign policy unless an intervention is w arranted on th e basis of hum anitarian efforts.
In analyzing Germany's role in Europe, Hyde-Price offers six roles o f G erm an
grand strategy: civilian power, tradition-nation, m oto r o f European integration, loyal
transatlantic partner, advocate of pan-European cooperation, and "m ediato r b etw een
East and W est".49 O ther authors, w ho also discuss Germ any's roles, agree th a t G erm any
will assume a leadership role in Europe, citing Germ any's role in th e European project.
Scholars place focus on roles but may differentiate am ong them according to perceived
pow er capabilities and interests.50 The change observed in relative pow er and continuity
in German foreign policy has sparked th e search fo r alternative explanations fo r
observed policy choices. The author explains th a t G erm any is viewed as m ainly an
economic pow er, yet economic strength has not necessarily increased since unification.
Further, Germ any has rem ained com m itted to m ultilateral operations in regards to
policy preferences, to include NATO and EU m atters.
W hile analyzing continuity and change in regards to Germany's use of pow er,
Beverly Crawford questions w h eth er th e bid for a perm anent seat on th e UN Security
council can be interpreted as th e Republic's w ay o f seeking recognition as a great pow er
(rather than showing an increased com m itm ent to m ultilateralism ). G erm any's foreign

49 Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging N ato and the Eu. (M anchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 2000), 44.
50 In this section, Sperling also addresses vertical and horizontal contexts o f decision m a k in g , th e
European M onetary Union (EM U), and re-visits bargaining betw een th e Federal G overnm ent and th e
Lander governments.
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policy choices can be interpreted and explained through various theoretical
fram ew orks.51 Some analysts have view ed this as a break w ith m ultilateralism , w hile
others have used the refusal of participation in th e invasion of Iraq as evidence fo r soft
pow er balancing (against U.S. legitimacy), w hile constructivists have argued fo r a sign of
a deepened com m itm ent to antim ilitarism .52
Tw enty years afte r unification, Bulmer & Paterson analyze continuity and change
in Germany's use o f power, guided by th e question most dom inant across all the
literature under review: would th e changes o f unification and the end o f th e Cold W a r
eventually lead to a change in Germ an (European) policy? Authors approach this
question by examining specific criteria o f structural continuity to see w h e th e r a shift in
th e exercise o f pow er occurred, focusing on the im pact o f German dom estic policy on
th e EU. Similarly, Crawford argues th a t although factors such as dom estic politics,
political culture, and international institutions contribute to foreign policy behavior in
Germany, pow er (and the econom y) is th e driving force th a t defines policy choices. The
author approaches the future o f Germany's foreign policy and potential contextual
changes from an interesting perspective: through th e lens o f the G erm an Chancellor,
elected in 2015, pointing to weaknesses in NATO's ability to adequately address security
threats.

51 This has been done extensively in regards to Germany's refusal to contribute to th e invasion o f Iraq in
2002 and th e overall analysis of th e use o f force.
52 Crawford, "The Norm ative Power o f a Normal S tate.Pow er and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys
Postwall Foreign Policy " 168.
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W hile addressing historic continuity in foreign policy, Crawford exclaims th a t
"Germ any has changed, must change, and will change", examining th e driving forces
behind these potential changes.53 Here, th e debates in the past decade largely reflect
such change in th e future, and scholars have analyzed several aspects of th e new
'Germ an Q uestion'.54 One of these questions includes a debate surrounding w h e th e r
international regimes provide a "veil behind which Germ any exercises self-interested
dominance, both in Europe and on the international state".55 These questions have
guided scholarly debates in regards to continuity and change in Germ an foreign policy
since th e end of the Cold W ar and unification. W hile some analysts, such as G unther
Hellmann, John M easheim er, and Volker Rittberger, caution against self-interest and
dominance, many other authors argue th a t a com m itm ent to m ultilateralism and the
rise of 'civilian pow er' have put aside fears o f the 'G erm an Q uestion'.56

Interests, Identity, and Norms
The m ajority o f the authors w ho fall under this category are part o f th e
M anchester University Press series titled Issues in G erm an Politics and address th e
intersection of interest, identity, and norms. Here, an argum ent is m ade fo r th e pursuit
of milieu goals rather than possession goals by both the Bonn and Berlin Republics.
Here, possession goals include those actions th a t aim at th e "preservation o f one or
53 Beverly Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe (Pasingstoke
Palgrave Macm illan, 2007), 11.
54 The 'German Question' refers to th e grow th o f Germ an p ow er th a t led to the provocation o f W orld W ar
I and W orld W ar II.
55 Crawford also lists several other questions, which are used throughout th e entire book (p. 14).
56 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe, 15.
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m ore of the things to which a country attaches value", such as territory, m em bership in
the UN Security Council, or ta riff preferences.57 M ilieu goals include those objectives
w ith results th a t influence international politics beyond a given country. Peace,
international law, or the creation o f international organizations fall under such goals and
are concerned w ith concepts oth er than a country's possessions. H ow ever, such milieu
goals are often pursued w ith th e intention of gaining a desired possession goal a t som e
point (increasing security), although a nation m ight, at tim es, simply be concerned w ith
improving the overall international environm ent.
Scholars analyze foreign policy goals by th e Berlin Republic and categorize each
as falling either into milieu goals or possession goals. The results show th a t G erm any has
indeed pursued possession goals. Authors place G erm any's NATO m em bership under a
self-preservation possession goal and G erm any influence in international econom y as a
self-extension possession goal. O ther scholars analyze these goals by using th re e
d ifferent theories: neorealism w ould argue th a t states pursue influence and autonom y,
w hile utilitarian-liberalism would advocate a m axim ization o f utilizing private and state
actors, and constructivism outlines th a t the state eventually conforms to norm s.58
Further, some scholars place G erm any as an em bedded hegemony w ith in Europe,
describing how German national interests take precedence over European interests.59

57 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Essays on In ternatio n al Politics (Baltim ore,: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962), 74.
58 Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, 11.
59 The idea 'em bedded hegemony' can be applied to th e fact th a t G erm any did not adhere to th e Stability
Pact rules whilst stressing to tighten th e rules initially. Crawford, Pow er and German Foreign Policy:
Embedded Hegemony in Europe.
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The discussion of norms in relation to Germ an foreign policy is prevalent in most
o f the literature, w hereby some scholars differen tiate betw een tw o sets o f norms:
norms th at govern civil societies and norms th a t govern interstate relations.60
Connecting this argum ent to constructivist theory, w hen societal and foreign relation
norms form a junction, constructivist th e o ry can indeed explain and predict state
behavior. However, when both norms are eith er absent or oppose each other, the
theory lacks explanation. Scholars also argue th a t Germ any's pursuit o f pow er has been
strategic and systemic (em pow erm ent w ithin th e EU), w hile continuously striving fo r
international cooperation and m ultilateralism . Therefore, most scholars under review
argue th a t Germ any is not a realist state. In regards to strategy, Hyde-Price analyzes
w hat he refers to as the three aspects o f Germ an grand strategy; this includes th e
enlargem ent security comm unity to th e eastern neighborhood, the fusion of the Atlantic
system, and the European security system th a t includes Russia. Crawford adds to this
analysis by showing how Germany's efforts in th e European integration process is
viewed as a continuity of the Bonn Republic's vision.
Harnisch & Maull outline six d iffe re n t objectives th a t make G erm any a civilian
power. Here, the main definition calls fo r an active path to replace politics th a t are
based on power, w ith socially accepted norms, or politics based on legitim acy.61 The
objectives used by the authors include strengthening international law, creation of

60 Simon & Paterson Bulmer, William "Germany and th e European Union: From T a m e d Power' to
Normalized Power? ," International Affairs 86, no. 5 (2010).
61 Sebastian &. M aull Harnisch, Hanns, Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin
Republic (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.
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democratic security communities, facilitating dem ocratic legitimacy betw een states, the
encouragem ent o f interdependence, and th e international division o f labor.62 W hen
discussing theoretical fram eworks to explain th e w h e th e r th e Berlin Republic has
pursued milieu or possession goals, scholars exam ine a common debate w ithin Germ an
foreign policy arguments about th e intersection o f norms and identity and th e parallels
of German and EU policy choices. One main argum ent here is th a t it is difficult to
separate German national goals from European goals as G erm any has aligned its
interests with those of the European project, often being referred to as a "good
European".63 Identity is used throughout th e literature to explain enlargem en t and
policy choices by Germany tow ard integration and enlargem ent reform o f th e EU,
blurring th e lines between German identities and European identities.64
Schroder's and Joschka Fischer's initial stance to continue G erm any's traditional
'pro-European' course is used to analyze the changes th a t led to differing interests in
foreign policy choices, resulting in scholars referring to Germany's new European policy
and interests as "weaker, leaner, m eaner".65 Here, some scholars point o u t th a t th e case
previously made fo r continuity in policy is weak; instead explaining th a t Germ any's
European policy has changed significantly. Throughout th e ir analysis th e authors refer

62 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic: The V ery M odel o f a Post-M odern M a jo r Power? A
Review Essay " 14.
63 Ibid.
64 Sperling also explains in detail the how German identity is shaped, explaining th e concept of
Selbstbeschrankung (Germany's limitation on national interests despite a relative p ow er advantage),
Westbindung (the concept of being a transatlantic partner as well as a partner to France), and
Selbstbindung (voluntary limitation o f German pow er in m ultilateral fram eworks) p. 15.
65 Hanns M aull, Germany's Uncertain P o w e r: Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke [England];
N ew York: Palgrave Macm illan, 2006), 95-108.
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back to Germ an interest driven behavior in policies relating to enlargem ent and the
constitutionalization of Europe, noting a shift in th e structural changes o f th e policy
processes and a weakening of Germany's "traditional European role".66 The argum ents
for changes in policy based on self-interest refer back to Sperling's initial analysis of
W olfer's milieu and possession goals, showing th a t G erm any indeed pursues possession
goals, or, at the least, milieu goals th a t benefit interests and eventually lead to
possession goals.
Almost im m ediately after unification, Chancellor Helm ut Kohl promised a foreign
policy which continued a focus on global partnerships and th e "peaceful balancing of
interests" while years later Chancellor Schroder declared th a t Germ any is willing to face
its history and would pursue policies th a t "reflect its own enlightened self-interests".67
Scholars in the field have linked statem ents by politicians and policy makers to id en titybased interests, w hile arguing th a t Germ an identity has been constructed in parallel
w ith European identity. Here, identity accounts fo r th e main source o f preferences,
w hereby a state's identity is shaped through ideas and beliefs instead o f "objective
m aterial conditions alone".68 The liberal argum ent, supported by several scholars, is th a t

66 Ibid, 105
67 Helga Haftendorn, Coming o f Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, Lanham M d (Rowm an &
Littlefield., 2006), 351,53.
68 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe, 25. For an in-debt
discussion o f state identity, please refer to Peter Katzenstein, Tam ed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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Germany's participation in institutions shaped its (European) identity and interests and
can therefore account for its foreign policy preferences.69
O ther scholars take issue w ith this argum ent, explaining th a t G erm any's core
identity has not been shown to be European, referring to Germany's exclusive
citizenship rules and restrictive im m igration policies.70 These scholars explain th a t th e
generation o f political elites w ho initially connected Germ an identity to European
identity will soon be gone.71 The most com pelling argum ent scholars bring fo rth in
opposition of identity-based interests, is th a t methodologically, no exam ples exist
w here "Germany's European identity shaped preferences th a t clearly ran counter to its
exclusive national identity, or its m aterial interests".72 Crawford, referring back to
Katzenstein's argum ent th a t Germ any's identity has becom e European, explains th a t
this could simply be dem onstrated in th a t m em ber states th a t are set to gain from a
stable EU will autom atically identify w ith Europe. This is also true fo r milieu goals, as
powers w ith interests in a stable political environm ent will often pursue interests and
goals and identify w ith th e ir region.

THEORIES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germ an security scholars point to th e difficulties in analyzing G erm an foreign
policy theoretically as a differentiation betw een national, systemic, and supranational
59 Simon Bulmer, Jeffery, C., & Paterson, W illiam Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional
M ilieu (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000); Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germ any in
Europe.
70 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe.
71 Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe, 26.
72 Ibid, 27
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levels o f analysis has to be made. Once again, th e scholars under review analyze
German foreign policy from the neorealist, utilitarian-liberalist, constructivist
approaches, as well as the Brimingham school. In regards to foreign policy, neorealism
analyzes the system-level variables and follows th e assumption th a t states respond to
shifts in the balance of m aterial pow er w hile utilitarian-liberalism emphasizes th e
subsystem variables.73 Constructivism focuses on both variables w hile assuming th a t th e
state will follow the "logic of appropriateness" in regards to societal and international
norms.74 The Birmingham school, which is comprised o f several authors under review,
analyzes both variables, but also assumes th a t states will follow the logic of
consequentiality in combination o f appropriateness. Here, and emphasis is put on th e
limiting role th a t international and dom estic institutions have on state action.
Each author has different predictions about th e fu tu re of Germ an foreign policy.
John M earsheim er predicted, in neorealist fashion, th a t a unified Germ any would
separate itself from previous com m itm ents to NATO and th e EU. This prediction was
based on the balance of pow er change th a t occurred after th e Cold W ar, to include th e
absence o f th re a t from th e Soviet Union, th e re fo re shifting th e security arrangem ents.
The neorealist position was th a t G erm any would take full advantage o f th e increased
pow er position and ultim ately pursue pow er politics. The predictions under the
utilitarian-liberalism fram ew ork is th a t changes only occur if the preferences of
domestic actors changes. Here, scholars explain th a t the preferences o f private

73 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic: The Very M odel o f a Post-Modern M a jo r Power? A
Review Essay" 16.
74 Ibid.
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domestic actors remained unchanged a fte r unification, and th e re fo re conclude th a t the
foreign policies o f the Bonn and Berlin Republics should not change.75
The central assumption o f th e constructivist theory is th a t identity construction
occurs and then creates interests and norms. Further, constructivism assumes th a t th e
international system is both m aterial and social, w h ereb y m aterial structures are
assigned meaning th e environm ent. This assigned meaning then provides th e norm ative
com ponent to th e analysis and explanation.76 In th e case o f Germ any, constructivism
predicts no change in foreign policy from the Bonn Republic to the Berlin Republic. The
explanations and predictions m ade by th e Birmingham school focus on th re e variables.
An emphasis is given to th e analysis o f the strategic (m ilieu) goals and draw a tten tio n to
th e limitations placed on states by institutional patterns w hile also exam ining interest
and identity (also finding a Europeanized iden tity).77 Further, the Birmingham school
analyzes the relationship betw een pow er and th e exercise th ereof, differentiating
betw een tangible and intangible pow er, and deliberate or structural exercise o f pow er.
Germ an economic and financial pow er has been structural, w hile offering financial
support fo r states th a t are in compliance w ith Germ an preferences is view ed as
deliberative pow er.78

75 Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories an d Case Studies.
76 Ibid, 17
77 Sperling, citing Bulmer, Jeffery & Paterson (2000), explains th a t th e Birmingham School, in examining
German foreign policy, pays particular attentio n to th e im pact o f German federalism , th e sectorization of
policy making, and th e impact observed by th e EU in constructing German interests w hile simultaneously
limiting Germany's freedom (p. 18).
78 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging N a to and the Eu.
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Crawford compares and contrasts th e realist and constructivist view o f G erm an
foreign policy and offers her own approach which claims th a t "Germ any has changed
the way it has pursued its original vision as its pow er position in Europe and in
international politics has grow n".79 The author's main argum ent here is th a t changes in
uses of power before unification w ere largely ignored and no t viewed as pow er politics,
whereas deviations from foreign policy choices a fte r unification, and w ith increased
overall power, w ere interpreted as a departure of Germ any's "unique vision of
cooperation and antim ilitarism ".80 Further, Crawford argues th at th e shifts in pow er th a t
occurred after the end of the Cold W a r have turned Germ any into a "regional hegem on"
(in Europe) and a "great power" globally, whose pow er is used to guide th e original
vision th at was in place before unification. Through this increased pow er, and continued
vision, Germany has become a "norm ative pow er", focusing on civilian measures and
diplomacy backed by material resources.81 Crawford then argues th a t Germ any's foreign
policy choices are appropriate fo r the current international environm ent, filled w ith new
threats th at disregard sovereignty and cannot be m e t w ith traditional uses o f national
power.
Scholars discuss post-unification changes in foreign policy, arguing th a t 'postW all' behavior differs greatly from th a t o f previous decades. Theories th a t address this
puzzle o f policy shifts and changes include a theoretical analysis o f structural realism,

79 Crawford, "The Norm ative Power of a Normal State.Pow er and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys
Postwall Foreign Policy " 169.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid, 170. Crawford here refers to Ian M anner's articulation o f norm ative pow er in N orm ative Pow er
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (2002).
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intergovernm entalism , liberal institutionalism , sociological/cultural explanations,
political party structure, and dom estic explanations. Scholars approach this exam ination
by asking, "Are international or dom estic pressures prim arily responsible fo r Germ an
foreign policy decisions?", w hereby the answ er to this question should include a theory
th a t is able to predict and explain policy preferences.82 Crawford finds th a t although
structural realism is able to explain certain policy behavior, it lacks in accounting for
Germany's sacrifice o f self-interest in certain cases.83 Similarly, the o th e r theories and
explanations under review by scholars all yield valid explanations in regards to some
foreign policy choices by Germ any since unification and in th e past decade, but not one
single theory accounts for all questions and changes. Liberal institutionalism is unable to
account fo r a state's desertion o f alliances and coalitions, identity-based argum ents
rem ain vague, and domestic explanations only account for part of policy variances
observed.84

The Birmingham School - The Ideal Model?
O ut of all theoretical fram ew orks under review, the Birmingham school directly
analyzes Germ an specific foreign policy choices, especially in regards to security.
Germany's strategic goals (milieu goals) are at th e center of investigation in relation to
European security order. The Birmingham m odel mainly seeks to exam ine w here
German foreign policy is headed and w h a t elem ents of change and continuity are

82 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Em bedded Hegem ony in Europe.
83 Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded H egem ony in Europe, 22.
84 Ibid, 21-34. Identity based arguments re fe r to "identity" as being th e driving force behind policy choices
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present in G erm any since unification. An assumption o f the model is th a t G erm an
interests are shaped by th e configurations o f institutions which also lim it Germ any's
freedom w hile Germany is viewed as having a Europeanized identity. The Birmingham
school's tre a tm e n t o f power (tangible, intangible, structural, or deliberate) results in
four contending types of pow er explained by G erm an security scholars: pow er th a t
intends to reach maximum relative gains (realist pow er), pow er th a t shapes institutional
rules (indirect institutional pow er), pow er th a t results from domestic policy decisions
(unintentional pow er), and pow er to shape the EU agenda to maximize Germ an
influence (systematic em po w erm en t).85
In analyzing the Birmingham model fo r its ability to explain and predict Germ an
foreign policy choices, Sterling uses several categories of analysis and a focus on
Germany as a security actor in Europe. The auth o r accomplishes this by exam ining
policies of prevention and assurance and G erm an compliance and contributions to EU
missions and programs. W hile assessing Germ any as a m ilitary actor, Sperling lists
Germ an defense expenditures (in comparison to those o f France, Italy, and th e UK) in an
EU context as well as German participation in UN, EU, and NATO-led m ilitary operations.
W hen comparing these analyses to the predictions and assumptions o f th e Birmingham
model, Sperling shows Germany's Europeanized identity in regards to interests,
Germany's reserved approach to th e projection o f m ilitary force, and th e pow er used by

85 James Sperling, "Germany and European Security Governance: How W ell Does th e Birmingham M odel
Perform?," European Security 18, no. 2 (2009): 127.
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Germany to reach its goals.86 The evidence used fu rth er shows assumptions about
foreign policy choices th a t reflect milieu goals as well as Germ any's continued
preference tow ard m ultilateral approaches.
W hen analyzing G erm any as a security actor, th e Birmingham m odel argues th a t
Germany will act in line w ith its European identity, pursuing "European" goals and a
"m ultilateral statecraft".87 This assumption does not account for th e im portance of th e
distribution o f pow er and the relevance of pow er in G erm an foreign policy. Scholars
explain th a t th e end of the Cold W ar, and th e end of a Soviet security th re a t, com bined
w ith lowered U.S. influence, allow ed Germ any to seek foreign policy security goals th a t
differed from those of the U.S. The author concludes th a t th e Birmingham m odel lacks
an explanation in regards to preferences and interests but does explain the reasons and
path of German foreign policy in conjunction w ith policies o f assurance and prevention.
In the past decade, several authors and analysts have questioned Germany's
European vocation. Although strongly observed during th e Bonn Republic, Germ any's
European policies have been "contingent, contested, and circum scribed".88 Now , the
pursuit of "European" goals predicted by th e Birmingham m odel have not been chosen
exclusively in recent years, and G erm an national goals have taken precedence. The postKohl era has been difficult to categorize by authors in th e field. W hile some scholars in
defense of the Birmingham model and th eo ry to explain Germ an foreign policy stress a

86 Ibid, 143
87 Ibid.
88 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 41.
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contingency factor in contem porary policy rather than th e structured m ultilateral
approaches, others refer to this period as "de-Europeanisation".89
Peterson groups Germany's European vocation into three stages: th e first stage
involves European integration, th e second stage refers to a close union to th e EU under
Chancellor Kohl in the early 1990s, and the third stage is referred to as th e post-Kohl
stage.90 Here, the author explains th a t European identity and policy choices w ere
gradual processes, w hereby concepts such as security and "actorness" w e re essentially
dictated by the political environm ent, leaving G erm any little room to act
independently.91 Scholars of th e Birmingham school argue th a t contingency in G erm an
foreign policy occurs in th e form o f "restoring th e goodness o f fit" betw een th e Germ an
domestic level and the European level, th e re fo re arguing th a t Germ any still has a
European vocation.92 Here, the argum ent is m ade th a t G erm any continues to have
fundam ental interest in European integration, and w hile less emphasis is put on
m ultilateral institutions, Germany's agenda includes supportive choices fo r European
foreign policy.93
Addressing arguments about clashing Germ an and European interests, the
Birmingham school scholars refer to this leveling as a potentially long period o f

89 G u n th e r. Hellmann, Germany's Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by Default.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 48.
90 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?."
91 Paterson here compares and contrasts Ostpolitik to Europapolitik, noting th a t Ostpolitik "could take on
a leadership role and also be seen manifestly to be making its own decisions" (p. 43).
92 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.
93 For a more in-debt discussion, please refer to S. Harnisch and S. Schieder, 'Germany's N ew European
Policy: W eaker, Leaner, M ean er', in M aull, H. (2006), Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy o f the
Federal Republic. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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'equilibrium '; however, Paterson e t al. also note th a t the school takes a "binary" view
towards Germ any supporting "both m ore and less Europe".94 In contrast to this view ,
others list changes in public opinion and coalition structures to show a deviation of
Germ an foreign policy to previous European interests, w hereby th e author accounts for
th e changes observed in Germ an policy by relating them to changing "opportunity
structures at th e European level".95 Although th e Birmingham school shares most o f this
analysis, Paterson argues th a t despite th e changes observed, Germany continues to
have a Europeanized identity, although governm ental policy show less European driven
interests. Paterson agrees th at Germ any's European vocation is "shrinking and will
continue to do so", but adds th a t G erm any will continue to be com m itted to the
European project, which continues to benefit Germ an interests.95
Taking into account the shortcomings of th e Birmingham m odel, and th e fact
th a t every other theory used to understand Germ an foreign policy behavior lacks
explanatory pow er in certain aspects, Beverly Crawford's articulation of G erm any as an
'em bedded hegem ony' m ay yield th e most parsimonious approach yet. This approach
combines the strong points of several theories under review and directly challenges
claims th a t Germ any is unwilling to take on a leadership role in Europe. Crawford's main
argum ent is th a t Germ any's foreign policy preferences are a reflection o f its position as
th e 'regional hegem on', possessing institutional pow er, and th e "need to protect th a t
pow er position and satisfy dom inant domestic interests" (p. 34). The author then lays

94 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.
95 Hellmann, Germany's Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by D e fa u lt, 50.
96 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.

74

out a compelling argum ent for Germ any's ability and willingness to lead which includes
aspects of cooperation, capabilities, and economy, and ends with th e prediction th a t
Germany is likely to drop many of its international burdens over th e next decade,
especially if economic stagnation continues.97

Power, Security, and Transformation
The post-war period shaped G erm any's foreign policy by w ay of occupation,
division, and defeat, and eventually merged w ith European institutions and m ultilateral
no

regimes.

M ilitary pow er and means w e re view ed as a last resort to resolve conflict,

and emphasis was given to civilian actions to foreign policy, such as peacekeeping,
international law, human rights, foreign aid, culture, and environm ent. This linkage o f
concepts, referred to as "cooperate security", was based on confidence building,
w hereby German society was com m itted to liberal dem ocratic practices and collective
security. This com bination, along w ith an obligation tow ards human rights and
antim ilitarism, "reshaped Germ an political identity".99 Germ any's pow er is often
assessed in economic term s, but also in exercising pow er th a t contributed to shaping
the European integration process. The Berlin Republic asserted pow er in pursing policy

97 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Em bedded Hegem ony in Europe, 55.The entire approach
can be found on pages 34-55, although the au th or uses her argum ent to guide th e reader throughout th e
rem ainder of the book.
98 Crawford, "The Norm ative Power o f a Normal State.Pow er and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys
Postwall Foreign Policy " 171.
" ib id .
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goals, and acting as a bridge betw een actors during Cold W a r disputes w hile also
rebuilding old friendships w ith European partners.100
Germany's relative pow er increased afte r th e end of th e Cold W a r and
unification w hile its economy becam e the strongest in Europe. Although G erm any has
decreased defense spending, its m ilitary is th e largest in Europe and only the U.S. has
m ore troops deployed w orldw ide.101 G erm any has since been referred to as an
"institutional power", contributing to European integration w hile giving up parts of its
independence and sovereignty. Germ any's exercise of pow er has been continuously
described as "norm ative", backed by m aterial pow er, w hereas Germ any's m ilitary's
purpose is territorial defense rather than th e projection of pow er.102 Despite Germ any's
increase in power, foreign policy choices have rem ained the same, holding on to the
vision of civilian and norm ative pow er.
The debate o f Germany's use o f pow er em erged due to assumption th a t
Germany would eventually return to pow er politics. A fter unification, G erm any could
have made foreign policy choices th a t w ere based on national interests, especially in
regards to European integration but Germ an leaders have continuously been com m itted
to a vision of diplomacy and growing norm ative p o w e r.103 Beverly Craw ford, a fte r
outlining Germany's norm ative pow er practices in regards to tw e n ty -firs t century
challenges, asks, "Can the exercise o f norm ative pow er alone reduce hum an rights
100 Crawford, "The Norm ative Power o f a Norm al State.Pow er and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys
Postwall Foreign Policy ".The author here also discusses Ostpolitik, adding examples o f policy initiatives
th at deviated from traditional pow er politics.
101 Ibid, 174
102 Ibid, 176
103 Ibid, 180

76

abuses and manage ethnic and sectarian conflict?", then adding th a t a c o m m itm en t to
antim ilitarism may call into question th e fact th a t Germ any is the third largest arms
exporter in the w orld.104 These questions, along w ith th e aspects o f cooperation,
international governance, and the feasibility o f security arrangem ents by G erm an
foreign policy choices may have to be asserted in another decade.
The discussion of Germ any as a norm ative pow er, in conjunction w ith an overall
discussion of the EU as a norm ative actor, becam e a trend in the lite ra tu re in th e early
tw enty-first century, and has rem ained a topic o f debate ever since. Ian M anners, along
w ith several other authors, analyzes th e EU and G erm any through norm ative theo ry
focusing on ideational aspects rather than m aterial or physical power. Here, a norm ative
power is the ideal type of international actor. Studies and literature surrounding the
concept seek to understand and in terpret th e causal and constitutive effects. Here,
scholars ask w hether Germany has shifted fro m a 'tam ed pow er' to a norm alized pow er,
referring back to Peter Katzenstein's assessment o f Germ any as a ta m e d pow er, arguing
th at this characterization o f Germ any is no longer a d eq u ate .105 In discussing pow er, and
Germany European diplomacy, these scholars explain th a t G erm any w ould proceed
alone and seek alternatives in order to reach policy interests and goals.
Scholars also outline the criteria under which pow er o f m em ber states w ithin the
EU can be exercised in the policy cycle. G erm any has been influential at th e agenda-

105 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tam ed Power' to Normalized Power?
."Katzenstein's initial analysis of Germany's use o f p ow er focused on soft power, placing im portance o f
Germany's norms and identity th a t became parallel to European norms and identity.
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setting stage, advocating policy and elim inating issues o ff th e agenda.106 Although
Germany's pow er position within Europe economically is unquestioned, especially in
Germany's role in the EU integration process, several authors discuss th e lack o f
Germany's power in th e defense and security policy arenas.107 Discussing th e
relationship betw een Germany and th e EU, scholars distinguish betw een G erm any's use
o f agent pow er as a m em ber-state, and the pow er given by the EU as a structure of
governance.108 Traditionally, Germ any has made use of indirect institutional pow er
rather than hard bargaining aspects of pow er politics. Although resources w ould have
allowed such practices, Germ any's history dictated a focus on diplom atic and
m ultilateral foreign policy choices and uses of pow er. Here, pow er was used to shape
th e direction the EU was headed.109
Power and norm alization differs from previous m ultilateral policy choices to th e
unilateral steps taken by Germ any, especially in regards to th e construction o f
alliances.110 This has becom e increasingly possible in the past decade as m em ber-states
increased in the EU and small coalitions of countries may be more appropriate to
address specific policy issues. Bulm er and Paterson stress th a t norm alization does not
refer to a return to realist assumptions o f balance o f pow er, but to a "balanced

107 This is particularly true in comparison to the U.K. and France, and reviewing th e lack o f public support
in th e intervention in Afghanistan.
108 Bulmer, "Germany and th e European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized P o w e r? ," 1058.This
notion of power was described as "dyadic power" by Stefano Guzzini (1993) in In ternatio n al
Organizations.
109 Bulmer and Paterson also discuss 'unintentional power', which refers to the im pact o f Germ an
economy on other European countries.
110 Bulmer, "Germany and th e European Union: From 'Tam ed Power' to Normalized P o w e r? ," 1059.
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approach in exercising power in th e EU".111 The authors do not contest th e overall
argum ent by other scholars th a t G erm any's foreign policy choices have rem ained
unchanged, but explain th a t changes occurred in Germ any's role in the EU. This is
particularly tru e for the w ay G erm any will conduct diplomacy in a g reater European
context in line w ith other m ajor European pow ers.112
Scholars base th e ir argum ent about the continuity and change o f Germ any's
foreign policy strictly on th e im portance o f pow er and th e role pow er plays in shaping
policy behavior. Germany's use o f pow er has translated by ensuring cooperation in th e
EU and fostering institutions, taking on "the role o f local patron and lea d e r".113 This
assumption and explanation of G erm any's exercise of pow er goes back to th e authors
initial statem ent of defining Germ any as an 'em bedded hegem ony', w hereby G erm any
provides institutional stability but now will also act in line w ith national interests, which
may, at times, be in opposition to those o f its allies. Scholars support this argum ent o f
policy shifts and deviation from previous policy patterns on three cases o f diplom acy,
security, and foreign economic policy.114
An argum ent fo r th e move from structure to agency can be m ade in G erm any's
use of power in the past decade. G erm any has used institutional pow er to influence
outcomes to benefit national interests, and political leadership has been m ore

111 Ibid, 1060
112 Examples o f this include Germany's (and Angela M erkel's) responses to the Greek crisis and th e
Stability Pact.
113 Crawford, Pow er and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegem ony in Europe, 15.
114 These three cases include Germany's decision fo r diplom atic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia,
Germany's transform ation o f technology export control, and Germany's decision to support th e EMU. For
an in-debt discussion see Power and G erm an Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 17-19.
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"purposeful in defending" these interests in Brussels.115 These changes in th e use o f
pow er are the results of differen t political leadership approaches and decisions th a t
emphasize domestic and national interests over a European agenda.116 Although
Germany's m ultilateral approaches w ith th e EU are still in place, th e y largely show a
calculation of which outcomes best benefit G erm an interests.117 Bulm er & Paterson
argue th at indirect institutional pow er used by G erm any is, a t this point, lim ited as th e
developm ent o f the EU has plateau. The authors question w h e th e r G erm any can
actually become a normal pow er w ith o u t sim ultaneously having negative effects on the
EU, especially in regards to Germany's economic power.
Although minor, Germany's security policies have also shown changes from th e
Bonn to Berlin Republic. A fter unification, Germ an politicians have kept w ith the
security policy continuity im bedded in th e long standing foreign policy th a t outlined a
deep com m itm ent to m ultilateral action and an obvious dislike to th e use o f m ilitary
force. Since th e end of the Cold W ar, Germ any has continued to look to both th e U.S.
and NATO as a security provider, th e re fo re som etim es being referred to as a 'taker' o f
security. Before unification, Germ an security policy cautiously avoided national interest
goals th a t could be interpreted as veering aw ay from m ultilateral fram ew o rk
com m itm ents to the greater European Com m unity, the United Nations, and Atlantic

115 Bulmer, "Germany and th e European Union: From 'Tam ed Power' to Normalized Power? ," 1072.
116 Bulmer and Paterson here give examples of Chancellor Schroder's discursive use of national interests in
regards to bilateral energy agreements w ith Russia and Chancellor M erkel's decisions to put domestic and
national policy before German European policy.
117 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tam ed Power' to Normalized P o w e r? ," 1073.
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Alliance.118 In recent years, G erm an security policies have been heavily influenced by
German popular opinion, especially in regards to m ilitary forces' support fo r Iraq and
Afghanistan. German security policy continues to reflect m ultilateralist approaches to
security threats, which include conflict settlem ent, crisis stabilization, and
nonproliferation efforts. Discussing security and transatlantic policies in Germ any, some
scholars note a change in Germ an EU policy in regards to EU enlargem ent and m arket
integration under Chancellor M e rk e l.119 Although future expansion (to th e W estern
Balkans) has not been ruled out, M erkel has called for stricter m em bership
requirem ents and has been view ed as a skeptic fo r granting Turkey m em bership;
offering a privileged partnership as an alternative.

SUM M ARY
Taking into consideration th e various theories and school of thoughts, the
authors under review seem to disagree on th e explanations o f the current stage of
German foreign policy. The Birmingham school authors continue th e ir argum ent th a t
Germ any indeed still has a European vocation, aligning G erm an interests w ith European
interests in a combined Germ an European policy, although noting th a t policies have
become 'leaner and m eaner'. O ther scholars make an argum ent to show a deviation
from the previously observed policy cycle and rhetoric o f continuity in Germ an foreign

118 Paul Belkin, "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," Current
Politics and Economics o f Europe 21, no. 2 (2009): 216.
119 "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," Current Politics and
Economics o f Europe 21, no. 2 (2009). The au th or refers to current EU policies as a "tem pered
enthusiasm", and notes a "skepticism" tow ard European m arket integration (p. 221).

policy, and instead argue fo r a new 'agency based' approach of Germ an foreign policy
w ith precise calculation to best serve national interests. W hile the neorealist
explanations, assumptions, and predictions about G erm an foreign policy have certainly
not been able to account fo r reality, it is im portant to note th a t the o th er schools lack
th e emphasis and analysis of pow er and how it applies to Germ any. Beverly Crawford
overcomes this problem by making th e concept o f pow er a focus point in her theoretical
analysis o f Germ an foreign policy, creating her articulation o f 'em bedded hegem ony'.
G erm any has used power, both institutionally and unintentionally, to serve national
interests and shaping the 'regional milieu goals'. An argum ent can be m ade o f a gradual
transform ation from structure to agency w ithin G erm an foreign policy. This gradual
transform ation and change will be analyzed in th e next th re e chapters o f this study, by
focusing on how change occurs, w h a t variables determ in e and shape this change, and
how this change can be explained theoretically.
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CHAPTER IV

ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE
USE OF FORCE

INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f this case study and chapter is to provide an overview o f w h a t
perspectives explain out o f area operations and security policies, specifically th e use of
force, and how th e concept has contributed to Germ any's changing foreign and security
policy. The case of Libya was selected to highlight th e policy area involving th e
relationship among allies and m ultilateral operations. I argue th at cases involving use of
force discussions are sequential and fit into Germ any's p attern and understanding o f
pow er, security, and identity. In order to analyze th e policy area of o u t o f area
operations and th e critical political dialogue in which th e use of force is debated in
German politics, three historical cases, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, will also be
analyzed based on the same criteria. The rhetoric, action, and behavior o f G erm an
policy makers in all cases will be exam ined to determ in e w hich independent variables
influence and explain Germany's behavior. Alliance solidarity stands fo r G erm any's ties
and com m itm ent to m ultilateral approaches w ithin a NATO and EU fram ew o rk, and
specifically Germany's history o f aligning w ith th e U.S. Historical m em ory accounts fo r
Germany's culture of restraint and adherence to W W II legacy and constructs. The
domestic influence variable reflects th e im portance of public political opinion in
Germ any to influence Germany's foreign and security policy while national interests

83

account for Germany's possession and m ilieu goals, som etim es parallel to the EU and
sometimes separate from the EU, to include economic interests. I argue th a t th e
selective use o f historical m em ory has becom e instrum ental to explain, inform , and
justify Germ an foreign policy fo r out o f area operations. In order to understand and
explain Germany's som ewhat puzzling behavior in the case o f Libya, comparisons
betw een previous use of force analyses in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are m ade to
provide additional insight and to link theoretical speculation to empirical evidence. Each
selected point of crisis involving G erm an debates and consensus reaching about th e use
of force is then categorized in term s o f change and continuity while identifying th e most
influential variables. Again, these variables are: dom estic influence, alliance solidarity,
historical m em ory, and national interests. Beyond the prim ary analysis on th e case of
Libya, this study will guide in understanding how change occurs in G erm an foreign policy
and how this change is studied and understood in broader applications. The selected
preceding cases involving use o f force discussions provide th e context fo r identifying
under which circumstances historical m em ory influences German foreign policy and
w h eth er rhetoric supports observed policy behavior.

OUT OF AREA MILITARY OPERATION: A HISTORY OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMANY'S
STRATEGIC CULTURE
Over the past tw o decades, security scholars and scholars o f G erm an foreign and
security policy have extensively researched, analyzed, and interpreted Germ any's out of
area m ilitary operations after W W II. The "use of force" dialogue fits under the um brella
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o f NATO alliance responsibility and out o f area operations, but is also bound to
perpetuated rhetoric and explanations based on historical m em ory and collective ideas
of Germany's reinvention after th e holocaust. Germ an m ilitary culture has resulted in an
antim ilitary stance tow ards foreign and security policies advocated by politicians and
legitimized by German society. The use of force debate em erged strongly in early 2 00 0
a fte r Germany's involvem ent in Kosovo; Germ any's role as a civilian pow er was
questioned by some w hile others argued fo r Germ any's position on th e 'right side o f
history'. Since then, the use of force debate has fallen into an overall puzzling
observation o f the continuities and changes; som etim es described as "inconsistent"
policies involving foreign affairs and security. From Kosovo and Iraq to Afghanistan and
now Libya, G erm any has adopted a strategic culture linked to restricting th e use o f force
more closely related to the old status quo: th e policy style o f the Bonn Republic.
This strategic culture, which highlights and emphasizes how th e past influences
and shapes current policy behavior, has been used as a fram ew o rk to analyze specific
security policies and behavior w ithin th e past tw e n ty years. Analyzing change or
continuity by examining how Germany's strategic culture evolved over tim e allows an in
depth look at security and defense behavior specific to Germ any's national identity
based on norms, values, and historical m em ory. These changes in G erm an strategic
culture began w ith th e newly constructed culture a fte r W W II which included a legally
restricted role, conscription, full integration w ith m ultilateral institutions, and
dem ocratization of civil-military relations. Further, in 198 9 -1 99 0 , a new ly-em erged
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Germ any began exporting security.1 This "radical" change a fte r th e Kosovo involvem ent
directly contributed to the continuous influence o f strategic culture on th e Bundeswehr,
out of area operations, and the debates over th e invasion o f Iraq in 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 . Scholars
have argued th a t Germany's historic past, as w ell as its strategic culture, binds policy
makers to a set of predisposed options.2
This strategic culture, w hile m arked w ith continuity over the decades,
underw ent several (small) changes or shifts, especially surrounding th e consensus on
the use of force. The 1990's w ere m arked by split party views on th e use o f force. The
Social Democrats (SPD) and th e Green Party advocated and prom oted pacifism w hile th e
CDU attem pted to change legal barriers th a t forbade Germ an deploym ent o f forces.3
Kosovo changed and reconstructed how th e use o f force was viewed, discussed, and
im plem ented fo r German foreign and security policy and was sanctioned by th e RedGreen coalition. The rhetoric surrounding Kosovo, which will be analyzed in much
greater detail in another section o f this dissertation, was marked by constant references
to th e hum anitarian efforts under which G erm any operated in Kosovo. The consensus
th a t was reached before Kosovo differed greatly from th e rhetoric and policy
surrounding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, although Libya appears to have all th e "right"
preconditions to w arrant th e use o f force based on hum anitarian efforts to prevent
genocide.

1 Kerry Anne Longhurst, Germany and the Use o f Force (M anchester, UK.: M anchester University Press,
2004), 2.
2 Germany and the Use o f Force (M anchester, UK.: M anchester University Press, 2004).
3 Brian C. Rathbun, "The M yth o f German Pacifism," Germ an Politics & Society 24, no. 2 (2006): 69.
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The CDU, im m ediately follow ing unification, argued for a Bundeswehr capable of
increased m ilitary operations in connection to NATO, under the concept of
Handlungsfahigkeit.4 These calls to increase influence, by political leaders such as th en
Defense M inister Volker Ruhe, w ere discussed by scholars in the field under th e
normalization debate, referring to an overall 'norm alization strategy' to increase
Germ an influence and to become a 'norm al' actor along o th e r European countries.
Chancellor Helm ut Kohl argued th a t G erm any should assimilate to th e responsibilities of
o th er 'norm al' state powers, but th e realization o f an increased international role in
peacekeeping missions would prove difficult due to party conflicts and consensus about
th e use of German m ilitary forces.5 Instead, G erm any contributed financially to out o f
area peace operations, a policy th a t has since been referred to as 'G erm any's checkbook
diplomacy'.
The 1994 Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) decision to rein terp ret the
previously accepted constitutional clause th a t forbade the deploym ent o f m ilitary forces
fo r out o f area operations unless fulfilling obligations under NATO Article V was
m onum ental for the use of force discourse.6 The FCC ruled th a t out o f area deplo ym ent
o f German troops and participation fo r peace keeping missions was legal under
m andates of collective security organizations such as th e UN, WEU, and NATO. This

4 The term itself means "ability to act", referring to Germany's capability to take on m ilitary operations.
For more on this, please refer to "The M yth o f Germ an Pacifism," Germ an Politics & Society 24, no. 2
(2006).
5 During these initial debates, th e FDP rejected a call to send Germ an forces in support o f out o f area
operations w ith o ut a constitutional am endm ent, th e SPD agreed only to hum anitarian purposes, and th e
Greens rejected any use of the German m ilitary beyond its borders.
6 Article V outlines th a t members of the NATO alliance are required to aid any m em ber th a t is attacked.
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m eant th a t the court decision directly dictated th e m ultilateral context in which such
missions must be assumed, fu rth er contributing to the establishm ent, legitim ization,
and construction of rules and norms. The rhetoric, at th e tim e , carefully distinguished
betw een the term s 'intervention' and 'hum anitarian efforts'. M ost im portantly, the
constitutional court decision effectively moved th e concept o f the use o f force from a
legally forbidden act to a politically debated policy. Politicians w ere no longer able to
hide behind th e curtains o f legality and w ere forced to debate, analyze, and com e to a
consensus on German troop deploym ent outside o f Germany's borders and beyond
territorial or alliance defense.
The details surrounding deploym ent and participation of the Bundeswehr in such
efforts had to be approved through a m ajority vote by th e Germ an Bundestag. Despite
th e appearance of a consensus on this issue, stark disagreements am ong the political
parties of Germany w ere observed as the concept of th e use of force u n d e rw en t this
constitutional transform ation. The G erm an Left opposed th e constitutional court
decision w hile other European countries at th e tim e (i.e. France and England) advocated
for stronger hum anitarian interventions. These early years o f consensus reaching
surrounding th e use o f force by Germ an m ilitary forces reflected a collective a ttitu d e
when m et w ith historical mem ories and interpretations o f w a r and th e purpose th ereo f.
The rhetoric, especially by SPD leaders, showed a lack o f distinction betw een "w ar fo r
self-interest or selfless aims", prom inently argued fo r by Katrin Fuchs (SPD) w ho said,
"M ilitary interventions are not hum anitarian actions," and cabinet m inister Heidem arie
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Wieczorkek-Zeul who added th a t "peace enforcem ent m eans fighting w ars."7 This early
rhetoric was marked by pacifism, and th e struggle to redefine and reconstruct
previously held norms and beliefs was evident throughout.
Also of im portance to note are th e initial criteria outlined by th e Germ an
governm ent after the FCC's decision on out of area m ilitary deploym ents. According to
these criteria, missions w ere lim ited to Europe and had to include a UN m andate.
Further, missions including the Bundeswehr had to be characterized through public
support while a convincing th reat to G erm any, Europe, and international peace had to
exist in order fo r military missions beyond defense of the alliance.8 W h ile these criteria
w ere only used initially, th e Germ an parliam ent developed The Parliam entary
Participation Act (Parlam entsbeteiligungsgesetz) in 2005, which officially required th e
consent of parliam ent for out o f area missions involving th e Bundeswehr. Germ any's
strategic culture after W W II was m arked by antim ilitarism . The norms developed during
this tim e carried over to th e period past Germ an unification and reflected th e overall
reluctance, and sometimes refusal "to consider m ilitary m eans as a legitim ate
instrum ent of foreign policy".9 Pacifism and rejection of th e use of m ilitary force are
therefore apparent concepts of security and strategic culture which G erm ans hold in

7 Rathbun, "The M yth of German Pacifism," 7 2 -7 3 . Katrin Fuchs, "M ilitareinsatze sind keine 'hum anitare
Aktionen,",Socialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 4 8 (115). 1993, 1-3 and ,"Das Nein W a r Deutlich: Interview
M it Der Spd-Vizechefin Heidemarie W ieczorek-Zeul U ber Bundeswehreinsatze," D er Spiegel, March 7,
1994, accessed October 8, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .s p ie g e l.d e /s p ie g e l/p rin t/d -1 3 6 8 5 3 4 4 .h tm l.
8 Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," Survival 37, no. 3 (1995): 92.
9 Harald Muller, "German Foreign Policy a fte r Unification," in The N ew Germany an d th e N ew Europe, ed.
Paul B. Stares (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 162.
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combination w ith the tendency to rationalize m ilitary operations based on cost.10 These
views, and consequently norms, tow ards the use o f force resulted in G erm any's
continued restriction of its m ilitary role in th e international environm ent, instead
focusing on economic, political, and diplom atic measures to resolve issue areas w ith in
th e security realm. Along with th e continued views tow ards antim ilitarism , G erm any's
strategic culture was also marked by com m itm ents to m ultilateralism and adam antly
rejected unilateral approaches. Germ any's focus on nationalism and unilateralism in th e
past, and the consequences th ereo f, resulted in a fear o f pursuing a Sonderweg, or
special path. The past few years of Germ any's foreign policy, especially in light o f th e
economic crisis and the abstention o f th e vote on m ilitary intervention in Libya, has led
skeptical scholars to refer to Germ any's Sonderweg once again, pointing to th e m ore
unilateral approaches based on national interests observed in recent G erm an policies.

Continuity and Change since Unification in German Foreign and Security Policy
Scholars within the field have w idely analyzed and exam ined continuity and
change of German foreign policy since unification, focusing on the puzzling phenom ena
o f structural changes th at w ere not preceded w ith pow er political policies geared
tow ard self-interest. As explained in the theoretical section o f this dissertation,
numerous fram eworks are used to understand and predict Germany's past choices in
behavior, none of which can fully grasp and account fo r Germany's policies in th e past
tw en ty years. Since unification in O ctober 1990, several policy changes occurred th a t fall

10 Duffield, "German Security Policy a fte r Unification: Sources of C ontinuity and Restraint."
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into the realm of security, defense, and foreign affairs. Germany's e ffo rt to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was view ed as th e first true departure from policy, raising
questions about unilateral behavior. Germ any encouraged its European Commission
(EC) partners to consider diplom atic relationship w ith both countries despite resistance
from other European countries, th e U.S., and the UN. Germany's im m ediate recognition
and violation o f the EC agreem ent resulted in media and scholarly speculation about
Germany's potential independent and unilateral approach to foreign policy in th e
fu tu re.11 Germany's decision was influenced by several factors to include a desire to end
conflict in the area, decrease Germ any's risk of increased w ar refugees, and to act on
domestic pressures. German society, especially th e southern region, is m arked by
historical, cultural, and political ties to Slovenia and Croatia, thus sym pathizing with
Croatia while the German media focused on Serb violence.12
Examining the fram eworks and argum ents by scholars in the field, th e
fundam ental determ inant and variable for these initial changes in policy can directly be
attributed to th e changes in th e external environm ent, resulting in new dem ands on
Germany as an exporter o f security. Germ any's central position resulted in an increased
expectation by its W estern allies to act on ethnic and territorial conflicts, refugee
migration, and m ilitary conflicts in th e fo rm e r Com m unist countries as w ell as on crises
outside of Europe, to include Iraq and Som alia.13 Despite these changes in the

11 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint," 185.
12 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint." For m ore inform ation
about the factors th at led Germany to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, see pages 1 8 5 -1 8 9 .
13 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint," 172.
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international environm ent, Germany's post-w ar political culture was m arked by
continuity and restraint, especially in regards to its security policy. This culture of
restraint can be explained through th e historical legacies o f Germ any's Nazi past.
Further, Germany's foreign policy past W W II and before unification was considered
"successful", thus constructing norms and rules which have been accepted, legitim ized,
and internalized by German political leaders, as w ell as domestic society.14
Additionally, Germany continued to stress th e im portance of integration into
institutional structures of international and m ultilateral cooperation am ong its allies.
This firm integration in the post-w ar and post-unification years served to fulfill
Germany's goal of strengthening and integrating Europe, as w ell as lessening the fears
o f neighbors towards potential special, unilateral approaches in th e fu tu re . Institutional
theorists here refer to the shadow o f the future in predicting peace and stability am ong
countries which are integrated into such structures and agreem ents. G erm any's relative
continuous foreign policy, especially fo r out o f area operations and involving the
Bundeswehr, can be partially attributed to the balancing effect of th e coalition politics of
th e Bundestag, resulting in a centering effect of Germ any's foreign policy. This
m oderate, or center, approach by Germ any has continued w ith a high degree of
coherency throughout the 1990's and 2000's, w ith th e exception o f th e use o f force in
Kosovo, Germany's strong tendencies to m ultilateral approaches in th e last tw e n ty years
has began to alter slightly, depending on the issue area, but certainly w ith some breaks
in m ultilateralism in 2002.

14 Ibid.
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Germany's desire after unification to fulfill its broadened obligation and
responsibility to the international com m unity appears to have altered slightly as
national interests and economic goals are pursued. John Duffield argued tw e n ty years
ago th at "continuity in German security policy is partly contingent on th e m aintenance
o f a relatively benign and supportive external environm ent," and w arned th a t hostile
developm ents could trigger a divergence in security policy areas by G erm any.15 Some
changes in Germ an foreign and security policy w ere observed from th e Bonn to Berlin
Republics. The old status quo was m arked w ith passive involvem ent,
noninterventionism , and refusal on th e use of force. The principles under th e Berlin
Republic after unification showed a responsible Germ any, willing to support out of area
operations and a desire to reestablish long held principles. W hile these changes a fte r
unification could be categorized as a reconstruction of policies and establishing a new
status quo, an analysis of the sequential points o f crises may offer a differen t, m ore
consistent view. This is also true w hen considering other foreign policy areas, which will
be discussed in chapter five of this dissertation.

15 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint," 191.
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Table 1: Germany's Status Quo
Old Status Quo>Bohn Republic

New Status Quo-Berlin Republic

Respect international law and human rights
Never use military force other than for selfdefense
Be peaceful and antimilitarist
Be committed to democratic ideals
Not harming allies and politically supporting
them
"Never again War"

Defend international law and human rights
Use military force responsibly for good causes
Protect peace and restore it, if necessary
Promote democratic ideals abroad
Aid allies and militarily support them
"Never again Genocide"

(Source: Leithner, Anika. Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, M em ory, and N atio n al Interest. Boulder,
Colorado: FirstForumPress, 2009:46)

The above chart shows how Germ any's understanding and application of
responsibility has changed, or appeared to have changed, from the Bonn Republic to the
Berlin Republic. W hile this table depicts how lessons of history influence Germ any's
dem ocratic com m itm ent, the table can also be used to assess current com m itm en t to
engagem ent and responsible behavior as observed during th e tw o selected case studies
for this dissertation and the analysis in this chapter about th e use o f force. Taking into
consideration th e past four years o f Germ an foreign and security policy, especially in
light of the economic crisis, may alter th e projected and previously observed change in
policy; instead showing a reversal, or continuance, o f previously held ideas about
responsible behavior. The choice to abstain during th e voting process in th e case of
Libya, thus siding w ith China and Russia, certainly questions several tenets o f Germ any's
responsibility to its allies and th e international system. This behavior, change, or
reversal should therefore be analyzed and grouped to determ ine w h e th e r policy and
action are representations eith er a) an adjustm ent to policy; b) a learning
process/norms, or c) a reconstruction or direct change in foreign policy. The case of

Libya will th e re fo re be analyzed in order to exam ine w h e th e r policy actions w ere
inform ed by historic m emory, thus directly connecting guilt and responsibility, w h eth er
a direct change occurred, w h e th e r Germ any's behavior falls into a norms based
fram ew ork fo r explaining and understanding policies and rhetorical actions around
Libya, and how this case was understood and categorized by scholars. In o rder to
provide a context for an analysis surrounding th e use o f force consensus in th e Libya
case, the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are briefly discussed using th e same
fram ew ork and variables.

The Use of Force: Kosovo
W hile th e use of force even during peacekeeping operations was still highly
opposed by th e Left, th e civil wars o f the 1990's contributed to an overall acceptance
th a t diplom atic efforts w ere unable to resolve th e bloody conflicts in both Bosnia and
Rwanda. The events in Bosnia changed how politicians, especially th e Greens and the
SPD, view ed th e com patibility of th e concepts of 'never again war,' and 'n ever again
Auschwitz'; questioning and weighing the im pact not to intervene m ilitarily w ould have
on their responsibility to protect people and prevent horrific hum anitarian cost.16 The
rhetoric at the tim e, especially from Leftist politicians w ho initially opposed th e use o f
force, showed a gradual change in reaction to th e international environm ent, and the

16 Rathbun, "The M yth of German Pacifism," 73.
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intersection of responsibility and guilt was publicly discussed.17 This intersection, the
previously held consensus, and th e changed which peaked in 1994, showed a gradual
learning process th a t resulted in policy advocacy o f approaches which m ade exception
in cases and conflicts w here hum an rights violations occurred.
The intersection o f responsibility and guilt, or, responsibility and historic
memory, eventually turned into a fe a r o f new guilt of th e consequences o f not
consenting to intervene forcefully. W hile th e CDU m ade this change faster and m ore
collective, the SPD and the Greens still differed internally on exactly which cases
required the use of force. W hile th e im portance o f Germ any's history was considered by
some, the SPD revolted and opposed against proposals by th e CDU to provide Tornado
aircraft air defense support in Bosnia in M a y 1 9 9 5 .18 The SPD eventually found
consensus on th e issue, being confronted w ith th e a fte rm ath of the massacre in
Srebrencia, and voted in support o f deploym ent o f a NATO peace operation th a t
included the use o f Tornado aircraft.19 The disagreem ents among th e political parties
internally during Bosnia influenced by previously held norms about pacifism and
noninterventionism , due to historical and collective m em ory, m et w ith new
considerations of responsibility, necessity, and potential guilt. The learning process and

17 "The M yth o f German Pacifism." The author quotes W a lte r Kolbow, defense spokesperson fo r the SPD
who recalled th at it becom e "increasingly difficult to stand by and watch murders take place".
18 "The M yth o f German Pacifism," 74. M o st notably, defense expert N orbert Gansel argued th a t "our
duty to help and to m ilitarily protect th e peacekeepers now weighs m ore heavily than any history th a t
forbids us from forcing others to their knees."
19 Rathbun discusses in detail th e specifics about th e differing opinions on the use o f force and
intervention in Bosnia between the SPD and th e left wing o f th e party, in particular th e public exchange of
letters between Joschka Fischer and th e left wing. Scholars have since analyzed this difference between
th e Red/Green parties and argued th a t differing stances on consent on th e use o f force w ere electorally
driven.
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critical discussions of the mid 1990s directly contributed to the left wing's approval o f
German contribution in th e NATO air w a r against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1998.
The im portance of Germ any's participation in Kosovo for its foreign and security
policy, especially the significant reinterpretation o f 'the use o f force', has to be view ed
and analyzed in connection to hum anitarianism . The most critical aspect o f Kosovo (and
Bosnia before) th at allowed G erm any to reach a consensus on forceful intervention lies
directly in the disastrous hum anitarian consequences if no action w e re taken . Ethnic
cleansing, genocide, and th e death o f innocent w om en and children w ere to o fam iliar
and too drastic to ignore, thus trum ping th e previously held "never again" norm
tow ards war. W hile Kosovo was certainly a m ultilateral e ffo rt under th e NATO um brella,
both parties o f the Germ an governm ent sought guarantees from NATO th a t the
intervention in Kosovo was not driven by territorial conflict, oil, or o th e r self-interest
m otives.20
W hile th e Bundeswehr's involvem ent in Bosnia's peacekeeping operation was
significant, Kosovo would mark th e first tim e Germ an forces w ere deployed and
participated in m ilitary operations outside Germ an borders since W W II. The significance
of Kosovo, and the consensus on th e use o f force is m ultifaceted: not only did the
German public w idely support th e mission, the execution o f the mission occurred
w ith out a UN m andate and under a Left governing political coalition. Although UN
Resolution 1199 called for an im m ediate cease fire, m ilitary action under an official UN

20 W infried Nachtwei, "Nato-Luftangriffe: Antiserbische Agression O der Einzige Rettungchance Fur Den
Kosovo," (Positionpaper 26 March 1999), accessed October 9, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .m u e n s te r.o rg /frie d e n /lu fta n g riffe .h tm .
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m andate was impossible due to Russia's opposition, yet intervention on th e basis of
gross human rights violations and hum anitarian catastrophes provided th e option fo r
Germany's Red-Green coalition to act.21 In O ctober 1998, NATO authorized airstrikes
against Serbian m ilitary targets. Discussions am ong NATO m em bers initially involved
capability determ inations in which G erm any offered m ilitary support w ith o u t
com m itting com bat troops for the mission in Kosovo.
W hile th e internal debates over th e consensus reaching process of th e use of
force betw een the Reds and Greens offers an interesting inquisition o f change w ithin
th e Germ an governm ent, the im portance o f this process to th e overall change to
Germ an foreign policy lies w ithin Germ any's desire to be view ed as a responsible
partner. The new coalition was tasked w ith a difficult decision which w ould define
Germany's continuity w hile increasing calculability and showing c o m m itm en t to
m ultilateral alliance solidity.22 Internal differences on th e question o f Germ an m ilitary
participation continued, especially am ong th e Green party led by ioschka Fischer. During
debates at the Bielefeld Party Congress in M a y 1999, Fischer publicly explained th a t
Germany's conflicting post-war political culture concepts o f 'never again w ar' and 'never
again Auschwitz' m eant Germ any, its citizens and politicians, had to take a stand to end
genocide in Kosovo. These calls, and th e overall argum ent by Fischer, showed th e

21 Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the M aking o f the Berlin Republic. An A lternative History o f Postw ar
Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110.
22 Joachim Krause, "Die Deutsche Politik in Der Kosovo-Krise," in H um antiare Intervention Und
Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, ed. Joachim Krause (Opladen: Leske+Budich, 2000).
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intersection o f guilt and responsibility, w hile uncovering Germany's obligation to th e
international community.
The case o f Kosovo for G erm any is interesting fo r several reasons. Germ any's
intricate history w ith the region and continued involvem ent and relationship certainly
contributed to speculations and analysis o f Germ any's strong behavior. To begin,
Albania was backed by the Germ an governm ent through the G erm an-Albanian
agreem ent signed in 1995, which, although generally w orded, was intended to apply to
Kosovo as well. Also, a German Inform ation Service was set up in Tirana in o rder to
assist Kosovar23 militia at the tim e . G erm any assisted th e Kosovo Liberation Arm y (KLA),
an ethnic-Albanian param ilitary organization, in acquiring weapons and e quipm en t from
Albania.24 Germany's continuous financial support for secessionist m ovem ents and veto
to a weapons supply cut-off request to th e KLA, placed G erm any on a clear side from
th e onset of th e conflicts. Rhetorically, defense m inister V olker Riihe explained th a t any
actor w ho agreed to the resolution to strengthen th e borders is essentially siding w ith
Milosevic, and called on th e U.S. to act against Yugoslavia during p re -w ar diplom atic
talks. Further, Ruhe strengthened Germ any's official position that Milosevic was
carrying out ethnic cleansing. W h ile the official rhetoric o f G erm any was often perceived
as a collective consensus on the conflict in Kosovo, internally, discussions w ere m arked
by "incoherence, intra-coalition wrangling, and bureaucratic rivalries".25

23 Albanians o f Kosovo
24 Adrian Hyde-Price, "Germany and th e Kosovo W ar: Still a Civilian Power?," German Politics 10, no. 1
( 2001 ).

25 "Germany and the Kosovo W ar: Still a Civilian Power?," G erm an Politics 10, no. 1 (2001): 25.
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The Rambouillet Agreem ent, a proposed peace agreem ent b e tw ee n Kosovar
Albanians and Yugoslavia drafted by G erm an foreign m inister Joschka Fischer and U.S.
Secretary of State M adeleine Albright, was accepted by th e Am erican, Albanian, and
British delegations and rejected by Russian and Serbian delegates. The failed and
rejected agreem ent contributed to a strengthened Germ an position which resulted in
th e first m ilitary intervention since W W II, w ith Chancellor Schroder arguing for
exclusively hum anitarian reasons to explain Germany's involvem ent. Until then,
Germany's foreign policy choices w ere m arked by pursuing norm ative goals, to include
the universal right o f self-determ ination. This concept, during the Kosovo crisis, was
then used to justify the forceful intervention in Kosovo w h ile emphasizing Germ any's
com m itm ent and responsibility to NATO allies. Both Schroder and Fischer fe lt th a t
involvem ent was necessary, yet Germ any's involvem ent, at first, was difficult to explain
to the Germ an public. Germ any also continued its com m itm ent to diplom atic efforts to
end conflicts by convincing Russia to w ith d ra w support fro m Belgrade.
Later reports showed th a t th e KLA was encouraged by Germ any to declare a
hum anitarian crisis in order to give legitimacy to a NATO intervention. Germ any's
behavior, action, and policies during th e Kosovo crisis put G erm any on th e m ap as an
active participant in the international com m unity and w orld affairs. A fter th e
intervention, German politicians pushed fo r independence fo r Kosovo and contributed
to the reconstruction of Kosovo through developm ent o f Kosovo's econom y and
infrastructure. Germ any had a continuous com m itm ent o f over 2 ,0 0 0 Bundeswehr
troops, under NATO in Kosovo, w hile Germ any supported th e privatization o f Kosovo's
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industrial enterprise with heavy involvem ent by th e Germ an businesses such as
Deutsche Bank and Siemens.26 Kosovo was recognized by Germ any in 2 00 8 and holds an
embassy seat in Pristina w hile Kosovo has an embassy in Berlin and consulates in
Frankfurt and Stuttgart.

The Use of Force: Iraq
The mission in Kosovo also differed greatly from the w ar in Iraq, which was
marked by aggression and focused on weapons o f mass destruction (W M D ). The
m ultilateral aspect of the w ar in Iraq th e re fo re did not convince G erm any to support
and participate in an intervention in Iraq. W hile initially seen as a break w ith
m ultilateralism for Germ any from its m ajor ally, th e U.S., the decision was m ade on th e
basis of moral legitimacy and responsibility to th e international com m unity. Initial
examinations and comparisons betw een Kosovo and Iraq led scholars in th e field to
assert th at the Franco-German solidarity observed during Iraq showed an almost
m ultilateral European approach to antim ilitarism and intervention, w hich was solidified
by Germany's stance. W hile domestic opposition to th e w ar in Iraq was certainly evident
during and after the invasion, th e im portance of political party opposition becam e clear
w ith th e Left strictly advocating against the U.S.'s rhetoric. Statem ents by political
leaders during the Iraq w ar showed and reflected th e overall antim ilitarist culture in
Germany, driven partially by dom estic influences, but analyses also explained th e
im portance of political goals to include securing a re-election of the Red-Green coalition.

26 "Germany and th e Kosovo W ar: Still a Civilian Power?."
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Perhaps most notably evidenced by Joschka Fischer's remarks of 'Excuse m e, but I am
not convinced' to Donald Rumsfield, Germany's behavior, action, and rhetoric during
th e discussions leading up to th e invasion o f Iraq showed Germany's 'n ew ly'-o rien ted
foreign policy. W hile breaks w ith m ultilateral approaches w e re evident in Kosovo, th e
anti-American undertone and behavior by G erm any was certainly 'new '; how ever, th e
policy of noninterventionism certainly fell directly into Germ any's established norm.
Therefore, to argue th at a direct change in policy occurred during and a fte r Iraq would
be a gross overstatem ent. Breaks w ith m ultilateralism occurred during Kosovo, under
th e im portance o f hum anitarian intervention. This principle o f hum anitarian
intervention and its connection to Germ any's concept of 'n ever again Auschwitz'
provided a base line to assess o u t o f area operations involving the use of force. The case
of Iraq provided neither a hum anitarian catastrophe argum ent nor was G erm any alone
in its refusal to support the U.S.'s mission in Iraq.
Germany took the position th a t th e UN inspections fo r W M D s in Iraq should be
com pleted before any other decisions w ere m ade, stressing th e im portance o f th e
diplomatic process. Besides Fischer, Chancellor G erhard Schroder's rhetoric was
strongly marked by opposition against th e invasion o f Iraq and the use o f m ilitary force.
Schroder, first speaking out against the invasion, added th a t G erm any w ould not
support m ilitary operations in Iraq even if th e w ar was supported and legitim ized
through a UN Security Council m andate. His position largely reflected th e overall a n ti
w ar sentim ent of th e German population. During 2003, polls showed an 80% opposition
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to the w ar by the German population, highlighting the im portance o f dom estic
influences on political policies.27
Germ any eventually joined forces w ith Belgium and France to block NATO fo r
th e planning of a possible w ar in Iraq. This break in alliance w ith th e U.S. w ould m ark
th e first tim e Germ any opposed an Am erican foreign policy choice since W W II. This
division of interests can also be seen as th e division in norms and beliefs which inform
strategic culture and the use of force. The rhetoric by th e U.S. at th e tim e grouped
France and Germany into the 'old Europe', w hile countries in the Baltic region
supported the Bush doctrine and deploym ent to Iraq. Despite Germany's opposition and
refusal to send troops to Iraq, G erm any continued to support U.S. foreign policy in o th er
parts of the world, and would eventually publically, although just rhetorically, support
efforts in Iraq. W hile relations w ith th e U.S. w eakened, th e relationship betw een
Germany and Russia became stronger. The decision by th e U.S. to invade Iraq posed
several challenges to international order. First and forem ost, the w estern allies
disagreed about the w ar itself, its reasoning and legitimacy, and outright opposed it. As
with most cases in this dissertation, the elem ent o f economic interests has to be raised
in the case of Iraq, as Germany exports goods to Iraq.28 Despite Schroeder's public
stance against the w ar, Germ any was bound to support a UN decision fo r international

27 Dieter Dettke, Germany Says "No". The Iraq W a r and the Future o f German Foreign an d Security Policy
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
28 According to the German Departm ent of State, bilateral tra d e has continued to grow in recent years,
and were at €1.3 billion in 2011.
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law purposes. A German court later ruled th a t th e invasion o f Iraq violated international
law .29

The Use of Force: Afghanistan
Afghanistan is an im portant case, both in term s o f Germ any's continued
progression for use of force discussion and consensus reaching, as w ell as G erm any's
role as a security exporter. Germany's com m itm en t to th e mission in Afghanistan
marked the first tim e of Bundeswehr deploym ent outside o f European borders. Initially
presented to the German public as a mission focused on developm ent and
reconstruction under the hum anitarian aid um brella, operations in Afghanistan changed
w ith the security environm ent to a m ore conflict intensive mission requiring critical
input and analysis on the role o f Germ any in Afghanistan. W hen O peration Enduring
Freedom (OEF) w ent into effect in O ctober 2001, th e chance of Germ an com bat tro o p
deploym ent was under discussion by m em bers o f th e Bundestag.30 W hile the
CDU/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), SPD, and Free Dem ocratic Party (FDP)
reached consensus and supported th e U.S. mission in Afghanistan, th e Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS) strongly opposed it, w ith th e Green party being internally
divided.
During the Bundestag hearing on th e vote fo r G erm an deploym ent o f forces to

29 Although a case involving a German soldier's refusal to obey and o rd er after th e invasion o f Iraq did not
receive much attention internationally, it reflects th e German understanding and belief in th e im portance
of legitimacy though international law (perhaps partially due to th e history surrounding th e concept o f
Rechtsstaat)
30 "Einsatz Deutscher Soldaten in Der A nti-Terror Allianz Ruckt Naher," D ie Welt, O ctober 8, 2001.
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Afghanistan w ith the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under UN Security
Council Resolution 1368 and 1373, and in coalition w ith NATO, Chancellor Schroder
stressed th at specific deploym ent caveats would apply to th e allowed 3 ,9 0 0 troops. The
initial m andate allowed fo r a mission o f tw elve months w ith a required renew al vote by
th e Bundestag. Further, th e m andate outlined full control over Germ an forces by th e
Bundestag and stressed th e hum anitarian aspect o f th e mission. The chancellor's
statem ents emphasized th e need fo r G erm any to show com m itm ent and responsibility
to its partners and added th a t participation in the mission in Afghanistan would be proof
th a t the German Sonderweg was an illusion.31 This precise rhetorical linking o f a W W II
legacy te rm to the possible consequences of Germany's foreign policy behavior shows
th e influence of historical m em ory on contem porary political discussions.32
Chancellor Schroder promised "unlim ited solidarity" in both a press conference
and to th e Bundestag, to support the U.S. in finding the terrorists responsible fo r the
attacks of Septem ber 11, 2 0 0 1 .33 This strong rhetorical support showed Germ any's
com m itm ent to take on m ore responsibility and a bigger international role, w hile
continuing to advocate its alliance solidarity and obligations tow ard global security.
W hile both Schroder and Fischer articulated continued support of G erm any's
com m itm ent to its allies, internally th e Red-Green coalition did not consent on the

31 "Government Statem ent by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder to th e Germ an Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll
1 4 /1 9 8 /1 9 2 8 3 .", accessed October 20, 2013, h ttp ://d ip b t.b u n d e s ta g .d e /d o c /b tp /1 4 /1 4 1 9 8 .p d f# P .1 9 2 8 3
32 "M it klarem Verstand und Ueberzeugung muessen w ir sagen, dass ein deutscher Sonderweg, ein sichHeraushalten in unserer W elt eine Illusion ist. Deutschland traegt Verantw ortung w ie andere Staaten
dieser W e lt auch." Ibid.
33 Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Quietly Chides German for His Dissension on Iraq," New York Times, August 17,

2002.
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mission and use o f force in Afghanistan. Similar to debates and discussions during th e
Kosovo w ar, as images and reports o f th e a fte rm ath o f civilian casualties due to th e air
strikes came pouring in, th e pacifist camp o f th e Greens began to voice th e ir dissent fo r
continued support.34 The m ajority o f th e Bundestag voted in Novem ber 2001 to
contribute German forces to th e OEF mission in Afghanistan. Chancellor Schroder
supported th e w ar on terro r post 9 /1 1 and deployed forces to Afghanistan as part of
NATO operations. W hen Schroder left office in 2005, over 2 ,0 0 0 G erm an troops w ere
still deployed in Afghanistan, making G erm any th e second largest tro o p contributor to
deploy its people after the U.S.35
The newly established UN mission to contribute and assist th e Afghan
governm ent in security efforts as w ell as civil reconstruction support under International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established under the concept o f security
assistance. The German governm ent com m itm en t 1,200 soldiers but em phasized the
difference betw een the OEF mission and th e ISAF mission. W hile the OEF mission was
publicly viewed in connection w ith th e U.S.'s efforts to fight terrorism , th e ISAF mission,
under the umbrella o f developm ental assistance, was easier to explain and justify to th e
German public. Further, reports of th e targeted killings o f Germans through suicide
bombings resulted in public demands to end Germ any's mission in Afghanistan. By
2008, the German governm ent rejected U.S. dem ands for increased G erm an forces to

34 It is im portant to mention th a t the debates surrounding Germ an force deploym ent fo r th e mission in
Macedonia in August 2001, which failed to result in a consensual vote by the governing coalition,
contributed to th e rocky discussions in th e case of Afghanistan.
35 Currently, Germany is the third largest country to com m it troops to Afghanistan, behind th e U.S. and
the U.K.
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Afghanistan, but agreed to provide 200 soldiers to relieve Norwegian forces per NATO's
request.36 Throughout these levels of demands, th e discussions and votes w ithin th e
governm ent and coalition rem ained diverse, w ith o u t a clear consensus on th e use of
force and Germ an com bat troop deploym ent to Afghanistan.
An im portant incident relating to th e political and theoretical discussion o f th e
use of force in th e case of Afghanistan involves G erm any and the Kunduz airstrike th a t
occurred in Septem ber 2009. An American fighter je t, per request by Germ an forces
stationed in the Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, struck fuel tanks thou g h t to
be captured by Taliban insurgents. The airstrike killed over 100 civilians, and resulted in
several political consequences, including restitution paym ents to th e victims, the
resignation o f then German defense m inister Franz Josef Jung, and th e investigation and
prosecution of Oberst (Colonel) Georg Klein, the com m ander who called in th e airstrike.
W hile Germ any was in the midst o f election after th e airstrike, the a fterm ath was
marked by an influx of debates, analyses, controversial discussions, and public outcry
over the mission in Afghanistan.
The Kunduz affair is interesting fo r several reasons. First, th e consequences and
action o f the airstrike in Kunduz changed th e perception of Germany's involvem ent in
th e mission in Afghanistan, which was believed to be fo r reconstruction and
developm ent purposes. This diverging understanding of the mission by th e G erm an
public, mixed w ith the engagem ent and fighting on the ground, resulted in rhetorical

36 "Nato Bittet Um Deutsche Kampftruppe," Suddeutsche Zeitung, M ay 17, 2010, accessed O ctober 22,
2013, h ttp ://w w w .su edd eu tsch e.d e/po litik/afg h an istan -n ato -b ittet-um -d eutsche-kam p ftru p p e-l.263484.
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changes in descriptions of the mission, and paved the w ay fo r a critical look into the
German forces on the ground in Afghanistan at th e tim e. Secondly, th e reaction of
Germany's domestic public which included a n ti-w a r protests with references to Colonel
Klein as a w a r criminal and mass m urderer, an opinion shared by several authors,
scholars, and analysts, shows a stark difference to the tre a tm e n t o f similar cases w here
responsibility falls on the U.S. Thirdly, th e Kunduz affair resulted in a critical analysis into
the conduct o f Germ an soldiers and 'w h a t a soldier is allowed to do during w ar', am idst
the legal process and criminal prosecution o f Colonel Klein as well as th e compensation
process for th e victims of the airstrike.37 Finally, th e legacy o f the Kunduz affair resulted
in th e contribution to the discourse on th e use o f force, the concept of 'civilian casualty',
and the diverse analyses o f the m edia, analysts, and security scholars. The affair was
broadcasted on national television in a movie title d "A murderous decision" (Eine
Morderische Entscheidung), while rem aining th e subject of political debates. G erm an
magazines heavily published analyses on th e affair, most notably an extensive research
project by th e m ajor German new spaper D er Spiegel, titled "A Germ an Crime" (Ein
Deutsches Verbrechen), which referred to th e incident as a 'w ar crim e'.38
Breaking a taboo in German political rhetoric, the w ord “Krieg" (w ar) was used
to describe Germ any's involvem ent in ISAF a fte r th re e Germ an soldiers w ere killed
during ground fighting w ith the Taliban. Then defense M inister Karl-Theodor zu

37 Joerg Diehl, "Kunduz-Prozess: Was Darf Ein Offizier Im Krieg?," Spiegel Online, March 20, 2013, accessed
October 25, 2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesw ehr-in-afghanistan-prozess-zuluftangriff-von-kunduz-beginnt-a-890034.htm l.
38 Ulrike Von Dem m er e t al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen," D e r Spiegel, February, 1, 2010, accessed
October 22, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .s p ie g e l.d e /s p ie g e l/p rin t/d -6 8 8 8 5 0 7 4 .h tm l.
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Guttenberg, publicly spoke of "w ar" and "w arlike circumstance" instead o f th e usual
language o f 'arm ed conflict' as previously argued fo r by Germ an foreign m inister Guido
W esterw elle.39 This rhetoric, by both G uttenberg and W esterw elle, reflects how political
rhetoric is used to justify, interpret, and influence votes w ithin political debates,
simultaneously seeking to change previously held convictions by G erm any's dom estic
society. W esterw elle, w hile not using th e te rm 'w a r', was adam ant in conveying th e
im portance o f Germany's involvem ent in an arm ed conflict situation "w ithin the
param eters o f international law" in order to allow G erm an soldiers in Afghanistan to
engage forcefully w ithout fear o f potential prosecution, adding th a t "w e ow e it to those
w ho are exposing themselves to danger on th e fro n t lines."40

THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA
The Arab spring m ovem ents experienced in Tunisia and Egypt eventually reached
Libya, resulting in a full civil w ar on February 17, 2011 w hen the Arm ed Forces o f the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shot at dem onstrators in Benghazi.41 The arm ed conflict, a
conflict betw een the m ilitary and civilian forces th a t supported Colonel M u a m m a r
Gaddafi and opposition forces seeking to o verthrow th e Gaddafi regim e, spread to

39 "Tabu-Bruch: Guttenberg Spricht Von Krieg in Afghanistan," ibid., April 4, 2010, accessed on O ctober 21,
2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tabu-bruch-guttenberg-spricht-von-krieg-in-afghanistan-a687235.htm l.
40 "The W orld from Berlin: 'N ew Evaluation on Afghanistan Long Overdue'," Spiegel Online, February 11,
2010, accessed October 22, 2012, h ttp ://w w w .s p ie g e l.d e /in te rn a tio n a l/g e rm a n y /th e -w o rld -fro m -b erlin new-evaluation-on-afghanistan-long-overdue-a-677289.htm l.
41 These arm ed forces w ere comprised o f th e Libyan Navy, Army, Air Force, and th e People's m ilitia. The
International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual assessment of global military capabilities and defense
economies estim ated total Libyan arm ed forces personnel to be around 76,000.
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Tripoli a fe w days later. This resulted in the establishm ent o f the National Transitional
Council, th e de fa c to governm ent o f Libya, form ed in Benghazi by th e opposition to
govern over Libya during the conflict and to map o u t th e transition o f th e country. The
council was officially recognized by France in M arch 2011 and viewed as a legitim ate
body representing the Libyan people by also holding the Libyan UN seat during the
revolution. The initial resolution (1970) of th e UN Security Council condem ned th e use
of lethal force by the Gaddafi regim e against protesters during the revolution, and
resulted in several sanctions against Gaddafi and his supporters, to include the freezing
of international assets and travel bans.42
Gaddafi forces w ere able to counterattack m ilitarily through w estern Libya,
eventually bombing planes and tanks held by opposition forces near Benghazi. A fter
reports of th e brutality exercised by pro-G addafi supporters reached th e international
com m unity, Libya's UN delegation, France, and th e United Kingdom proposed a UN
Security Council resolution to establish a no-fly zone and to authorize m ilitary force in
order to protect civilians in Libya. Further, th e Arab League also directly requested th a t
the UNSC impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Resolution 1973 was adopted on M arch 17,
2011, w ith a 10-0 affirm ative vote, no oppositions, and five abstentions. W hile France,
the United Kingdom, and the U.S. voted for th e resolution, Brazil, China, Germ any, India,
and Russia abstained from the official vote. The resolution authorized 'all necessary

42 Resolution 1970 United Nations Security Council, "In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes
Touch Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in W ake o f Crackdown on Protesters,"
February 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .u n .o rg /N e w s /P re s s /d o c s /ll/s c l0 1 8 7 .d o c .h tm .
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measures' and effectively approved th e use of force in th e Libyan conflict to protect
civilian populated areas under attack by the Gaddafi regim e.43
During the EU sum mit in Brussels in M arch 2011, which was m arked by
"annoyance", the validity o f th e new ly form ed council in Libya was discussed w ith
several EU states questioning France's instant recognition.44 According to one report,
th e eastern and southeastern Europeans w ere "appalled a t how ruthlessly France and
Great Britain attem pted to push through th e ir policies", resulting in th e prevention of
th e no-fly zone clause for the initial resolution on M arch 11, 2011 45 A fte r th e escalation
of violence and after th e Arab League officially requested a m ilitary intervention,
internal statem ents show th a t Germ any, Russia, and th e U.S. initially questioned the
problems attributed to the establishm ent o f a no-fly zone. M o re specifically, U.S.
Defense minister Robert Gates relayed his skepticism to Thomas de M aiziere during a
meeting, as it would "require air strikes against Libyan anti-aircraft batteries".46 The U.S.
decision to support the no-fly zone given on M arch 15, 2011 was influenced through
arguments brought forth by President Obam a's advisors, UN Ambassador Susan Rice,
and Samantha Power, w ho argued in line w ith th e UN concept of "responsibility to
protect". According to interviews, th e Germ an governm ent was not m ade aw are of this

43 "Security Council Authorizes 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians in Libya," U N News Centre,
March 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .un.org/apps/new s/story.asp?N ew slD =37808#.U oU lr9JD vTo.
44 Andreas Rinke, "Screbrencia or Afghanistan? W h y G erm any Abstained on the Libya Vote-Tracing th e
History of a Decision," IP Journal (2011).

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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changed position and decision, and no a tte m p t was made to "explain th e astonishing
turnaround in W ashington" which took Germ an politicians "by surprise".47
W hile the possibility of a Germ an "no"in th e form o f a veto was dismissed
quickly, Chancellor M erkel's remarks to the Saarbrucker Zeitung (new spaper) on M arch
17, 2011, outlined Germany's skepticism tow ards m ilitary interventions. The chancellor
stated, "I cannot get us involved in a mission w ith an extrem ely uncertain e n d ".48 A fter
her address a t a plenary session of the Bundestag, heated internal debates ensued
about issues surrounding Germ any's alliances and how th e protection of the civilian
population could be ensured. It is interesting to note th a t some anonymous interview s
show the conversations and dialogue betw een de M aiziere and NATO Secretary G eneral
Andreas Fogh Rasmussen, in which Germ any's c o m m itm en t to the alliance was ensured
despite Germ an abstention: Germ any would provide Germ an soldiers fo r th e A irborne
W arning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan which left Rasmussen
"satisfied".49 Perhaps, these internal exchanges are to account for th e official
statem ents by German politicians detailing G erm any's out o f area mission support a fte r
the news of Germany's abstention broke.
Resolution 1973, under Chapter VII of th e United Nations Charter, called fo r a
ceasefire and end to the violence and brutal attacks by th e Gaddafi regim e, imposed a
no-fly zone over Libya, restricted all flights besides hum anitarian aid flights, and
strengthened a previous arms em bargo imposed by th e Security Council. U nder an allied

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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coalition, French m ilitary jets entered Libyan airspace to enforce and secure th e no-fly
zone imposed by the resolution on M arch 19, 2011. By August 2011, rebel opposition
forces stormed Tripoli, eventually taking control o f th e area. The fighting ended in
October 2011 in the city o f Sirte w here Gaddafi was first captured and eventually killed
by rebel forces, resulting in th e official liberation o f Libya on O ctober 23, 2 0 1 1 .50 W hile
initial reports estim ated th a t 3 0 ,0 0 0 people w ere killed and 50,000 w ere w ounded
during the six months of civil w ar, official numbers are not available. These estim ates
w ere eventually reduced by th e National Transitional Council to about 2 5,0 00 , and an
unfinished Libyan governm ent reported an even low er estim ate in January 2013 of
4,700 rebel fighters killed and another 2 ,1 0 0 missing, and no reports o f civilian
casualties.51 The Septem ber 2012 attack on th e American consulate in Benghazi, which
killed th e American ambassador to Libya and resulted in the resignation o f th e Am erican
UN ambassador, had severe political repercussions fo r th e U.S. W hile Libyans voted fo r
the first tim e in parliam entary elections in July 2 01 2 , th e country remains unstable and
insecure.

50 Thomas Erdbrink and Liz Sly, "Gaddafi's Rule Crumbling as Rebels Enter Heart o f Tripoli," The
Washington Post, August 21, 2011, accessed O ctober 23, 2013,
http://w w w .w ashingtonpost.com /w orld/m iddle-east/libyan-rebels-converging-ontrip o li/ll/0 8 /2 1 /g lQ A b F 3 R U J _ s to ry .h tm l.
51 Ian Black, "Libyan Revolution Casualties Lower Than Expected, Says Ne Governm ent," The Guardian,
January 8, 2013, accessed O ctober 25, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .th e g u a rd ia n .c o m /w o rld /1 3 /ja n /0 8 /lib y a n revolution-casualties-lower-expected-governm ent.
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The German Response to Libya
Germany's abstention to the vote on UNSC resolution 1973 was m e t w ith
surprise, shock, and anger from th e international com m unity. The conflict in Libya
appeared to have all the 'right' preconditions to w a rra n t a legitimized approval fo r th e
use of force based on humanitarian intervention in a m ultilateral coalition, and w ithin
th e norm ative fram ew ork of international law. Germ any's official choice to align itself
w ith China and Russia, knowing th e consequences such inaction would have, left
analysts and reporters wondering w h e th e r Germ any's foreign policy is significantly
changing. Germany's behavior, understanding, and justification of said behavior during
th e crisis may be viewed as a reconstruction or new path fo r its foreign and security
policy objective; however, when viewing cases in which th e use of force was debated in
German policy w ithin the past tw e n ty years, th e case o f Libya falls w ithin a sequential
path. Among the dom inant variables th a t influence G erm an foreign and security policy,
m ultilateral alliance solidarity was certainly at th e fo re fro n t o f the conflict in Libya, w ith
France, th e United Kingdom, and the U.S. leading the charge in seeking a legitim ized
intervention in Libya w ith an authorization on th e use o f force. W hy then did G erm any
abstain from th e vote to intervene in th e civil w a r in Libya?
The German UN Ambassador, Peter W ittig , addressed the Security Council during
a debate fo r Resolution 1973, giving Germ any's official reasoning and explanation fo r
abstention:
Decisions on the use o f m ilitary force are always extrem ely difficult to take. W e
have very carefully considered th e

option

o f using m ilitary force

—

its

implications as well as its lim itations. W e see great risks. The likelihood o f largescale loss of life should not be underestim ated. If th e steps proposed turn o u t to
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be ineffective, w e see th e danger of being draw n into a protracted m ilitary
conflict th at would affect th e w id er region. W e should not e n te r into a m ilitarily
confrontation on the optim istic assumption th a t quick results w ith fe w casualties
will be achieved. G erm any th e re fo re decided not to support a m ilitary option, as
foreseen particularly in paragraphs 4 and 8 o f th e resolution. Furtherm ore,
Germany will not contribute to such a m ilitary effort w ith its own forces.
Germ any th erefore decided to abstain in the voting. (Peter W ittin g, M arch 17,

2011)52
Germany's abstention was im m ediately noted, in both scholarly and media
circles, as a clear 'N O ', drawing parallels to th e invasion in Iraq and Germ any's support
of humanitarian interventions in th e Balkans. References of the past to Germ any's
potential Sonderweg w ere m entioned by scholars and journalists alike. A fter th e vote on
resolution 1973, Germ an politicians continuously articulated full support fo r th e mission
in Libya, yet this rhetoric proved th a t talk indeed is not cheap. Given th e legal
qualifications and legitimacy o f th e UNSC resolution and th e m ultilateral facet of the
vote, backed by hum anitarian reasoning, along w ith the support o f th e Arab league,
Germany's behavior, in the Libyan case, was influenced by different variables. In o rder
to explain and understand this potential variation in norm -consistent policy, it is crucial
to examine the official rhetoric and statem ents o f policy makers w hile also considering
the international security environm ent.
On March 18, 2011, Guido W esterw elle explained th e German governm ent's
position on the Libyan crisis at th e parliam ent. During his speech, W esterw elle was clear
in Germany's opposition, stating th a t "G erm an soldiers will not participate in com bat

52 "S/Pv.6498," ed. United Nations Security Council (M arch 17, 2011), accessed Novem ber 2, 2013,
http://w w w .securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/% 7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf.
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mission in Libya", adding th at this decision was not easy fo r G erm any.53 Continuing his
explanation, W esterw elle explained th at, despite some differences about dom estic
political issues, th e constructive debates resulted in a collective consensus against the
dictator Gaddafi and w ere on th e "side o f international law ".54 A fter explaining and
outlining Germany's position in regards to th e Libyan population and against Gaddafi,
W esterw elle makes a distinct break in his speech to separate the questions on m ilitary
interventions and German participation in such missions. W hile G erm any rhetorically
supported the elem ents o f resolution 1973, stressing the im portance o f sanctions and
Germany's support thereof, the break w ith th e alliance is due to Germ any's
understanding of the concept on the use o f force.
Explaining th a t the decision to sanction th e use o f force and deciding over th e
lives of German soldiers is the most difficult one to be debated over politically,
W esterw elle details the Germ an choice to abstain from th e UNSC vote, adding th a t
there is "no such thing as a surgical strike".55 Germ an soldiers would th e re fo re not
participate in m ilitary operations in Libya. Despite G erm any's abstention from th e vote,
which was viewed and analyzed as a "No" ra th e r than a refraining from voting,
W esterw elle outlined the ways in which G erm any was currently acting "responsibly"
though the contribution o f 7,000 Germ an soldiers to out of area operations w orldw ide.

53 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterw elle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17 /9 7 ," A usw artiges A m t, March 18, 2011, accessed Septem ber 2,
2013, http://w w w .ausw aertigesam t.de/D E /lnfoservice/P resse/R eden/ll/110318_B M _R egierungserkl% C 3% A 4rung_Libyen.htm l.
(translated)
54 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterw elle Vor D em Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 1 7 /9 7 ," A usw artiges A m t, March 18, 2011.
55 Ibid.
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W hile th e im portance to rem ove Gaddafi fro m pow er was stressed throughout
W esterw elle's speech, the Germ an governm ent did not o ffer a solution or a ltern a te
route to reach this goal besides strengthening sanctions and focusing on diplom atic
efforts. W hile this position may be difficult to understand in light o f G erm any's
continued emphasis on hum anitarian-based interventions and m ultilateral approaches,
th e decision falls in line w ith previous attitudes tow ards Germ an participation in ou t of
area operations involving the use o f force. Libya, w hile difficult to analyze based on th e
legal and factual aspects, is th erefore a continuous, sequential case in Germ an
consensus reaching on the use of force; influenced, shaped, and constructed through
historical memories.
It is im portant to note th a t the internal debates, and the debates follow ing
W esterw elle's speech, did not show a clear consensus am ong politicians internally in
Germany. Dr. Rolf Mutzenich (SPD) accused W esterw elle of being influenced by
domestic politics, arguing th at the UN resolution is the "right consequence" based on
th e events in Libya.56 Policy makers w ho opposed the abstention from th e vote argued
th a t W esterw elle owes an explanation on the behavior to th e international com m unity.
To them , abstaining from the vote painted a poor picture o f Germ any to those countries
w ho voted fo r Germany to have a high position w ithin the Security Council and to th e
people of the Arab world w ho recently supported W esterw elle on Tahir square. On th e
o ther hand, members of th e Left party (Jan van Aken) accused the SPD of

56 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen," Deutscher Bundestag W eb and Text Archive accessed
Novem ber 5, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .b u n d e s ta g .d e /d o k u m e n te /te x ta rc h iv /ll/3 3 7 9 8 1 3 6 _ k w ll_ d e _ ly b ie n /.
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"warm ongering", explaining th a t forceful interventions in Libya would lead to fu rth er
bloodshed. The Left viewed the abstention on th e UNSC resolution as advancem ent
from previous decisions under th e Red-Green coalition governm ent w ho "blindly"
com m itted to m ilitary deploym ent in Afghanistan.57 The CDU/CSU supported th e
decision, w ith Ruprecht Polenz explaining th a t both th e UN resolution and Germ any's
abstention are justified, as "too m any unexplained risks exist", adding th a t abstaining
elim inates suspicion of Germ any only com m itting troops due to the oil in th e region.58
Given the statements m ade during debates a fte r th e decision was announced by
W esterw elle, those party m em bers w ho supported Germ any's official decision agreed
th a t the uncertainty o f the resolution's end point contributed to th e abstention,
emphasizing th e im portance to consider not only NATO advice, but also th a t o f th e EU.
W hile th e decision was fiercely debated afterw ards and included accusations and
interruptions, parliam entary m em bers such as Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) em phasized th a t
while Germ an soldiers may not participate in com bat missions in Libya, G erm any would
participate in the "mission to deprive Gaddafi o f pow er" through stronger sanctions and
taking on Libyan refugees.59 The Green party supported th e UN resolution, stressing the
im portance of the hum anitarian aspect in Libya based on th e concept o f hum an rights
and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Renate Kunast (Green Party) referred back to a
UN resolution of 2005, which under the headline o f "Responsibility to Protect" outlined

57 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen," Deutscher Bundestag W eb and Text Archive
58 Ibid.
59 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner," Deutscher Bundestag: accessed N ovem ber 5, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .b u n d e s ta g .d e /d o k u m e n te /te x ta rc h iv /ll/3 3 9 2 9 1 0 1 _ k w 2 3 _ in te rv ie w _ s tin n e r/in d e x .h tm l.
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th e responsibility of states to protect its people. Failure to abide by this principle
th erefore w arrants engagem ent and action by the international com m unity. Kiinast
argued th a t Germany must show clearly th a t human rights are im portant to G erm any
and its foreign policy.60 W hile differing in internal consent on the vote is evident w hen
considering th e statem ents made by Germ an politicians, th e official G erm an stance to
abstain was reached by the m ajority vote.
The im portance of W W II legacy, specifically the concept of th e culture of
restraint, is certainly evident in the Libyan case based on official rhetoric references to
m em ory and experience; however, the ways in which other factors influenced th e
decision making must also be included. The im portance o f hum anitarian preconditions,
m ultilateral alliance based-approaches, responsible behavior, and leg itim ized/U N
sanctioned efforts did not sway the Germ an vote to an affirm ative "yes". Further,
Bundeswehr reform , cost, and Germ an soldiers currently in Afghanistan also influenced
th e decision. As Angela M erkel noted in a speech before th e parliam ent a fte r the
abstained vote, instead of contributing crew mem bers fo r AWACS flights over Libya,
G erm any would increase participation in Afghanistan. The chancellor com m ented to
media outlets th a t Germany was not neutral, and, like th e international com m unity,
aims to bring an end to the Gaddafi regime.
National or domestic interests m ay have influenced th e decision to abstain from
th e Libya vote, specifically Germany's general opposition to m ilitary interventions.
According to a poll, 85 percent o f th e Germ an population opposed Germ an soldiers'

60 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen."
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participation in a Libyan intervention and tw o thirds of Germans agreed w ith th e
abstention o f UNSC resolution 1973.61 W h ile over 60 percent of Germ ans supported a
forced m ilitary intervention against Gaddafi, the m ajority o f those asked rejected
participation in such an intervention in Libya by th e Bundeswehr.62 Further, an o th er 65
percent of Germans agreed w ith the official behavior o f G erm any not to participate in
the intervention. The results o f the dom estic polling on th e use of force debate over
Libya, is a reflection o f the overall struggle for Germans to define and settle the conflict
of responsibility and guilt. Germans recognized th a t Gaddafi 'must go', but most w ere
unwilling to do so themselves. This a ttitu d e can be explained through a variety o f
variables, mostly influenced by Germ any's continued antim ilitaristic outlook shaped and
constructed through W W II legacy.

GERMANY'S BEHAVIOR: MEDIA AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO LIBYA
Germany's official position and abstention from th e vote was m et w ith criticism
by both international and domestic m edia outlets. The Germ an press ran headlines
pointing to the "Catastrophic Signal" to th e Arab w orld (D er Spiegel), Richard Herzinger
in Die W elt com m ented on the "sham eful" w ay in which Germ any showed th a t it had
"learned nothing", and D ie Z eit outlined how G erm any "sugar coated" th e damaging

61 "A 'Catastrophic Signal1to the Arab W orld: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," Spiegel
Online, March 21, 2011; Rinke, "Screbrencia or Afghanistan? W hy G erm any Abstained on th e Libya V o te Tracing th e History of a Decision."
62 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen B efiirw orten Den Angriff," Bild, M arch 20, 2013,
accessed Novem ber 17, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .b ild .d e /p o litik /ll/lib y e n -k ris e /a b e r-m e h rh e it-le h n tbeteiligung-ab-16933388.bild.htm l.
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consequences of its isolating behavior.63 Across Europe, The Guardian, described how
Germ any marginalized itself over th e abstention from the vote w hile on th e oth er side
o f th e Atlantic, Roger Cohen in The N e w York Times, outlined the ways in which M erkel
"shunned" her allies, lost her credibility, and erased Germ any's predictability.64 The
th em e across the m ajority of th e media coverage shows a clear consensus: G erm any
m ade a w rong and 'puzzling' decision to abstain from the vote on a Libyan intervention.
Interviews and comments given by G erm an politicians after th e abstention w ere
filled w ith sharp critiques o f the decision. Ruprecht Polenz (CDU) com m ented on the
"w ide operational gap" within the decision, Heidem arie W ieczorek-Zeul called the
abstention of the intervention a "disgrace", w hile some politicians w ith th e SPD and
Green Party supported the decision.65 Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained th a t Germ any
m ade the right decision as the m ajority o f th e Bundestag agreed not to participate in
m ilitary action in Libya. Further, he explained th a t w hile Germ any is not com m itting
ground troops to Libya, 40 percent of th e A W ACS operations are m anned by G erm an
soldiers.66 O ther official interviews and com m entary on Germ an television showed a
them atic explanation used by politicians to justify Germ any's abstention. M o re
specifically, in regards to th e argum ent fo r hum anitarian intervention and th e

63 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab W orld: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention; JORG Lau,
"M acht M ai - Ohne Unsl," Zeit Online, March 24, 2011; Richard Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt," Die W elt,
March 18, 2011.
64 Severin W eiland and Roland Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya," The Guardian, M arch,
18 2011; Roger Cohen, "Merkel in M iniature," The N e w York Times, April 18, 2011.
65 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befurworten Den Angriff."
66 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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responsibility to protect, some policy makers explained th a t if one was to intervene in
Libya, the same should go fo r Yemen and th e Ivory Coast.67
The ways in which Germ an dom estic opinion influences foreign policy choices
are evident by Germany's 'representative dem ocracy' and Chancellor M erkel's
operationalization of the concept. Several analysts and scholars com m ented in the
media on M erkel's "soft" approach based on "popular m ood" rather than confronting
difficult decisions, th e Libyan intervention being one o f th e m .68 Rhetorically, Chancellor
M erkel has responded to debates w ith "there is no alternative", as outlined in an
unflattering article in Der Spiegel, which argued th a t the chancellor lacked confidence
and assertiveness to rule Germ any. Guido W esterw elle's behavior during the Arab
Spring movem ents was severely attacked in th e m edia upon Germany's abstention from
th e Libya vote. W hile Germany pushed fo r harder sanctions during the m ovem ents in
Tunisia and Egypt, France rem ained in th e background. In previously accepted policies,
G erm any 'dealt' w ith issues in th e East, w hile France was responsible fo r th e south of
Europe. A fter W esterw elle's public display o f support for th e movem ents in Egypt and
Tunisia and declaring th at "we are on th e side of th e freed o m movem ents in th e Arab
w orld", his official position to abstain was contradictory.69 Perhaps Germ any's strong

67 These comments w ere m ade by Ulrich Deppendorf (M arch 21, 2011) and by th e m inister fo r economic
cooperation and developm ent Dirk Nebel on tw o different television segments on G erm an TV.
68 Dirk Kurbjuweit, "A Germany o f 82 Million Chancellors: W h y Angela Merke's Failures Continue to
M ultiply," Spiegel Online, April 13, 2011, accessed N ovem ber 16, 2013,
http://w w w .spiegel.de/international/germ any/a-germ any-of-82-m illion-chancellors-w hy-angela-m erkel-sfailures-continue-to-m ultiply-a-756543.htm l.
69 Lau, "M acht M ai - Ohne Unsl."
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initial support in the region tow ards freedom and dem ocracy contributed to th e
confusion, surprise, and anger fe lt by th e international com m unity and m edia.
W hile some reporters and newspapers w ere extrem ely critical o f Germany's
decisions, others, w hile also pointing to th e damaging results, appear to have a difficult
tim e assertively arguing against Germ any's abstention, instead posing questions and
focusing on the afterm ath of Germ any's behavior. The official responses by politicians,
which often included details of Germ any's continued support and mission in
Afghanistan, is also them atically included by journalists and described as a "bartered
transaction".70 The fact th a t the abstention placed G erm any alongside China and Russia
is also widely analyzed and discussed in th e m edia. Die Z eit explains th a t no foreign
minister before W esterw elle allowed fo r G erm any to be grouped w ith China and Russia,
while focusing on W esterw elle's statem ents and behavior.71 According to some
journalists, W esterw elle made flaw ed comparison's to Iraq in 2003 by assuming th a t
potential air attacks in Libya will undoubtedly lead to ground fighting w ithin in a bloody
civil w ar.72
In the German speaking m edia and through popular political blogs, Germ any's
isolating behavior is discussed in parallels to Germ any's irresponsible past. From
Germany's refusal to com m it m ore troops to Afghanistan to the handling of th e Euro
crisis, the Libyan abstention only fu rth e r contributed to th e murmurs about Germ any's
new German foreign policy approach m arked by individualism. Interestingly, both

70 The German term , or concept for this is "Kompensationsgeschaft"
71 Lau, "M acht M ai - Ohne Unsl."
72
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international com m entators and internal Germ an journalists continuously question how
Germany will be viewed by the international com m unity. Analysts w orry and w o n d e r to
w h at extend th e afterm ath of th e Libya case will contribute to the uncertainty fe lt by
Germany's partners and neighbors. M a n y Germ an w riters point to G erm any's economic
pow er as an export nation, and calling fo r an end to Germ any's assumption th a t o th e r
nations will contribute to the security um brella which kept Germ any safe.73 W hile
Germany's abstention from the vote did not prevent m ilitary intervention, journalists
predicted dire consequences and lasting effects. To most analysts from G erm any's allies,
th e move essentially showed th a t G erm any was unwilling to help, w hile W esterw elle
was described as "Germany's pacifist-in-chief".74 W esterw elle's stance, previous
behavior, and arguments are them atically analyzed throughout the m edia's analysis of
Germany's abstention, w ith journalists explaining W esterw elle's position as "out of
touch with reality", but understanding th a t Germ any's official position will be accepted
by the electorate.75
Like th e scholarly analysis o f Germ any's abstention shows, th e broad media
almost exclusively described, analyzed, and understood Germany's abstention from th e
vote as a clear "Nein". This differentiation from reality, w hile interesting, also gives
insight into th e international com m unity's ow n understanding and conceptualization of
Germany's behavior. To discuss G erm an behavior w ithin a political context, it seems

73 Clemens W ergin to Flatworld - Der Aussenblog von Clemens W ergin, 2011. Accessed Novem ber 12,
2013, h ttp ://fla tw o rld .w e lt.d e /ll/0 4 /2 0 /d ie-s e lb s tv e rzw e rg u n g -d e r-d e u ts c h e n -a u s e n p o litik /.
74 W eiland and Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya."
75 Ibid.
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impossible to forget or om it history and past experience. From Germ any's Sonderweg to
th e clear "Nein" th at was blasted all over th e media a fte r th e 2003 invasion o f Iraq, th e
media judges quickly w hile struggling to tru ly explain Germ any's special position.
Instead of attem pting to understand Germ any's official reasoning, journalists point to
the em barrassm ent Berlin should have fe lt, decisions M e rk el did not m ake, and
statements W esterw elle was supposed to leave out.
W hile drawing parallels to the invasion o f Iraq, journalists also discuss th e im pact
of th e Libya abstention for the elections in Germ any. M uch has been debated of
Chancellor Schroder's motives in 2002 in th e midst o f his national election campaign.
Similarly, the media points to W esterw elle's potential considerations fo r th e FDP. Given
M erkel's tendency to vote along the populist opinion, it comes to no surprise th a t
W esterw elle takes domestic positions into consideration. The continued skepticism held
tow ards forceful m ilitary engagements by th e Germ an public, especially th e upper
m iddle class w ho often support th e FDP, m ay have influenced W esterw elle's staunch
com ments even a fte r the abstention.76 M ost journalists rightly point to th e crucial
difference in Schroder's position in 2 00 2 and W esterw elle's position a fte r Libya: th e
fo rm er had France and the UNSC on his side, w hile the la tte r may have d ented th e
German-French relationship.
W hile some journalists in the G erm an m edia rem ained neutral in reporting th e
facts and listing potential consequences o f the Libyan abstention, others detailed th e
"shameful" behavior exhibited by Germ any, w hereby th e focus was once m ore on

76 Ibid.
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W esterw elle. Placing Germany on th e side o f Gaddafi by abstaining, Richard Herzinger in
Die Zeit dismisses W esterw elle's a tte m p t at selling his decision in th e fra m ew o rk of
'Realpolitik', instead arguing th a t th e decision is m erely a reflection of th e isolationist
sentim ent of Germ any.77 Instead o f comparing Libya to Iraq, Herzinger points to th e
missed intervention in the Balkans in 1992, which resulted in tw o massive m ilitary
interventions th at w ere hastily executed, as well as Afghanistan. According to th e
journalist, Germany's prolonged w a it to act in th e past resulted in involvem ent in
unmanaged conflicts. Herzinger also includes Afghanistan in his comparison, arguing
th a t Germ any, after observing disinterest from afar, only acted once th e Taliban becam e
a deadly theat. The inaction detailed by some m edia experts led analysts to predict th a t
similar consequences would occur in th e case of Libya.
W hile some scholars critique Germany's behavior, m ost have a difficult tim e
theoretically explaining and justifying Germ any's behavior. The m ajority o f journal
articles and opinion pieces authored by scholars include an argum entative judgm ent
mainly focusing on the afterm ath o f th e Germ an decision. Some, how ever, rem ain
neutral, instead attem pting to explain by chronologically detailing th e facts which led to
Germany's abstention. In Berlin, scholars, through anonymous interviews, trie d to detail
th e internal EU debates th a t took place at th e EU sum m it in Brussels. A political scientist
at Berlin's Free University said th a t "G erm any is no longer a credible p artn er in th e
Atlantic alliance", w hile Joschka Fischer called Germ any's foreign policy a "farce".78

77 Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt."
78 "Germany, Russia Learn High Cost of Abstaining from Libya Un V o te ,” The Australian, March 25, 2011.
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Hanns W . M aull, in a Germ an journal article published in 2011, referred to G erm an
foreign policy as "disoriented", detailing th e problem s associated w ith th e case o f Libya.
In the excellently detailed argum ent, th e scholar com pares th e case of Libya to the
Kosovo of 1998-1999, but argues, as do most scholars under review, th a t th e abstention
positioned Germ any against its tw o closest allies, France and the U.S. w hile isolating
itself in the EU.79 In order to com pensate for this shift in alliance, G erm any adopted, as
observed before in Iraq in 2003, the "politics of th e guilty conscious" by com m itting
soldiers to AWACS missions in Afghanistan.80 On to p of discussing th e im portance of the
concepts "never alone" and "never again w ar", which both w ere fulfilled in th e Libyan
case, Maull attributes the concepts o f "politics before force", or Germ any's emphasis on
diplom atic efforts, for Germany's abstention in th e Libya case. Both journalists and
scholars pointed to the im portance o f th e elections in B aden-W urtenberg and
Rheinland-Pfalz, which m otivated th e FDP to push th e position of non-intervention
through m ilitary force as well as Germ an domestic opposition tow ards th e intervention.
Besides this, Germ an scholars question Germ any's role concept as a responsible actor in
the EU. In the past, Germ any has greatly benefited from th e EU while enjoying th e
security umbrella provided by th e transatlantic alliance. In recent years th e cost-benefit
scale has leveled out, and Germ any th e re fo re views th e role concept and th e increased
responsibility as burdensom e.81

79 Hanns W . M aull, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos," Zeitschrift fu e r Politikwissenschaft

1( 2011 ).
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Security scholars fu rth er point to several problem s in Germany's foreign policy,
evident by th e Libya case. Specifically, w hile th e international environm ent drastically
changed a fte r the end of the Cold W ar, G erm any's foreign policy approach has not.
Germany relies on cooperating partners, and, in th e past, has matched its foreign policy
approach to those of other allied nations and declaring th e behavior as "norm al".
Hence, debates and discussion in scholarly circles have resulted in questioning w h e th e r
Germ any has become a 'norm al actor'; how ever, G erm any is not, and has not been, like
any other country within the EU. According to Hanns M aull, Germany's abstention,
which was widely viewed as yet another 'N ein', showed th a t Germany chose another
Sonderweg, damaged its hard earned trust and reliability, and broke o ff from its closest
partners.82 M ost prom inent German security scholars agree: Germany's abstention and
behavior during the Libya crisis was a disaster. Harald M u lle r called G erm any's behavior
a "moral and political mistake", and added th a t w hile he was against th e intervention in
Kosovo and the continued missions in Afghanistan, one "m ust intervene w hen one
should, can, and is allowed to ".83 Scholars also address th e cliches used by G erm any in
justifying the abstention; mainly the fe a r for a w a r over oil, which most scholars dismiss
on th e basis o f official numbers detailing Libya's trading partners.
Scholars w ho analyze Germ any's behavior, both theoretically and in practice, are
puzzled by the abstention. Some note th a t G erm any could have 'symbolically'
participated by voting "yes" to the no-fly zone w hile still ensuring no G erm an soldiers

82 Ibid.
83 Harald M iiller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen," Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und
Konfliktforschung. Standpunkte 2(2011).
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would participate in on-ground engagem ents in Libya. Scholars also point ou t th e
damaging image Germ any exudes by being grouped w ith th e BRIC-states (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China). Three of the four BRIC states have political reservations about
hum anitarian-based interventions due to th e ir ow n controversial m ovem ents
internally.84 According to M uller, these states abstained, fearing th a t a developm en t of
norms can positively influence secession m ovem ents. W hile Brazil does not have th e
same political interests as the rem ainder of th e BRIC nations, the scholar suggests th a t
Brazil was asked to abstain.85 Security scholars also focus on Germany's continued
emphasis on diplom atic efforts, specifically th e use o f sanctions. In th e Libya case, most
scholars agree th a t sanctions, even increased sanctions, w e re not useful. Further,
consensus among German scholars shows th a t Germ any's position contradicts its role as
a civilian power.

SUM M A RY
This section has detailed Germ any's behavior, rhetoric, and action during four
selected cases w here the use o f force was discussed politically. Each case was
controversial and highly publicized and resulted in changes in German policy. This
chapter focused on the factual data in each case, w hile simultaneously presenting th e
evidence used by security scholars to argue fo r or against Germany's position as a global
actor. The cases o f Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan w ere historically analyzed in o rd er to

84 Russia (Chechnya), India (Kaschmir), China (Tibet).
85 Muller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."
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place the case of Libya on a linear path in G erm any’s foreign policy p attern. Chapter six
will then apply the variables to th e evidence presented in this chapter in o rd e r to
analyze and determ ine which variable affected th e outcom e in each case w ith th e goal
o f pinpointing when and how historical m em ory enters Germ an foreign and security
policy debates.
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CHAPTER V

ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN

INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f this case study and chapter is to provide an overview of w h at
perspectives explain Germany's varied behavior tow ards a global issue: nuclear
nonproliferation. Specifically, this chapter will analyze Germ any's policies, rhetoric, and
behavior during the negotiations w ith Iran, in light o f Iran's nuclear program . This study
will begin w ith a historical overview of th e case, inclusive o f detailing facts surrounding
th e ten year span o f negotiations. This chapter will fu rth e r explain th e EU-Germ any-lran
relationship, Iran's nuclear program, and Germ an responses and behavior in th e case.
The relationship betw een Iran and Europe, and G erm any particularly, has been
long and marked by difficulty in diplom atic and political processes since th e Iranian
revolution of 1979. These difficulties are in th e areas of economic tra d e and agreem ents
as well as human rights based issues, political relations, and most recently, th e Iranian
nuclear program. The efforts by Germ any, th e EU-3 (Germ any, France, United Kingdom),
the EU, and the international com m unity to handle the potential acquisition o f nuclear
weapons by Iran has been challenging and oriented tow ards short-term goals. G erm any
has approached this issue in line w ith national nonproliferation rhetoric based on an
argum ent for peace and stability in the M iddle East, which can be understood through
Ian M anner's concept of Norm ative Power Europe (NPE), focusing on diplomacy,
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democracy, freedom , and human rights. Parallel to this, Germany's own rethinking o f its
nuclear pow er poses an im portant pillar o f Germ an foreign policy objective. G erm any's
past experience w ith the international com m unity regarding nuclear pow er informs
Germany's behavior and choices tow ards th e Iranian nuclear project and Germ any's
central role in establishing accountability guidelines fo r Iran. W hile G erm any has been
vocal about its opposition tow ard Iran's nuclear program in th e past, critiques have
highlighted Germany's inconsistent behavior tow ards sanctions and policy avenues for
Iran. Nuclear weapons, as the ultim ate currency o f pow er, and possession and
acquisition thereof, are certainly linked to realist argum ents on structurally-based
international relations. How can Germ any's behavior tow ards nuclear pow er and Iran's
nuclear program be explained and understood? This case study hypothesizes th a t
historical m em ory and W W II legacy has an effect on Germ any's nuclear history w h ile
informing Germany's policy choices tow ards the Iranian nuclear program . Germ any's
m ultilateral alliance solidarity, dom estic influence, and national and econom ic interests
are variables th a t also may explain G erm any foreign policy in this policy area. Germ any's
behavior is then analyzed to determ ine w h e th e r this case is an exam ple o f an
adjustm ent in policy, a reconstruction o f policy, a learned policy, or a norms-based
continuation o f previously em ployed policy.
An argum ent can be made th a t Germ any's and th e EU's approach to convince
Iran to halt its uranium enrichm ent program is linked to th e nonproliferation rhetoric
employed by G erm any which connects norms and ideas in order to strengthen
international security through policy practice. This case study will focus on Germ any's
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rhetoric and action in combination w ith the EU to highlight Germany's foreign policy
based on m ultilateral approaches w ithin a global issue area. Germany's and th e EU's
effectiveness in dealing with Iran's nuclear program is difficult to assess w ith o u t
considering historic relationships, theoretical analyses, and recent developm ents to
prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. A fter analyzing Germ any's
nonproliferation approach in order to understand the diplom atic relationship in th e past
ten years betw een the EU and Iran, this study examines scholarly literature as w ell as
news media to explain the EU's approach tow ard Iran's nuclear program , once again
emphasizing Germany's specific role. Germ any's role will be analyzed based on th e
aforem entioned variables to d eterm ine the influence on historical m em ory on Germ an
foreign policy in the analysis, chapter six, of this dissertation. This chapter will conclude
w ith a summary of arguments and findings about nonproliferation norms, th e G erm an
and EU voice, and the effectiveness of sanctions in light of historic relationships.

The EU-lranian Relationship
Europe's relationship w ith Iran is long and diverse. Iran has several relationships
to countries w ithin th e union, including a long-standing colonizer/im perialist
relationship to G reat Britain, or relationships rooted in long-standing friendship and
economic ties, such as the relationship betw een G erm any and Iran. Rather than
outlining th e relationship in term s of tra d e and treaties, which vary to o much to
elaborate in this chapter, I will first outline the EU's role as a m ediator and global actor
in light of Iran's nuclear program, and focus on an in-depth analysis o f th e G erm an-
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Iranian relationship. Sebastian Harnisch describes the relationship b etw een th e EU and
Iran as th a t of a 'm ediator', w ith a "critical and constructive dialogue w ith Tehran" in
place before Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program was exposed in 2 0 0 2 .1 According to some
scholars, the EU's role as a m ediator partially failed as Iran's program did not constitute
a th reat to international stability and peace, yet was approached by th e EU as such.
Several policy offers outlining m ultiple, com prehensive approaches 'lacked credibility',
as these offers did not include a security guarantee by th e U.S.2 Although th e EU initially
took the lead in negotiations w ith Iran, the U.S.'s role and actions w ere central to Iran's
reactions and diplom atic processes and directly contributed to a halt in the
negotiations. The institutional design o f th e EU and its actions are in line w ith a th eo rybased approach on norms th at directly links to th e policy advocated tow ards Iran.
According to Harnish, w ithout th e U.S., Iran would have not first accepted th e EU as a
m ediator, and eventually discontinued relations w ith th e EU.

The German-lranian Relationship
Germany's prolonged and continuous relationship w ith Iran has been a "sore
point" fo r German-American relations during th e 1990's and has been attrib u ted to a
conflict in national interests.3 The historical relationship betw een G erm any and Iran
began before W orld W a r I w hen Iran began th e relationship in order to counterbalance

1 Sebastian Harnisch, "M inilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran
Initiative," European Security 16, no. 1 (2007): 8.
2 "M inilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," European
Security 16, no. 1 (2007): 18.
3 Jacob Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," N ew Republic 216, no. 20 (1997): 17.
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British and Russian influence in th e area.4 The relationship extended through out the
1920's and 1930's, w ith extensive student exchange programs and m ilitary equipm ent
supplied by Germ any to Shah Reza Khan. A fter W W II, W est G erm any continued the
relationship w ith Iran and became a close ally to th e Shah. Even a fte r th e Iranian
Revolution, German firms and businesses have shared and supplied technology to Iran,
eventually becoming Iran's main trading partner.5 In th e 1990's, before th e recent
elevation o f Iran's nuclear program, over 170 Germ an firm s operated in Iran, to include
Krupp, Daimler-Benz, and Siemens. Despite international political incidents, the
Germ an-lranian business relationship rem ained strong, w ith Iran extending this
relationship to fo rm e r East German businesses.6 The Germ an and Iranian intelligence
services have also shared inform ation and cooperated closely in the 1990's, to include
several personal visits betw een th e Germ an intelligence chief Bemd Schm idbauer and
Iranian cleric and chief of intelligence Ali Fallahian.
The Germ an-lranian relationship was justified to Germany's w estern allies under
th e approach of 'critical dialogue', also referred to as 'constructive engagem ent', and
explained as an opportunity for Germ any to prom ote w estern values in Iran including
reforming domestic politics in Iran. In th e past, policy makers argued th a t this critical
dialogue contributed to Iran's adoption of th e N on-Proliferation Treaty in 1968;
however, some scholars conclude th a t Germ any's policy of d eten te as w ell as th e U.S.
4 For the purpose o f this brief overview, I have focused on th e recent relationship b etw een Germ any and
Iran, but first German missions to Persia w ere reported in th e 16th Century.
5 Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," 18.
6 Such international political incidents include th e 1979 seizure of th e American Embassy in Tehran and
th e 1992 assassination of Kurdish exiles at a restaurant in Berlin; th e German business com m unity reacted
w ith "keep political matters out of business"
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policy o f containm ent has not changed or affected the Iranian regime during th a t tim e .7
German news magazines, as w ell as interviews w ith Germ an analysts, point to
Germany's prom otion of a softer approach which includes less economic sanctions.
According to Germ an reports in 2009, Iranian im ports to G erm any alm ost doubled, w ith
German exports to Iran also increasing steadily. Germ an media th e re fo re reflects th e
idea of keeping business and politics separate, w ith com m entators criticizing G erm an
policy makers fo r focusing on foreign policy w ith o u t taking into consideration th e overall
relationship, th e economy, and th e im pact o f the business and dom estic relationship.
On the other hand, German security scholars are outraged by Germany's continued
economic relationship with Iran, calling Germany's foreign policy 'dam aging' and
'inconsistent' by opposing stronger sanctions.
According to the Germ an Federal Foreign Office w ebsite, G erm an exports fell by
19 percent in 2011, with G erm an businesses in Iran not renewing business contracts
since the initial sanctions began in 2007. Between 2007 and 2013, G erm an exports to
Iran increasingly dropped (except during 2010), from 3.6 billion Euros in 2 00 7 to one
billion Euros in 2013. Similarly, im ports fro m Iran also steadily dropped from 583 million
Euros in 2007 to 157 million Euros in 2013, w ith th e exception of 2 0 1 0 w h ere both
imports and exports w ere at a record high.8 Beyond trade relationships and the overall
historic relationship betw een G erm any and Iran, Germ an citizens still travel to Iran very

7 Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots."
8 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," ed. Auswartiges A m t, accessed D ecem ber 5, 2013,
http://w w w .ausw aertigesam t.de/sid_D CD 155D9A B 53D25911F278B439796D EB /D E/A ussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/lran/B ilate
ral_node.htm l#doc337586bodyText2.
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frequently. Germ any has a language institute, a diplom atic school, an archeological
institute, and a Christian com m unity establishm ent in Iran, as well as a long-standing
relationship in educating Iranian scientists in Germ any, w hereby official diplom atic
relations have been established since 1 9 5 2 .9

Iran's Nuclear Program
Scholars and historians w ho analyze recent developm ents in Iranian foreign
policy, and especially Iran's nuclear program , emphasize Iran's resources and history as
a powerful em pire. Themes of pride, privilege, and international standing can explain
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The privilege and benefits from civilian nuclear pow er
can be used to strengthen Iran's standing as a great civilization, contribute to political
regime resilience, and influence regional and international allies. Further, civilian
nuclear pow er could be used by Iran to level and ta m e Europe and th e U.S., making th e
acquisition th e re o f rather lucrative.10 Iran's nuclear program has its origins in th e 1970's
due to Iran's strategic position during th e Cold W ar. Initially signing th e A greem ent fo r
Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses o f Atom s in 1957 w ith th e U.S., Iran received pooltype reactors and fuel from the U.S. in 1967, w hile Iranian scientists w ere trained at
prestigious institutions such as th e Massachusetts Institute o f Technology.11 Throughout

9 A German-Persian agreem ent o f friendship, trade, and shipm ent was established in 1873, w ith an article
outlining foreign policy th a t states G erm any would support Persia in th e case of potential w ar betw een
Persia and another power.
10 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Program m e," European
Security 13, no. 3 (2010): 471.
11 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned fo r the Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest for Nuclear
Power," Middle East Journal 60, no. 2 (2003).
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th e Cold W ar, th e U.S. adm inistration visited th e Shah w ho eventually announced plans
to develop nuclear pow er capability in 1974 and initiated contracts to build w a te r
reactors with France. By 1975, m utual investm ent contracts betw een Iran and th e U.S.
for uranium enrichm ent facilities in the U.S. and spent fuel reprocessing facilities in Iran
w ere set into action, along with an agreem ent w ith G erm any to establish six nuclear
reactors. Germ any began construction on th e Busher reactor in 1 9 7 6 .12
The coup d'etat, organized by th e Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and th e
British Secret Intelligence Service (M I6 ), which o v erth rew then prim e m inister of Iran
M oham ed Mossadegh in 1953, along w ith th e events im m ediately before and during the
Iranian revolution of 1979, lead to th e beginning of th e continuously strained and often
non-existent relationship betw een the U.S and Iran. The U.S. stopped cooperating w ith
Iran in regards to th e ir nuclear program and urged o th er countries to do th e same.
M eanw hile, the Islamic Republic began an overall rejection o f all things "W estern" and
eventually reduced oil exports and cancelled all nuclear projects. Ayatollah Khomeini's
views tow ards nuclear technology and th e effects on Iran's dependence on th e W est
contributed to the interruption of the program , but also his ethical opposition to the
concept and idea of W M D s .13 The energy crisis and the Iran-lraq w ar caused Iranian
clerics to change th e ir stance tow ard th e nuclear program and eventually turned to
'new ' suppliers which included Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, China, and th e Soviet Union.
In 1987, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreem ent fo r nuclear cooperation and opened the

12 An agreem ent to exchange nuclear technology ad cooperate in nuclear safety betw een th e U.S. and Iran
was signed in 1977, as well as th e signing o f th e U.S.-lran Nuclear Energy Agreem ent in 1978.
13 Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 4 72.
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Esfahan Nuclear Research Center. By 2002, the U.S. revealed secret nuclear projects
administered by Iran, which included a uranium enrichm ent facility in Natanz and a
w a te r production facility in Arak.14
Upon this discovery, the U.S. reacted by declaring a violation o f Article II of th e
NPT, followed by Iran's denial and invoking o f Article IV. In 2003, th e International
Atom ic Energy Agency (IAEA) called on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, w hich set
into m otion visits and diplomatic efforts by Germ any, France, and th e United Kingdom
w ho visited Tehran and urged Iran to sign and comply. By 2005, Iran inform ed th e IAEA
of th e decision to resume uranium conversion in Esfahan, halting negotiation b e tw ee n
Iran and the EU-3. An im portant aspect to note is th a t in 2005, Suprem e Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, as Khomeini before him, rejected th e idea of nuclear w eapons, and
pronounced a "fatw a against th e developm ent, production, stockpiling, and use o f
nuclear weapons".15 The literature surrounding Iran's nuclear program, fro m both
theoretical as well as strategic analyses, differ in term s o f Iran's right to establish a
nuclear program. W hile some authors argue th a t Iran has th e right to m aintain a nuclear
program for civilian purposes outlined under th e NPT, w ith th e added obligation to
claim these activities to th e IAEA, o th e r scholars w arn against the devastating balancing
effects a potential nuclear Iran w ould have on th e M id d le East.15

14 Kibaroglu, "Good fo r the Shah, Banned fo r th e Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest fo r Nuclear Power."
15 "Good fo r th e Shah, Banned fo r the Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Pow er," 472.
16 Tom Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a C om m itted Iran," European
Security 17, no. 2 (2009): 274.
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Iranian views and motivations
Iran's motivations and reasoning behind pursing nuclear w eapons include
prestige, global respect, national pride, th e perception o f th reat, and a 'quest fo r
recognition'.17 Further, pressure from Iran's public contributes to th e developm ent o f
Iran's nuclear program fo r use o f collective and national defense. According to a recent
survey, 90 percent of Iran's population is in favor of nuclear pow er.18 Iran's nuclear
program is also supported by several Islamic nations, Non-Alignm ent M o v e m e n t (N A M )
countries, as w ell as some European countries which support Iran's nuclear program on
th e basis of enrichm ent.19 Internal Iranian views on nuclear proliferation d iffer and are
separated by scholars into four categories: 1. Iran does not need nuclear w eapons or
nuclear capability, 2. Iran is entitled to peaceful nuclear technology, 3. Iran needs to
develop nuclear weapons capability, and 4. Iran should develop nuclear w eapons
im m ediately.20 The m ajor im plication seen by some scholars and political analysts is th e
potential dom ino effect o f nuclear programs in th e M iddle East should Iran acquire
nuclear weapons.

17 Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned fo r th e Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest fo r Nuclear Power,"
219.
18 "Good for the Shah, Banned fo r the Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power."
19 N AM countries here further make an argum ent th a t th e developm ent o f nuclear weapons w ould stand
for all Muslims in th e world, whereby a level o f expectation exists th a t Iran would eventually share th eir
nuclear technology w ith other NAM countries.
20 Kibaroglu takes these views from Dr. Nasser Hadian, and Associate Professor in th e Faculaty o f Law and
Political Science at th e University of Tehran.
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Germany and Iran's Nuclear Program: Germany's theoretical approach
Although France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear w eapons capability,
the EU's articulation towards Iran's nuclear program has mostly been in line w ith
rhetoric em ployed by German policy makers based on nonproliferation theory.
Statem ents made by Joschka Fischer in 2005 and Germ an Foreign M inister Frank-W alter
Steinm eier in 2006 point to Iran as only one o f th e cases which underm ine th e global
nonproliferation regime, urging an increase in disarm am ent practices.21 G erm any's
rhetoric, and statements made by Angela M erkel, has consistently included an aspect of
approaches th a t w ork tow ard a w orld w ith o u t nuclear weapons by reducing nuclear
arsenals. Despite this, in recent years, Germ any's, as w ell as the EU's approach, has not
only focused on Iran's nuclear program but mostly presented nuclear issues along w ith
regime change w ithout taking into consideration th e Iranian perspective, especially in
regards to national security. The literatu re about th e EU's theoretical approach and link
o f policies tow ard Iran's nuclear program shows th e EU's role as a global actor in
influencing behavior by using concrete policies in line w ith norms such as hum an rights
and political freedom s.22
The European approach, w hich has num erously been referred to in term s of Ian
M anners' 2002 articulation of NPE, has strong aspects of asym m etry and unilateral
direction on securitizing th e issue o f Iran's nuclear program by only considering th e

21 Harnisch, "M inilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative,"
423.
22 Lynne Dryburgh, "The European Union as a Global Actor: Exploring Eu Policy Towards Iran," ib id .17, no.
2 (2008).

European or 'W estern' view on security, and essentially ignoring Iranian concerns.23
Referring back to statements m ade by Joschka Fischer in 2 0 0 5 about his hopes fo r Iran
to return to 'rational policy', scholars outline an argum ent fo r depictions and
constructions o f double standards o f how nuclear and non-nuclear states are dealt w ith.
Here, a clear construction of 'w e' and 'th ey' is observed in th e dialogue betw een th e EU
and Iran, as well as overall international rhetoric describing Iran's nuclear program .24
The EU, as th e 'good citizen', backed by th e international com m unity, has th e re fo re
established a "pow er asym metry" th a t allows fo r a "m ore decisive coercive diplom acy"
action by th e EU.25 Securitization occurred by portraying, outlining, and exposing the
behavior of an actor w ho violated international law and norms; an actor unwilling to
change and comply despite num erous changes, offers, and com m unicative efforts. This
view is also supported by surveys conducted on m em bers o f the European Parliam ent as
well as European citizens, w ho despite view ing Iranian actions as irrational, reject a
military option using force against Iran.
Ian M anners' articulation o f NPE and the elem ents o f the concept theoretically
explain and describe German and EU approaches tow ard th e Iranian nuclear program .
The idea o f civilian power, w ith a focus on econom ic prowess rather than m ilitary
capabilities, provided the building block fo r M anners' argum ent of th e ideational impact

23 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," ibid.13, no. 3
( 2010 ).

24 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 477.
25 Ibid.

o f the "EU's international identity and role as a representative norm ative p o w e r".26
Here, a focus is given to th e pow er o f ideas and norms through cognitive processes th a t
essentially shape 'norm al' international relations and construct an id e n tity fo r th e EU.
This norm ative approach includes a strong com m itm ent to human rights, peace, liberty,
th e rule o f law, democracy, and social solidarity, concepts found in th e EU's acquis
com m unautaire (European Union Law), and diffused through contagion, inform ation,
official process, transference, and culture.27 Although M anners argues fo r this concept
by applying the abolition o f the death penalty, NPE can explain the current views and
approaches tow ard Iran's nuclear program in th a t policies are constructed on a
norm ative basis and with an emphasis on m ultilateral action in order to 'civilize'
international relations through ideas and norms. This means that th e factor which
shapes Germany's and the EU's role as an international actor is based upon w h a t th e
actor is, rather than how it acts and w h a t it says. Therefore, the EU can be view ed as a
'changer of norms' in the international system through the exercise o f norm ative pow er,
which has evolved from th e previous concepts o f civilian and m ilitary p o w e r as a
categorization. This theoretical understanding and explanation of 'actorness' is
im portant w hen analyzing Germ any's w ill and desire to influence, shape, and change
th e international environm ent, and can contribute in understanding G erm any's norm sbased policy approaches.

26 Ian Manners, "Norm ative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal o f Common M a rk e t
Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 238.
27 For specific references to these concepts in th e articles and an explanation o f th e process o f diffusion
fo r these norms, please refer to "Norm ative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal o f
Common M a rk e t Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 242-45.

On the other hand, some scholars focus on th e negative effect o f th e EU's
'coercive diplomacy approach' tow ards th e Iranian nuclear weapons crisis.28 Here,
diplomacy is th e main instrum ent, w hereby coercive diplom acy has th re e distinct
characteristics: a demand, a th reat, and tim e pressure. The dem and has to be
form ulated w ith the opponent and has to be supported by a th re a t th a t requires tim e
pressure or a deadline. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach present th e
concept as a w ay to persuade th e opponent and to avoid w ar, w hereby several
questions and aspects have to be taken into consideration before linking th e o ry to
policy. Legitimacy of demands, credibility o f the th re a t, credibility o f tim e pressure, and
m otivation of actors all contribute to decisions w ithin coercive diplomacy as an
alternative betw een going to w a r and doing nothing. It is im portant to note th a t not all
individual countries within Europe articulate th e ir opposition to the Iranian nuclear
program in line w ith nonproliferation rhetoric. Scholars have pointed to d o u b le
standards and legitimacy issues under th e NPT as early as 2003, especially in regards to
th e argum ent of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in o rder to protect national
interests. Some scholars highlight this legitimacy issue by presenting France's argum ent
for national interests. National interests-based argum ents fo r nuclear weapons
acquisition emphasizes the difficulty in convincing a state such as Iran to forgo
proliferation despite being geographically situated in an unstable region.29

28 Tom Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by th e Eu: The Iranian Nuclear W eapons Crisis," Third W orld Quarterly
28, no. 3 (2007).
29 Scholars often discuss this in com bination to some o f th e de fa c to w eapon states (Israel and Pakistan),
who are allowed to keep their nuclear weapons.

144

The European Union's approach towards Iran's nuclear program
Since the elevation of Iran's nuclear developm ents, but also since Iran signed th e
NPT Additional Protocol in October 2003, th e EU has taken a constructive diplom atic
approach; advocating diplomatic measures and offering various carrots to Iran w hile
also taking into consideration both cultural and as strategic goals. This approach is
referred to by scholars as an exam ple o f non-politicized governance.30 A fter th e initial
signing in 2003, Iran along w ith the EU-3, signed th e Paris agreem ent in 2 00 4 before the
EU-3 made a comprehensive offer to Iran in Vienna (Vienna proposal) in 2 00 6 . W h a t
follow ed a fte r the proposal is th e period currently under exam ination which began w ith
several rounds of sanctions: UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), UNSC Resolution 1747
(2007), and UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008). The EU's foreign policy and diplom atic
approach tow ard Iran and its nuclear program has gradually evolved fro m th e initial
form at consisting o f only Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (E3) w ho advocated
diplomacy combined with the th re a t of sanctions, to the EU-3, consisting of the E3 and
High Representative Javier Solana in order to give th e group EU legitimacy, and
eventually resulting in the EU3+3, adding Russia, China, and the U.S. to th e process to
show m ultilateral security governance.
W hen analyzing th e relationship betw een th e EU and Iran, some scholars take a
poststructuralist approach to exam ine the relationship betw een identity, ideas, and
policy in order to understand th e foreign policy choices of each actor.31 The main

30 Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 471.
31 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme."
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argum ent is th a t in order to m ake sense of diplom atic efforts and policy, analyses have
to include an understanding of identity and perception and th e discourse th e re o f, which
directly ties into constitutions of security.32 This discourse refers to th e language and
rhetoric used betw een actors and contributes to constructing concepts such as pow er,
ideology, threats, and cooperation. The argum ent and analysis fall in line w ith general
views of constructivism in the establishm ent o f knowledge, norms, and identity outlined
by Alexander W endt, in opposition to traditional realist balance of pow er explanations.
Securitization, or the process o f uncovering and understanding rhetoric structures th a t
eventually become accepted as international concepts and practices, can be used to
examine th e complex relationship and diplomacy betw een th e EU and Iran. M o reo ver,
th e case of Germany's relationship and foreign policy approach to Iran's nuclear
program fu rth er underlines the im portance of identity, norms, and knowledge as
Germany's foreign policy is marked by constructed discourses.
An im portant aspect in understanding this relationship is th e view and image
held by Europeans and Germans o f Iran, and vice versa. Here, the historic relationship
betw een Europe and Iran, going back to th e Persian Empire, is w idely discussed by
scholars w ho try to explain the current foreign policy choices m ade by each actor.
Perspectives by French, British, G erm an, and ancient historic docum ents paint a
complex picture of Persians, ranging in th e ir descriptions from 'barbarians' to 'peoples

32 Ibid. The author here refers back to an argum ent m ade by Lene Hansen (2006) in Security as practice,
discourse analysis and the Bosnian W ar: "Foreign policy discourses are analytical constructions through
which the construction and linking o f identity and policy can be studied" (p. 51).
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com m itted to principles such as tru th and justice'.33 Throughout several analyses, a
them atic exam ination by historians detail th e resemblance betw een Persia and Europe.
Iran's complex transform ation by several authoritarian regimes w ithin th e past century,
combined w ith domestic practices and policies, contribute to the current negative view
held by Europeans of Iran. This view transcends into rhetoric em ployed by policy makers
and leaders, th erefore directly constructing an 'O ther' into international narratives.34
This 'othering' o f the Iranian regim e translated to a distrust o f Iran and its foreign policy
by the W est, w hereas the EU is view ed as acting w ithin th e ir norm ative narrative and
approach in an effort to provide stability and security w ithin the region.35

Sanctions, recent developments, and the EU/German Voice
The EU W M D strategy eventually becam e the 'm anifesto' o f th e official EU
approach to non-proliferation and Iran's nuclear program . In 2004, th e EU3 proposed a
deal w ith new negotiations and economic benefits, which was signed in Paris in
Novem ber 2004 with Iran agreeing to freeze its uranium enrichm ent program until a
long-term agreem ent was reached. This offer, which included various carrots such as
cooperation in trade, technology exchange, and security, coincided w ith Ahm adinejad's
electoral victory of 2005, and th e European offer was rejected and Iran's enrichm ent

33 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 4 69.
34 This construction, rhetoric, and narrative is not only employed by European leaders and actors. An
argument can certainly be made of an elevated occurrence of 'othering' by the United States within th e
past ten years which has directly contributed to current views and relationships betw een 'The W est' and
Iran (most notably President Bush's categorization of Iran as part o f th e 'Axis of Evil')
35 The dichotomies of 'us' and 'them ' becom e part of th e securitization discourse through portrayal o f
values, norms, and identities internationally.
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program was re-started.36 The EU put forth another com prehensive proposal, using a
'softer' rhetoric byJoshka Fischer, w ho asked Iran to 'be reasonable' but declaring th a t
"if Iran w ere to go nuclear, it w ould jeopardize stability in th e entire region. This is not
only Israel's concern, but also o f all of Iran's neighbors".37 A fter an elevation o f talks
betw een th e IAEA and Iran in 2005, a nuclear dossier was referred to the UNSC in 2006,
along w ith a statem ent by the EU-3 detailing th e ir diplom atic efforts w ith Iran. In 2 00 6
th e EU-3 became the EU3+3, adding China, Russia, and the U.S. to th e negotiation team ,
eventually form ulating a proposal in Vienna w ith a focus on economic sanctions, which
w ere believed to be most fe a red .38
W h a t the EU (EU-3) have said in regards to Iran's nuclear developm ent has been
presented as a collective European view , backed by policy makers and politicians, and in
line w ith policy recom m endations and choices. Statem ents made by Javier Solana at the
European Parliament, as well as press releases by G erm an, French, and British policy
makers, w ere presented as justifications w hen discussing th e European relationship
w ith Iran. Here, the lack of trust and transparency is cited as a reason w hy a
preservation o f international law is essential w hen dealing w ith Iran. In 2 00 6 , th e EU
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana,

36 Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 276.
37 "Interview with Federal Foreign M inister Joschka Fischer in th e Suddeutsche Zeitung (Sz) on 6 August
2005 on Iran, Europe and Un Reform," ed. Auswartiges A m t (2005), accessed D ecem ber 10, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .au sw aertig es-am t.d e/E N /ln fo service/P resse/ln terview /A rch iv/05/050808FischerlranEuVn.html.
38 The German foreign minister made this argum ent publicly, citing Iran's economic dependency w ith th e
W est
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expressed this concern in clear term s, explaining th e root problem and cause o f the
strained relationship betw een Iran and the EU:
The problem w ith Iran is essentially a problem o f confidence. For many years,
Iran, a signatory to the NPT, carried o u t nuclear activities w ith a to tal lack of
transparency. This is a legitim ate source o f concern fo r th e international
com m unity as recognized by th e Iranians them selves...The six countries have
follow ed a tw o track approach: dialogue and referring th e case to th e UNSC.
Dialogue could not last forever. It is up to th em to decide w h e th e r th e tim e has
come to follow th e second track. But th e door to negotiations is always open
(Javier Solana, October 4, 2 0 0 6 ).39
W hile th e U.S. was part o f th e negotiations at th e tim e of this statem ent, a clear
distinction can be made betw een th e predom inately diplom atic approach of th e EU.
Although EU representatives also em ployed rhetoric of 'othering', th e tone o f Solana,
and his closing comments for th e above statem ents shows a deep understanding of th e
complex relationship in place betw een Iran and Europe. The lack of response by the
Bush Administration to Ahm adinejad's M ay 2 00 6 lette r was criticized by the EU, and
created friction betw een the EU and th e U.S.40 A fte r Iran officially and publicly rejected
th e Vienna proposal, the EU announced it was considering sanctions based on its
coercive foreign policy, backed by the UNSC fram ew ork, and declared it w ould only
negotiate if Iran suspended th e enrichm ent program.
The initial rounds o f sanctions in 2006 proved som ew hat difficult w ith Russia and
China resisting firm er measures which w ere advocated by th e EU and the U.S. In 2007,
the EC External Relations Commissioner gave a speech to th e European Parliam ent in
39 "Remarks by Javier Solana, Eu High Representative fo r th e Cfsp, on th e Latest D evelopm ents Concerning
Iran to th e European Parliament Foreign Affairs C om m ittee . Brussels, 4 October 200 6 ", ed. European
Union (2006), accessed December 4, 2013,
http://w w w .consilium .europa.eu/ueD ocs/cm s_D ata/docs/pressdata/EN /discours/91168.pdf.
40 Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 278.
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regards to final findings and approaches tow ards Iran's nuclear program. The
Commissioner expressed his concern ab o u t the overall state and fu tu re o f non
proliferation globally. This delivery, which tim ely referred to North Korean nuclear
developm ents, was based on non-proliferation globally and broadly, ra th e r than in
securitization term s towards Iran, as observed in th e past. The Commissioner did not
outline the various security threats posed by Iran or Iran's future nuclear program , but
instead focused on a technical analysis and fram ew o rk o f non-p ro liferation.41 Sanctions
in 2007, backed by France, Germany, and th e United Kingdom, included a ban on arms
sales, w hereby British and French policy makers em ployed stronger language and
rhetoric fu rth er advocating harsher sanctions similar to those sanctions proposed by the
U.S., which included the Iranian banking and economic system .42
These sanctions w ere partially enacted in 2008 w ith UNSC Resolution 1803,
which called fo r a financial freeze to individual assets of people believed to be involved
in th e nuclear program, as well as travel bans and increased inspections o f cargo bound
to and from Iran. By 2008, even Solana used language and rhetoric th a t pointed to
cultural differences betw een Iran and th e W est, focusing on the destabilizing effect a
nuclear Iran would pose to the M iddle East. Solana's articulation em phasized th a t th e
punishment in the form o f sanctions was not th e prim ary objective, but rath er an
increased e ffo rt and avenue fo r potential negotiations w ith Iran. Although th e EU

41 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Program m e," ibid.13, no. 3
(2010): 481.
42 Although he later corrected this statem ent slightly, French Foreign M inister Bernard Kouchner declared
th a t "France needed to prepare for th e prospect of w ar w ith Iran" (Santini, 2010, p. 4 8 2 and Baldwin,
2007).
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backed the UN resolutions, policy makers advised th e U.S. to reduce rhetoric th a t
included military action and the use o f force, w hile advocating diplom acy as th e only
possible approach. By M arch 2008, Ahm adinejad declared th a t Iran would no longer
deal w ith the EU and instead com m unicate only w ith th e IAEA.43
In June 2009 the EU3+3 offered an updated version o f the initial Vienna proposal
to Iran, which has not been acted upon. A fter m eetings w ith Tehran in Geneva, and
several statements made by EU policy makers as w ell as President Obam a, the
possibility o f Israel striking Iranian nuclear facilities was m ade known internationally,
therefore reopening the securitization debate including th e use of force. The role of the
EU since 2009 has th erefo re been tw o -fo ld and rather complex; on th e one hand, the
EU's (and Germany's) com m itm ent to its allies such as Israel is continuously reiterated
publicly, while also balancing and 'patrolling' the M id d le East in order to avoid possible
m ilitary conflicts 44 Throughout the process in the past decade, an articulation o f Iran's
complex and interrelated dom estic and foreign policy approach has been absent in
international discussion about Iran's nuclear program, painting th e picture o f an
irrational actor and securitizing th e issue in order to legitim ize future action. Some
scholars make this argum ent by chronologically analyzing th e language and rhetoric
employed by European policy makers on th e basis of a discursive exam ination o f the
concept of security and perceived th reat.

43 To international surprise, the U.S. sent Under Secretary o f State W illiam Burns to talk w ith th e EU and
Iran in July 2008, a policy shift which was accredited to EU pressure. Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld
Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 282.
44 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Program m e," ibid.13, no. 3
(2010): 484.

The legitimacy and double-standard issues raised in th e early 2000s in regards to
dealing w ith Iran's nuclear weapons program did not help th e overall relationship
betw een the EU and Iran, since France and the United Kingdom are both nuclear
weapons states. As several scholars point out, Iran has never disputed th a t it is not
allowed to have nuclear weapons; how ever, Iran has been very clear through out the
negotiations th a t the enrichm ent o f uranium is allow ed according to Article 4 o f the
NPT.45 Drawing similarities betw een North Korea's nuclear program to th e process o f
Iran's nuclear program, analysts argue th a t although Iran can simply w ith d ra w from th e
NPT and announce possession of nuclear weapons, th e intention o f th e acquisition of
nuclear weapons worry th e W est, w hile th e size o f th e civilian nuclear program th a t Iran
should be allowed to have was also under debate. In analyzing the EU's coercive
diplomacy approach tow ard Iran, some scholars conclude th a t articulated threats do not
always reach goals; however, th e EU's, and specifically Germ any's negotiations can be
seen as elevating the EU's role as a global actor. The EU, and Germ any, as a global actor,
balances the differing advocated approaches by th e U.S., Russia, and China, w hile acting
in line w ith European identity, norms, and prom oting collective, m ultilateral actions.
O ther scholars examine the effectiveness of dealing w ith Iran by assessing a
realization in objectives, nam ely th e prevention o f th e acquisition o f nuclear w eapons.
Analyzing the EU's strategy in term s of cost and benefits analysis, an im portant aspect of
nonproliferation logic has been neglected by EU policy makers: the prestige associated

45 Sebastian Harnisch, "M inilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran
Initiative," ibid.16, no. 1 (2007): 624. Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by th e Eu: The Iranian Nuclear W eapons
Crisis."Sauer (2007)
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with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the symbolism and popularity a t hom e fo r
countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This symbolism and understanding o f the
underlying motives by Iran is entirely absent in EU policy makers' conception of the
problem .46 This is partially explained by th e EU's a tte m p t to become a global actor,
visible and pow erful in world politics beyond traditional diplomatic initiatives and in
opposition to th e U.S.'s unilateral and militaristic approach. The internal divisions w ithin
th e EU over policies and sanctions tow ard Iran also contributed to th e stalled or
'ineffective' outcom e of th e halted negotiations. According to a convincing argum en t by
Tom Sauer, during the entire negotiation process, th e EU "changed fro m being a
m ediator to being a coercer" w ith o u t offering new proposals for Iran, w hile 'softer'
approaches advocated by G erm any and o th e r EU m em ber states w ere shut dow n
im m ediately by the U.S.47
A review of the scholarly debates surrounding the effectiveness of th e EU's
approach in dealing w ith Iran's nuclear program, taking into consideration long standing
relations and historic events, scholars and analysts disagree about th e results and
interpretations of the negotiating process. Some point to th e problem o f d o u b le
standards w hile others explain th e im portance o f considering Iranian dom estic politics,
while yet another group highlights th e lack o f th e EU (and others) to consider th e
national security threats articulated by Iran. Analysts critically exam ine th e a fte rm ath of
th e EU's negotiation process w ith Iran, arguing th a t the EU has tried to push Iran to

46 "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 284.
47 "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 288.
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com m it to rules beyond those outlined by th e NPT w ith an approach o f 'misguided
dem and', essentially denying Iran th e developm ent of a national nuclear fuel cycle.48
Part of these criticisms fall under the double-standard argum ent, but th e underlying
conclusion is th a t unlike th e U.S.'s approach o f counter-proliferation argum ents, which
advocate a reshaping or replacing o f th e existing regim e, th e EU lacks a clear and
consistent strategy. Scholars suggest a full return to diplom atic institutions com bined
with an articulation and adoption o f w h a t John Herz called "Realist Liberalism" 49
Similarly, Suzanne M aloney questions th e sanctions, and carrot-and-stick policies, which
have been m ore focused on the latter, and strongly urges th e Obama A dm inistration to
focus on the diplom atic process.50

Policies, agreements, and recent developments
The policies employed by th e EU can be categorized as a securitized foreign
policy approach marked by coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy has been defined as
backing "one's dem and on an adversary w ith a th re a t of punishm ent fo r noncompliance th at he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply

48 Sten Rynning, "Peripheral of Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Com bat th e Proliferation o f
Nuclear Weapons," ibid.16, no. 3 (2007).
49 According to Rynning (2007), Herz', 'realist liberalism' would entail a doctrine th a t must "weave
together th e EU's m ultilateral am bition and its penchant fo r singling out illiberal regim es for special
treatm ent. M ore on th e concept can be found a t John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and th e Security
Dilemma," W orld Politics 2, no. 2 (1950).
50 Suzanne Maloney, "Sanctioning Iran: If Only It W ere So Simple," Washington Q uarterly 33, no. 1 (2010):
145.
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w ith the dem and".51 Scholars w ho categorize th e EU's approaches tow ards Iran in line
w ith coercive diplomatic measures show th a t Iran's nuclear program is an exam ple fo r
securitization. Europe and other 'W estern' countries have stopped explaining w hy Iran's
nuclear ambitions are a severe security problem which m ay have dangerous impacts on
th e international community, instead accepting this as a security issue on a de fa c to
basis. This is partly due to the images of th e Iranian regime held by th e W est, m arked by
authoritarianism , human rights violations, and absence o f th e civil liberties enjoyed by
Europeans. Europe then becomes an agent seeking peace and security in international
politics, based on norm ative foreign policy choices and a focus on dem ocracy
prom otion; concepts th at seem to directly contradict and com prom ise Iran's foreign
policy.
A fter th e 2002 shock th a t Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program for alm ost
tw o decades in violation o f the NPT, negations betw een Iran and Europe officially
began. M ost im portantly, this discovery lead to th e EU's categorization o f security over
economic interests, creating a stronger foreign policy approach as an alternative to th e
approach employed by the Bush adm inistration. This foreign policy approach had to
encompass a comprehensive and m ultilateral policy, representative of th e entire union
in order to be viewed legitim ate, but also serve as a parallel to perceived American
hegem ony for initiatives in the M iddle East a t the tim e .52 The European unified and

51 Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an A lternative to W ar, Institute of Peace
(Washington, D. C.1997), 4.
52 This alternative approach was also put into place in response to th e EU internal crisis o f th e Iraq w ar.
Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 275.

proactive approach, spoken w ith "one voice", declared in O ctober 2003 th a t they
"would make everything possible in order to avoid Iran becoming a nuclear state".53
Throughout these initial negotiations, and th e rhetoric em ployed by EU-3
representatives Dom enique de Villepin, Jack Straw, and Joschka Fischer, a clear distance
betw een the European approach and th e approach o f the U.S. was present. M o re
specifically, th e European approach was based on concepts, aspects, and beliefs of non 
proliferation rhetoric and theory w ith an initial rejection of th e use o f force. The EU
form ulated this approach as a strategy o f 'preventative engagem ent' w ith an emphasis
on international law on the basis of United Nations m andates.54

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOW ARD IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TRADE, RHETORIC,
ACTION, AND THE MEDIA
As w ith all areas of Germ an foreign policy, the concepts of 'never again w ar',
'never alone', and 'w ith peaceful means only' have to be taken into consideration in
order to understand the relationship betw een G erm any and the M iddle East. These
concepts refer to W W II legacies and describe Germ any's com m itm ent to m ultilateral
approaches and Germany's role as a civilian pow er.55 Bearing these principles in m ind,
Germany's foreign policy in th e Gulf region has historically been value-based and
interest driven and focused on economic issues. Foreign policy choices by G erm any

53 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Program m e," ibid.13, no. 3
(2010): 474.
54 Ibid.
55 Eberhard Sandschneider, "German Foreign Policy Towards th e Gulf Region," Emirates Lecture Series

86 ( 2010 ): 1 .
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became domestically debated w ith the rise o f Ostpolitik and approaches based on th e
ideas of 'W andel durch H andel' (change through trade), including bilateral agreem ents
with Germany's eastern neighbors.56 G erm any has several strategic priorities in the
M iddle East to include an interest in political stability, cooperation tow ards th e fight of
terrorism , im provem ent and extension o f G erm any business, and preventing Iran from
becoming a nuclear pow er.57
It is im portant to include th e som etim es controversial policies fo r th e period o f
1993 to 1998 throughout the Clinton-Kohl era. During this tim e , sanctions and
diplomatic pressure due to Iran's potential nuclear program w ere heavily debated.
W hile the Clinton adm inistration supported and advocated fo r economic sanctions, th e
German governm ent refused sanctions and supported Iran's nuclear program in term s
o f its legality under th e NPT.58 This analysis and stance has since changed w ith th e 2003
discovery of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Since then, G erm any has continuously
emphasized the principle o f m ultilateralism w hen dealing w ith Iran or o th e r states
within the Gulf region, including issues beyond Iran's nuclear program .59 Despite this,
Germany, in recent years, has placed national interests before those of th e EU, w hile
taking a separate position from other EU m em b er states. This can certainly be said fo r
Germany's policies tow ards Iran, as G erm any has often suggested softer approaches
with less severe economic sanctions. W hile literature about th e G erm an-lranian

56 These trade agreements include countries such as Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and th e GDR
57 Sandschneider, "German Foreign Policy Towards th e Gulf Region."
58 Matthias Kuntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb," The Journal o f International Security Affairs
18, no. 39-45 (2010).
59 Such as human rights policies
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relationship in regards to trade is extensive, the m ore recent emphasis in scholarly
analysis surrounds Germany's foreign policy tow ard Iran and the relationship b e tw ee n
th e tw o countries in light o f Iran's nuclear program.
W ith a long standing diplom atic and trade relationship, Germ any has taken a
'softer' approach in the past ten years to prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran. Although
German foreign policy, opinions, and statem ents by politicians can be, at tim es, singled
out as a German 'voice' or 'view', th e m ultilateral approaches with France and th e
United Kingdom, and m ore recently China, Russia, and th e U.S., m ake it difficult to
separate German diplomatic efforts from those under the um brella o f EU dialogue. In
th e past six years, friction betw een Germ any and the United Kingdom and France
occurred over Germany's consideration o f Russia's proposal fo r Iran which included an
allowance of limited enrichm ent.60 The U.S. blocked this proposal im m ediately and
rounds of UNSC resolutions and sanctions began. In 2007, G erm any again proposed a
"softer approach", which was shut down by the U.S., France, and th e United Kingdom,
and contributed to disagreements am ong EU m em ber states later th a t year. Austria was
also in support of a softer approach, once again rejected by France and th e United
Kingdom to which Germany reacted publicly in th e m edia.61
In Septem ber 2007, Germ an M inister of Foreign Affairs S teinm eier accused th e
U.S. and France of hypocrisy about earlier accusations o f Germ an firm s' prolonged
business w ith Iran while th e U.S. and France secretly also engaged in business deals w ith

60 Sauer, "Struggling on the W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran," 278.
61 Spain also publicly disagreed with fu rth e r sanctions.
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cy

Iran.

American companies such as M icrosoft, Caterpillar, and Coca-Cola operate in

Iran, while French exports include Peugeot and Renault.63 Germ any openly voted
against new economic sanctions by th e UN in 2007, which was certainly noticed by th e
international community. The influence o f dom estic opinion in Germ an foreign and
security policy is distinctively evident throughout several issue areas. A 2013 PEW
Research on Global Attitudes Project shows th a t 96 percent of Germ ans are against Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons; however, only 50 percent o f those asked would support
possible military action to prevent Iran from nuclear weapons acquisition.64 The m edia
coverage and domestic reaction to th e Iranian nuclear program over th e past ten years
has not been as involved and outspoken as foreign policy involving o u t o f area and use
o f force debates.
W hile Germany's rhetoric tow ards Iran has been mostly strong and in line w ith
th e EU voice, opposing nuclear weapons acquisition in Iran, Germ any's allies have
criticized Germany for the softer measures advocated by th e Federal Republic.
Specifically, Germany's economic ties w ith Iran have been scrutinized heavily in the
media and through official political statem ents. Scholars point to G erm any's policy o f
noninterventionism in regions such as Libya, Syria, and M ali, and argue th a t G erm any's
position as the third-largest exporter o f arms creates a conflict for G erm any's foreign
policy directive. In the realm o f nonproliferation, Germ any's economic w eight does not
62 "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty o f Hypocrisy," Der Spiegel, Septem ber 27, 2007,
accessed December 2, 2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/international/w orld/iran-sanctions-berlin-says-usand-france-guilty-of-hypocrisy-a-507443.htm l.
63 "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty o f Hypocrisy," D er Spiegel, Septem ber 27, 2007.
64 "Pew Research Global Attitudes Project," (2013), accessed Decem ber 8, 2013,
h ttp ://w w w .p e w g lo b a l.o rg /1 3 /0 6 /ll/g lo b a l-v ie w s -o f-ira n -o v e rw h e lm in g ly -n e g a tiv e /.
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translate to the responsible behavior expected by the international com m unity.
Germany's relationship and ties to Israel fu rth er com plicate Germ any's ability to level its
foreign policy choices. In 2011, Shaul M ofaz, the chair o f th e Israeli Foreign Affairs and
Defense com m ittee, advised G erm any to adopt "a clear policy towards Iran" and to
advocate "tough sanctions".65 In an article w ritte n by Karl-Theodor zu G uttenberg in The
W all Street Journal, the fo rm er defense m inister noted Germany's "historical and moral
responsibility to support Israel against an Iranian th reat", w hile M erkel, in 2008, publicly
declared th a t "Israel's security is part of G erm any's raison d'etre and cannot be
negotiated".66 It is interesting to note th a t opinion polls show that th e G erm an public
views Israel as an "aggressive country th a t pursues its interests w ith o u t consideration
for other nations".67
On the other hand, some analysts argue th a t from an economic tra d e
perspective, Germany's economic sanctions w ith Iran have only hurt th e G erm an
industry. The "strategy o f discouragement" adopted by th e German governm ent
resulted in m ajor German economic tra d e partners including Deutsche Bank, Linde, and
ThyssenKrupp to w ithdraw from Iran. The m arket gaps occurring from G erm an business
w ithdraw al w ere then filled by Chinese and Russian companies. In this case, th e
sanctions imposed by Germ any did not contribute to th e prevention o f Iran's nuclear
weapons acquisition, but hurt th e Germ an econom y w hile providing business gaps to
65 "Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Dem and Greater Measures against Tehran," Spiegel
Online, Novem ber 14, 2011.
66 Karl-Theodor Zu Guttenberg and U lf Gartzke, "Germany M ust Have Israel’s Back," The W allstreet
Journal, April 2, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013,
h ttp ://o n line.w sj.co m /new s/a rtic le s /S B 1 0 0 0 1 4 2 4 1 2 7 8 8 7 3 2 3 2 9 6 5 0 4 5 7 8 3 9 6 1 1 3 8 4 5 6 8 9 8 6 2 .
67 "Germany Must Have Israel’s Back," The W allstreet Journal, April 2, 2013.
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th e com petition. Machines and systems w ith Germ an origin are used by tw o thirds o f
Iranian industrial enterprises and three quarters o f small and medium sized firms,
making Germ any Iran's num ber one im p o rte r.68 Furtherm ore, Iran's dependency on
Germ an suppliers was confirmed in 2 00 8 by the G erm an-lranian Cham ber o f Industry
and Commerce, adding th a t China or Russia could not easily replace this export gap.69
Historically, the controversy surrounding th e G erm an-lranian trade relationship dates
back to th e Kohl-Clinton era, w hen the U.S. imposed sanctions which w ere underm ined
by Germany. The period from 2 00 6 to 2 00 7 was m arked by resistance from G erm any to
th e economic sanctions proposed by th e U.S. W hile the U.S., France, and th e United
Kingdom supported stronger economic sanctions, Germ any, along w ith China and
Russia, rejected harsher sanctions. Germ any's economic and trade interests in Iran
certainly impacted the initial years o f negotiating stronger sanctions. Further,
independent EU sanctions w ere also opposed by Austria and Italy and th e economic
sanctions during this period w ere imposed under the UN umbrella. M oreover,
Germany's refusal to support stronger sanctions during th e EU3+3 negotiations grouped
Germ any alongside Russia and China.
Rhetorically, Germany's position has been in line w ith alliance solidarity,
condemning a potential nuclear Iran and advocating sanctions over m ilitary
interventions. In Novem ber 2009, Chancellor M erkel addressed the U.S. Congress,
stating th a t "a nuclear bomb in th e hands o f an Iranian president, w ho denies th e

68 According to th e German-lranian Cham ber o f Industry and Commerce in Tehran and affirm ed in 2007
by Berlin's Federal Agency for Foreign Trade. Kiintzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb," 40.
59 "Berlin, th e Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb."
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Holocaust, threatens Israel, and denies Israel the right to exist, is not acceptable" and
needs to be m et w ith "tough economic sanctions".70 W hile th e chancellor's rhetoric is
certainly strong and shows support and alliance solidarity, th e initial rhetoric observed
by German leaders was quite different. Even upon discovery o f Iran's clandestine
nuclear program some 18 years in th e making, European and German exports to Iran
increased while Joschka Fischer explained th at, "W e Europeans have always advised our
Iranian partners th a t it is in their considered self-interest to regard us as a protective
shield."71 Beyond Germany's view tow ards nuclear w eapons, the nuclear disaster in
Fukushima, Japan prom pted Germ any to rethink th e nuclear energy program . According
to W esterw elle, he realized th at "it was simply impossible to return to business as
usual" after the events in Japan.72
A fter some controversial accusations by th e Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence
agency, Germ any banned th e export of specific goods to Iran which have been m odified
and used in questionable ways, including th e conversation o f German trucks to rocket
launchers.73 W hile cases like these call fo r obvious sanctions o f specific goods, the
G erm an governm ent was also concerned w ith th e hardship th a t sanctions could impose
on th e Iranian people, especially in regards to medical and pharm aceutical export
sanctions. A fter the official report of th e IAEA was released in Novem ber 2011, revealing
alarm ing details about Iran's nuclear program, th e international com m unity reacted
70 "Berlin, th e Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb," 39.
71 "Berlin, th e Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb," 41.
72 "Spiegel Interview with Germ an Foreign M inister," Der Spiegel, March 21, 2011, accessed Decem ber 5,
2013, h ttp ://w w w .spiegel.de/international/germ any/spiegel-interview -w ith-germ an-foreign-m inistergadhafi-m ust-go-there-s-no-question-a-752164.htm l.
73 "Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Demand G reater Measures against Tehran."
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w ith renewed concerns but little action. The reports showed th at Iran actively w orked
on developing a nuclear device w ith a possible m ilitary elem en t. Guido W esterw elle said
th a t unless Iran "conducts serious negotiations on its nuclear program, new, m ore
severe sanctions would be inevitable".74 Despite this strong rhetoric on th e one hand,
W esterw elle also emphasized Germ any's opposition to m ilitary action, adding th a t
Germany rules out "all discussion on a possible m ilitary option".75

SUM M ARY
The most recent developm ents in light of th e election of Hassan Rouhani
prom pted Chancellor M erkel to call fo r a rekindling o f th e deepened relationship
betw een Germany and Iran, opening th e door fo r renew ed constructive cooperation in
order to prom ote international stability and security. Scholars and journalists continue
to point to the inconsistencies in Germ any's foreign policy behavior, categorizing
Germany's inaction and unwillingness to impose m ore severe sanctions on Iran w ith
Germany's unwillingness to participate in a m ilitary intervention in Libya. Specifically,
th e German media has focused on Germ any's economic interest-based policies. In a
highly critical Germ an article published in D ie Z e it in April 2013, journalists point to
Germany's willingness to export arms to dictators and unwillingness to discuss hum an

74 "laea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atom ic W atchdog," D er
Spiegel, Novem ber 9, 2011, accessed Decem ber 5, 20 1 3 , h ttp ://w w w .s p ie g e l.d e /in te rn a tio n a l/w o rld /ia e a lam basts-iran-nuclear-progam -israel-hails-report-as-turnaround-for-atom ic-w atchdog-a-796849.htm l.
75 "laea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atom ic W atchdog," D er
Spiegel, Novem ber 9, 2011.
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rights w ith China and Russia as this is "bad fo r business".76 Throughout th e scholarly and
media responses to Iran's nuclear program and Germ any's behavior, analysts
continuously point to Germany's role as th e third largest arms exporter behind th e U.S.
and Russia as reported by th e Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI).
This chapter presented a historic overview o f the G erm an-lranian relationship w hile
focusing on the factual data surrounding th e approach of th e EU3+3 tow ards Iran's
nuclear program. Further, scholarly analysis and theoretical argum ents w ere taken into
consideration to understand Germ any's varied behavior. The evidence presented in this
chapter will be analyzed and applied to th e selected independent variables in chapter
six of this dissertation in order to d e term in e w h e th e r Germany's foreign policy and
rhetoric is determ ined by historical m em ory.

76 Jochen Bittner et al., "W irTu n Doch Nix..." D ie Z e it, March 21, 2013, accessed Decem ber 5, 2013,
http ://w w w .zeit.d e/13/13/D eutschlan d-A u ssen po litik.

164

CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze th e presence and strength o f the selected variables in
each case in order to understand and explain Germany's foreign policy behavior.
Alliance solidarity and m ultilateral approaches, historical m em ory and W W II legacy,
domestic influence, and national interest will be exam ined in tw o policy areas, out o f
area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. W hile the central focus of th e analysis for
out of area operations is on Germany's abstention in the case of Libya, th e cases of
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are also included in this analysis in o rder to present a
linear, sequential case for continuity and change in G erm any's behavior. For th e policy
area involving nuclear nonproliferation, Germ any's behavior during the EU3+3
negotiations w ith Iran w ere exam ined based on th e same criteria to look for
corroboration of the im portance o f historical m em ory in G erm an foreign and security
policy and rhetoric. The analysis w ill show w h eth er, according to th e hypotheses
selected for these case studies, G erm any has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric,
determ ined by historical m em ory and identity or not. This is analysis is separated into
four sections. The first tw o sections will present th e variables and findings fo r th e cases
for out of area operation and nuclear nonproliferation respectively. The third section
will compare both policy areas fo r th e cases of Iran and Libya, highlighting w h e th e r
Germany's recent change can be categorized as an adjustm ent, reconstruction, learning
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process, or norms-based continued behavior. The theoretical debates and analysis thus
far have focused on Germany's continuity in policy despite an increase in pow er. The
fourth section of this chapter will apply th e th re e international relations theories,
structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to the selected cases in order to detail
each fram ew ork's ability to explain th e change or continuity in Germ any's foreign policy
behavior.

CASE I: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA
The question introduced at the beginning of this case study guided this research
in determ ining w hat consensus has to be reached in order to authorize th e use o f force.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is th a t Germ an foreign policy and rhetoric is eith er
determ ined, or not determ ined by historical m em ory. An assumption is made th a t
Germany has underw ent a transform ation from an old status quo tow ards a potential
new status quo in German foreign policy execution. W ho th e n has to be on board to
authorize th e use of force? W h a t are th e main variables th a t influence this decision?
Under which circumstances does historical m em ory influence Germ an foreign policy,
and how im portant is m em ory in the Libya case? Does Germ an political rhetoric support
policy action? W hile th e m ajority of this case study focuses on the Libya case, th e use of
force debate fo r Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan w ere also included in the application o f
the variables to compare and contrast am ong each case briefly, and to set th e context of
th e argument.
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The following table shows th e presence o f the selected variables and evidence in
recent cases w here the use of force was debated. Further, th e chart depicts and
explains additional indicators fo r outcom es in policy choices. For use o f force cases in
Germ an foreign policy, four variables w ere selected: 1) M ultilateral Alliance Solidarity,
2) Historical M em ory, 3) Domestic Influence, and 4) National/Econom ic Interests.
Additional behavioral descriptors include: Engagem ent/Responsibility, Consent,
Rhetoric, Deploym ent Caveats and Hum anitarian Argum ents, and th e International
Environment. Each case is then categorized by an observed change as e ith e r an
adjustm ent to policy, reconstruction of policy, learning o f policy, or norm s-consistent
policy.

Table 2: Application of Variables: Case I
Iraq 2003

Kosovo
Humanitarian
Argument

•

Use of force

•

approved
based on
humanitarian

M ain difference
to Kosovo. Not
based on
hum anitarian

crisis

Afghanistan
•

Reconstruction/

•

developm ent
support

•

Libya
•

Hum anitarian
Argum ent
made

Hum anitarian

(n o t influential
enough)

argum ent

support (main

•

consequence
s o f inaction

•

Outside of
Europe

domestic
understanding)

•

Ethnic
cleansing

•

Based on
ideology
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Table 2: Continued
Kosovo
(VI)
Multilateral
Alliance
Solidarity/
NATO/EU

•

Showing

Iraq 2003
•

com m itm ent

Break w ith
alliance
(France, Russia)

to partners
and Int'l

Ubya

Afghanistan
•

•

community
(although

External
pressure to

No actual
c o m m itm e n t/

expand mission

grouped w ith

Showed
continued

China/Russia/

com m itm ent

•

Brazil
•

Rhetorical

arguably a

co m m itm en t

little too late)

to fully
support
resolution
•

C om m itm ent
o f Germ an
soldiers
manning
AWACS
missions in
Afghanistan

Engagement/
Responsibility

•

Becoming a

•

responsible,

Consequences:

predictable

break w ith U.S.;

External
pressures to

actor (begins
th e Germany

asking o f 'th e new

com m it

NO

Germ an Question'

Yes, but caveats
•

•

as a 'norm al'

•

actor debate)

•

No. Break
w ith alliance.
"Inconsistent
foreign
policy"

Based on civil
reconstruction
Need for
alliance
solidarity,
responsibility

Consequences:
voiced frustration
by allies

Categorization
of Change

•

Reconstructio
n (of 'never

•

again w ar';

culture o f

based

•

•

restraint)
•

First use of

but can be
categorized as
newly o rie n te d /

Pushing for

Shifted

e o f Kosovo

•

No change in
actual policy

force since
W W II
independenc

•

(antim ilitarism ,
pacifism,

use of force
and Norms
hum anita rian
intervention)

Norms
consistent

Norms
consistent as

Norms
consistent:

soldiers were

A nti

deployed with
caveats.

norm

intervention

Change:
elimination of

trum ped

draft
(professionalize

n o rm /N o

/c o m p e te n c e /
•

•

hum anitarian
change

capability)

A djustm ent
(learning

First German

a fte r Kunduz)

troo p
deploym ent
outside
European
border

•
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Table 2: Continued
Iraq 2003

Kosovo
(V2) Domestic
Influence

•

Broadly
supported

•

after

•

Strongly

Afghanistan
•

opposed

Domestic
discontent/

Election

opposition

Libya
•

M ajority
strongly

D ifferent

opposed
Germ an

were

understanding

military

reported

o f Germany's

intervention

role in
Afghanistan

but fe lt th a t

massacres

influence

•

Gaddafi must
•

go
Election
influence

(V3) National
Interests/
Economic
Interests/cost

•

•

Cost of
integrating

"Nein" was
view ed as new

•

Cost of

East Germany

orientation fo r

•

Cost o f war

played a role

national

Proximity to
war, cost of

interest based
policy

refugee influx

•

•

•

reconstruction

No plan fo r
future
•

theB RIC

integrating

•
•

Economic
interests in

Cost of
East/E U
integration

Too
expensive.

countries
•

Lack of

No interest in
foreign policy

capability

or to take
leadership

Cost of w ar

role in
Europe
•

Refugee cost

•

Cost of
Bundeswehr
Reform;
troops in
Afghanistan;
cost o f w ar
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Table 2: Continued
Kosovo
(V4) Historical
Memory/WWl
1Legacy

•

Prominent
Presence.

Iraq 2003
•

•

peaceful
resolution and

Change after
Kunduz

•

Historical
m em ory

diplomatic

2010
engagement

enters

efforts

on ground

discussion

•

/rh eto ric
(discussion of
"never again

Pacifism/
antim ilitarism

•

Culture of

Libya

Afghanistan

Emphasis on

•

•

civilian
casualties
•

efforts

civilian
•

Antim ilitarism

•

Culture o f
restraint

•

war")

Past
history/m em o

Intersection
o f g uilt/

zone resulting

restraint

Auschwitz"
"never again
•

Emphasis on
diplom atic

Discussion of
casualties/
norms/values

Could not
guarantee no

ry o f no-fly

responsibility

in hostile,
lengthy
interventions

Consent
(dominant
attitude of
political
leaders)

•

•

(internally

•

not: Red-

Elite consensus,
domestic

Green, CDU-

consensus

•

Consensus
until 2009

•

M a jo rity
consensus

•

Internal

yes)

disagreem ent

externally

throughout
debates

eventually
strong
consent-vote

Rhetoric

•
•

Strong
(Fischer)

•

Strong (Fischer/
Schroder)

Von Gutenberg.
Use of th e word

•

(M e rkel,

Krieg

Rhetoric

W e s te rw e lle /
Party

matched

m em bers)

action
•

Deployment
caveat

•

No troop

Strong

N /A

Bundestag

Rhetoric did
n o t match
action

N /A

limitations, no on

deployment

ground
engagement,
different mission

In fl Setting/
Institutional
Restraints

No UN
m andate/NATO
setting

•

NO UNSC

•

ISAF vote 2001

•

support/illegal
•

Support from
o th e r states

goals
•

Influence of
economic
crisis

(France,
Canada, Russia)

Split over EU

•

Siding w ith
BRIC countries
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The evidence selected fo r this analysis shows th a t variable 1, M u ltilateral
Alliance Solidarity, was not present in th e Libya case as Germ any decided to abstain and
instead side with China and Russia. References to historical m em ory and W W II legacy
(variable 2) w ere also observed throughout several speeches, interviews, and
statem ents given by policy makers. Dom estic influence (variable 3), although strong
throughout Germany in opposing a m ilitary intervention in Libya by th e Bundeswher,
can also be attributed to Germany's culture of restraint and norms-based behavior
adopted after the W W II. The potential influence o f th e local elections on rhetoric and
action adopted by W esterw elle and o th er policy makers m ay have contributed to th e
abstention; however, the im portance of dom estic opinion and influence o f elections
only further reinforces the argum ent o f th e cyclical and continuous influence of
historical memory. The ongoing financial crisis, Bundeswehr reform , and th e continued
mission in Afghanistan may also have had m inor factors in influencing th e decision to
abstain, falling into th e realm o f national and economic interests.
Another variable, specific to G erm an foreign and security policy relating to out of
area operations, is th e concept of hum anitarian-based interventions. W hile this concept
was crucial in the reconstruction and reinterp retatio n o f 'never again w ar' in th e use of
force debates during the Kosovo intervention, hum an rights-based offenses in Libya
w ere considered but not influential enough to w a rra n t a vote for resolution 1973. W hile
G erm any officially condemned Gaddafi's hum an rights violations and publicly called fo r
an end to the suffering of civilians, 'responsibility to protect' and 'hum anitarian
intervention' arguments did not m easure against G erm any's culture o f restraint, based
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on historical m em ory and norms-based behavior. The concept of 'responsibility', which
has been at th e forefront o f debates throughout G erm any's post-W W II years, was once
again highlighted in the Libya case. Although G erm any has proven to be a responsible
actor and reliable partner in th e past, th e abstention prom pted th e international
com m unity to question and doubt Germ any's responsibility as a regional security
exporter.
W hile m ajority consent was reached by th e Bundestag for G erm any's abstention
on th e resolution, the internal differences among m em bers o f the p arliam ent was no
surprise. The debates before, during, and a fte r th e vote w e re marked w ith controversial
opinions and argum entative statem ents. Despite this internal struggle to reach a
consensus, the m ajority of Germans opposed Germ an troop deploym ent fo r an
intervention in Libya. Further, th e th re e other cases considered for this analysis w ere
also marked by strong consensus, despite differing outcom es. The rhetoric em ployed by
policy makers fo r all cases under review is strong and often controversial. W h ile political
rhetoric, in Germany, is often strong and influential, these fo u r cases show th e
im portance o f rhetoric in cases involving the use o f force. Germ any's pacifist convictions
post-W W II, continuously interfere w ith contem porary 'calls to action' by th e
international com m unity, especially in cases involving hum an rights violations,
beginning w ith Kosovo. Fischer, in 1995 in front o f th e Bundestag, m ost clearly
articulated the Germ an struggle o f leveling values and beliefs:
W e are in a real conflict betw een basic values. On the one hand, th e re is a
renunciation o f force as a vision of a w orld in which conflicts are resolved
rationally, through resources to

laws and

m ajority decisions, through th e

constitutional process and no longer through b ru te force; a w orld in which
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m ilitary means are rejected, and in which the aim is to create structure to
replace them and make th em redundant. On the o th e r hand, th e re is a bloody
dilem m a th a t human beings m ay be able to survive only w ith th e use o f m ilitary
force. Betw een solidarity fo r survival and our com m itm ent to non-violence - th a t
is our dilem m a.1
This struggle to, on the one hand construct a foreign policy based on G erm any's
collective norms and values, yet on th e other, Germ any's responsibility to act as a
security exporter was certainly evident in the Libya case, w h ere supporters o f th e UNSC
resolution urged fo r Germany's support on th e basis o f hum anitarian intervention.
W hile Germany's population was largely in favor o f Kosovo, th e data shows th a t
domestic opinion in Germany in regards to potential m ilitary operations in Libya w ere
different.
In both the Kosovo and Libya case, an argum ent can be made o f th e influence on
domestic opinions on the vote and debates due to ongoing and upcoming elections. The
rhetoric in all cases involving use o f force debates w ere strong, and filled w ith
references to antim ilitarism , historic m em ory, and past experiences. An argum en t can
therefore be m ade th a t Libya is another instance o f norm-consistent foreign policy
involving m ilitary interventions, w hereby th e norm is inform ed by several variables.
Selective use o f historical m em ory has becom e instrum ental to explain, inform , and
justify foreign policy for out of area operations by th e Bundeswer. This is evident by the
continuous reference to past m em ory, and continued policy choices which w ere
constructed and shaped im m ediately a fte r W W II. Germ an cases involving th e use of

1 This quote was translated by Hanns M aull in M aull, "Germ any and th e Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian
Power’?," 63. The original, German speech, can be found at Archiv der Gegenwart: Deutschland 1949 bis
1999, December 14, 1995, pp. 4 9 .7 11-49.722.
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force are th erefore sequential and no m ajor changes have occurred. This is not to say
th a t all cases are marked by the same continuity. Germ any, and especially th e red-green
coalition, has emphasized a continued com m itm en t to European integration and
alliance solidarity, especially to w ard the U.S. The Septem ber 11th attacks th e re fo re also
proved to be a 'defining m om ent' in Germ any's political history as, then m ore th an ever,
Germany's com m itm ent and responsibility as an alliance partner to th e U.S. was crucial.
W hile Germany's break w ith the U.S. fo r th e invasion of Iraq can be explained and
justified m erely by the illegitimacy surrounding th e case, shying away from
responsibility fo r Afghanistan w ould have been nearly impossible. Joschka Fischer in his
German m em oir in 2007 explained th a t Germ any's past continuous foreign policy w ould
now, post-Septem ber 11, m erely serve as "a difficult to d etect guideline in the mist of
the new world disorder".2 He correctly argued th a t G erm any would have to explore new
and dangerous paths in order to m eet th e challenges of th e new security environm ent
through engagem ent and responsibility. The case o f Afghanistan has, is, and continues
to stand for Germany's continued com m itm ent to its alliance. W hile specific
deploym ent caveats w ere put in place before participating in out of area operations in
Afghanistan, Germany's ISAF involvem ent has been used heavily, even during th e
afterm ath of Libya, to highlight and present Germ any's actions as a responsible actor.
Beyond W W II legacy, th e Kunduz civilian afterm ath only fu rth er influenced and
propelled Germany's policy of noninterventionism in th e Libya case. The intersection of

2 Joschka Fischer, Die Rot-Grunen Jahre. Deutsche Aussenpolitik Vom Kosovo Bis Zum 11. Septem ber
(Cologne, Germany: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 433.
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guilt and responsibility, w hereby guilt and m em ory appears to be m ore influential,
translate into Germany's continuous com m itm en t to pacifism by keeping Germany's
horrific past strongly engrained in today's consciousness. For example, beyond
conceptualizations of th e use o f force, historic guilt is continuously processed and
recognized by Germ any.3 This processed gilt is also included in the analysis o f some
journalist and scholars, w hereby some w ere quickly to point to Germany's shameful
past and shameful present behavior in th e Libya case. Some scholars m ake comparisons
to the Iraq w ar, w hile others focus on th e similarities to th e Kosovo case. The media and
scholarly response for the Libya case was broad and approached through different
theoretical fram eworks, mainly focusing on the consequences of Germ any's abstention
for Germany as a civilian and 'norm al' power.

Findings
Power, Rhetoric, and Domestic Influence
The case o f Libya in 2011 m arked the first tim e th a t Germ any 'voted' differently
from its NATO and EU allies w ithin the UN Security Council setting. This fact alone calls
fo r greater analysis on the issues surrounding Germ any's behavior in th e Libya case.
Surely aware of the impact the abstention may have, especially w hen considering th e
transatlantic crisis th a t occurred in 2003, the consensus th a t was reached in th e

3 This is referred to in German as Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (a w ay o f dealing w ith th e past). This is
evident by th e numerous museums, monum ents, and public events geared towards Germany's
confrontation with its Nazi past. It is interesting to note, th a t Germ any is unique in processing this guilt
intensively and continuously in comparison to o th er nations.
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Bundestag shows th a t cases involving th e use of force rem ain highly controversial,
complex, and difficult to understand. G erm any w ith its dark political history comes to
decisions about com bat missions outside its borders and those of Europe by considering
its past failures. Germany's risk-averse culture mixed w ith constructed, norms-based
behavior can account for the foreign policy stance taken in th e Libya case. W hile
domestic factors certainly influence Germ an political debates, the historical m em ory
argum ent can be made for Germany's population as well: Germans, politicians and
citizens alike, are continuously (perhaps subconsciously) influenced by G erm any's W W II
legacy and constructed culture o f restraint, which shapes th e German m indset on
military intervention and the use of force. The intersection of responsibility, guilt, and
m em ory is clearly reflected in th e Libya case, w hereby n e w er m em ory was also included
in the justification for the abstention. The a fte rm ath and shock of th e Kunduz incident in
Afghanistan, com bined w ith Germ any's aversion to "wars" and m ilitary force, place th e
Libyan case in a sequential line o f cases o f crises parallel to Germany's evolving foreign
and security policy.
The inclusion o f historical pasts is evident in the international com m unity's
reaction to Germany's abstention. Historical m em ory shapes the sensitive issue o f a
som ew hat fundam ental fear tow ards th a t 'special path' Germ any appears to have taken
once more, but this tim e not only against its transatlantic partner th e U.S., but its
closest European ally, France. The intersection o f responsibility and guilt is also evident
by tw o opposing concepts in th e debates over m ilitary interventions: on th e one hand,
the responsibility to protect and on the o th e r th e opposition to th e prom inence of
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forced intervention over diplom atic avenues to resolve international conflict. W h ile th e
responsibility to protect points to previous cases such as Srebrencia, Rwanda, and
Kosovo, forced intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq have not necessarily led to initially
desired goals which creates conflicting argum ents.
Germany's behavior and adam ant opposition to an intervention in Libya falls in
line with Germany's understanding o f pow er. W h ile pow er is theoretically understood in
a m ultitude o f ways, Germany has taken severe steps to m ove from its W W II fixation on
pow er to a reconstructed forgetting and neglecting of pow er. This constructed
understanding o f power, based on historical m em ory and Germ an identity, has becom e
a basis for collective consensus by G erm any, w hile specific aspects o f th e use and
exercise of said pow er are, at tim es, still conflicted. This view towards pow er, and, in
this case, intervention by means o f m ilitary force, becam e a dom inantly accepted
outlook of foreign policy since th e Iraq invasion o f 2002. The deploym ent caveats of
Afghanistan, mixed with th e horrific experience in Kunduz, fu rth er contributed to th e
continued policy choices made by G erm any, dom inated by W W II legacy and strict
opposition to military interventions. The Libya case th e re fo re falls directly into an
almost linear path o f policy choices based on norm s-consistent behavior, influenced by
domestic attitudes, historical m em ory, and economic considerations, trum ping th e
fram ew ork of m ultilateral alliance solidarity and hum anitarian-based argum ents.
Germany's abstention on Resolution 1973 was reached by a m ajority consensus
w ithin the German Parliament. G erm any's petition fo r a perm anent seat in th e UN
Security Council was viewed by some analysts as a return to power politics and
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explained theoretically through structural realism. Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained
th a t aligning w ith Brazil and India, and Germany's abstention from th e vote on Libya,
does not lessen Germany's chance o f a perm anent seat.4 This position and conviction of
rightful behavior fo r Germany shows a clear understanding o f Germ any's use o f pow er,
its influence, execution, and consequences. Further, as W esterw elle explained, due to
his conviction th a t the resolution had 'significant dangers and risks', it w ould not have
been 'honest' for Germany to vote fo r th e resolution but th en to refuse to com m it
ground troops. W hile German policy makers often stress and highlight G erm any's
responsible behavior worldwide, th e official position in th e Libya case illustrates
Germany's lack of interest in taking up a leadership role in Europe, especially in regards
to foreign security policy choices.
National interests-based choices, and the pursuit o f possession goals are
certainly characteristics of a nation aw are o f its pow er. W h e th e r th e case o f Libya falls
into a calculated choice based on national and economic interests, or one th a t can be
described as falling in line w ith historical pasts, all result in th e same conclusion:
Germany's understanding o f its pow er is d iffe re n t from its neighbors and allies. W hile
today's security environm ent requires increased responsibility from Europe, G erm any
chose a rather luxurious path o f self exem ption. W h ile not only abstaining from th e
vote, Germany's inevitable 'siding' w ith Russia and China, showed th a t G erm any was no
longer a 'team player' by positioning its voice directly against its allies. Although
Germany's behavior may have been irresponsible and continues to be difficult to

4 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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understand, Germ any can certainly afford to make such decisions and has quickly
recovered from th e tem porary outpour o f outrage by the international com m unity.
During W esterw elle's speech a fte r Germ any's abstention from th e resolution, he
explained the failure o f surgical strikes to prevent civilian casualties, adding th a t
Germ any has learned this through experience: "There is no so called 'surgical
intervention'. Each military mission will also result in civilian casualties. W e know this
from painful experience ...I must th e re fo re ask and remind you, th a t w e learned these
lessons from recent history, from recent m ilitary missions, and must consider this when
w e stand before a decision".5 This painful experience was most recently fe lt a fte r the
civilian casualties due to th e controversial decisions surrounding th e Kunduz affair in
Afghanistan. The immensity o f th e political repercussions, mixed w ith dom estic
attitudes and international judgm ents, directly add to Germany's m em ory o f and
experience w ith use o f force missions. Kunduz only fu rth er contributed to th e Germ an
discourse and understanding o f out of area operations and constructed a sequential
attitude o f antimilitarism and lack o f support fo r m ilitary interventions (and "w ar")
based on old and new memories.
The Libya case also highlights an unfortunate clash betw een rhetoric and action
by Germany. Germany's rhetorical com m itm ent as a responsible global p artner did not
translate into actual policy to act in such a role. W esterw elle's continued m entioning of
the im portance to end the Gaddafi regim e certainly clashed w ith th e lack of solutions

5 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterw elle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 1 7 /9 7 ," (translated).
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offered by Germany, short of increased sanctions and refusal to participate in
legitimized, m ultilateral approaches. W esterw elle's active support o f th e Arab Spring
uprising fu rth er complicates the ability to understand and com prehend his and th e
Germ an position. The internal differences among parliam entary politicians, ranging
from calling the decision a 'disgrace' to supportive explanations of coherency in Germ an
policies, w ere also evident in the num erous interview s given to national and
international newspapers and magazines.6 Journalists also pointed to W esterw elle's
comparison to the invasion in Iraq o f 2003, arguing th a t such a comparison is a "sham"
as the 2003 invasion was based on ideological beliefs and fabricated evidence w ith o u t a
UNSC resolution.7 The rhetoric surrounding th e abstention was complex and
controversial and marked by references to th e term s 'w ar', most prom inently
m entioned by the Leftist party, but also by G erm an journalists for new spaper headlines
hinting at a Germany's potential involvem ent in another w ar.
Also interesting to note is th e odd position held by th e Germ an public. According
to an opinion poll by BildZeitung in 2011, w hile th e m ajority supported a forceful
m ilitary intervention against Gaddafi, 71 percent opposed th e contribution o f Germ an
troops to such an intervention.8 These som ew hat com peting opinions highlight the
continuous and evident struggle by Germ ans to show responsible behavior w hen
m ilitary interventions are necessary. W hile Germans w e re seemingly convinced th a t

6 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab W orld: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," accessed
Novem ber 13, 2013, http://w w w .sp ieg el.d e/in tem atio n al/g erm an y/a-catastro p hic-sign al-to -th e-arabworld-berlin-divided-over-security-council-abstention-a-752259.htm l.
7 Lau, "M acht M ai - Ohne UnsL"
8 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Beftirworten Den Angriff."
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Gaddafi must go, and appalled by th e human rights abuses occurring in Libya, th e
opinion polls, and arguably the official abstention, show th a t Germans do not w a n t to
take, quite literally, m atters into th e ir own hands. The old concept o f 'never again',
which was m om entarily reinterpreted by Joschka Fischer during the Kosovo crisis,
certainly remains strong in the Germ an psyche. W W II legacy, historical m em ory, and
interpretations o f the past, has led to a continued and active view o f antim ilitarism and
opposition to the use of force in G erm an foreign and security policy, despite cases th a t
call for hum anitarian intervention. The G erm an public's opinion fu rth er highlights
Germany's understanding of pow er, in a narrative on non-m ilitary capabilities, y et is
marked by an obvious discomfort in th e areas of m ilitary operations, th e use o f force,
and war. Unlike in the United Kingdom or France, th e G erm an public has a long history
o f opposing Germ an deploym ent o f forces even fo r peacekeeping missions, and th e loss
of lives during such missions are extrem ely sensitive.9 W hile polling trends before th e
mission in Afghanistan showed th a t tw o thirds o f all G erm ans desired a foreign policy
closely resembling Switzerland's neutrality, th e current state of dom estic opinions
varies.10 In 2013, an extensive report on transatlantic trends conducted by th e G erm an
Marschall Fund of the U.S. found the m ajority of Germ ans polled w e re against any
m ilitary involvem ent internationally. Specifically, 75 percent o f Germans w e re adam ant

9 Reimund Seidelmann, "Germany's Security Policy," in The N e w Germany. History, Economy, Policies, ed.
Reimund Seidelmann (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2011).
10 Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the M a k in g o f the Berlin Republic (New York, N ew York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 294.

181

about Germany not getting involved in a m ilitary intervention in Syria, w ith 61 percent
condemning the use of drones to kill enem ies.11
Germany's domestic a ttitu d e tow ards arm ed conflict and th e Bundeswehr's
participation in out of area operations involving th e use o f force continuously influences
policy makers. W hile Chancellor M erkel and th e Bundestag collectively supported th e
mission in Afghanistan, it is im portant to m ention th a t th e chancellor's first visit to
Afghanistan did not occur until 2009. Further, at this point in the mission, although
there is little domestic support, w ith d raw al from Afghanistan would result in an
international backlash and attack Germ any's credibility, especially in light o f th e Kunduz
afterm ath. Germany's questionable behavior during th e Libyan crisis officially,
internally, and through statem ents made by Chancellor M e rk el, show an alm ost
comprehensive response geared to w ard satisfying all requests and dem ands placed
upon Germany. Namely, th e Germ an public opposed th e mission in Libya w hile th e
international com m unity looked to G erm any to participate. W hile M e rk e l opposed th e
use of German aircrafts during th e Libyan conflict, she favored G erm an soldiers in Libya
under the fram ew ork of hum anitarian relief.12 On the o th e r hand, Frank-W alter
Steinmeier (SPD) argued th a t G erm any m ade a mistake in focusing on elections, hoping
th a t the allies som ehow end up on Germ any's side, instead o f actively w orking to
prevent the decision o f th e security council.13 The debates and voting fo r th e security

11 "Transatlantic Trends," (German Marschall Fund o f th e United States, 2013), 19, accessed January 5,
2014, http://trends.gm fus.org/files/13/09/TTrends-13-K ey-Findings-R eport.pdf.
12 Kurbjuweit, "A Germany of 82 Million Chancellors: W h y Angela M erke's Failures Continue to Multiply."
13 Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung M arch 27, 2011
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council resolution 1973 was im m ediately preceding local elections (M arch 27, 2011),
and since over 61 percent o f Germans opposed th e decision to m ilitarily intervene in
Libya, politicians may have been influenced by these dom estic factors.14
The various com m entary and debates in both G erm any and in th e international
media in regards to Germany's abstention also highlighted th e differences o f EU goals
both within Germany's leadership and in coalition w ith Germany's allies. Alexander Graf
Lambsdorff, an FDP m em ber o f th e European Parliam ent, argued th a t G erm any's
behavior and vote w eakened th e EU.15 The Libya case also highlights Germ any's
disinterest in certain areas of foreign policy or to take on leadership roles in th e EU and
globally. The observed disagreements among m em bers o f th e EU, especially in regards
to the Arab Spring movements, w ere highlighted once m ore in the a fte rm a th of
Germany's abstention. W hile France dom inated th e M editerranean policies, evident by
the creation o f the Union for th e M editerranean in 2008 and headed by th e n President
Sarkozy, who argued th a t G erm any and o th er non-M ed iterran ean states should not be
able to fully participate in issues concerning M e d ite rran e a n states, G erm any's foreign
policy did not focus on Tunisia and Egypt during th e Arab Spring.16 The fact th a t the
agendas of the Union for the M editerranean and th e European Neighbourhood Policy
are similar in nature, may also account fo r Germ any's lack o f concern fo r th e region.
Germany's defensive behavior showed in the a fte rm ath of th e abstention. Several
politicians, including W esterw elle and M erkel, continued to detail G erm any's role as a

14 The CDU was defeated in an all tim e low and lost its support in B aden-W urtenberg to th e Green Party.
15 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab W orld: Berlin Divided over Security Council A bstention.”
16 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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responsible, predictable partner to its allies by com m enting on Germ any's increased
role in th e mission in Afghanistan.
It is interesting to note th a t even Germ an security scholars m ake historical
references to Germany's shameful past in order to underline and strengthen th e ir
argum ent. For example, esteem ed scholar Harald M uller, in a German article published
in 2011, heavily criticized Germany's abstention and decision, especially th e position
held by m embers o f the Bundestag w ho belong to th e Left party (Die Linken). In
response to th e "no war" shouting by th e party, M u lle r argues th at not only was a civil
w ar going on in Libya at th e tim e o f th e debates, but this behavior o f "silently observing
th e w ar yet morally condemning th e rescuer" is rem iniscent of a tim e "w hen Germ ans
turned their heads left while th e G estapo17 picked up th e ir neighbors on th e right".18
W hile the comparison sounds and looks intriguing, a direct link or parallel is hardly
established, and the tw o instances are entirely d iffe re n t, historically and factually.
Arguments and references to Germ any's historical past certainly underline strong
statements, provide controversial shock appeal, and are easily 'rem em b ered ' when
Germ any does not behave 'according to th e norm ', or in this case, according to its allies.
References to Germany's horrendous past behavior have been brought fo rth in light o f
the Libya case as well as during th e economic bailouts fo r Greece by scholars,
journalists, and politicians. The British press participated in "Germ an-bashing" w hile

17 Geheime Staatspolizei-The Secret police o f Nazi G erm any and German occupied Europe, adm inistered
by selected officers of the SS (Schutzstaffel-the Germ an defense param ilitary organization under Adolf
Hitler)
18 Muller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."

184

French journalists continued to ask w h e th e r G erm any really shares th e sam e com m unity
values.19
Germany's national and strategic interests m ust also be included fo r a
comprehensive analysis on the Libya case. W hile m ilieu and tem porary goals m ay have
been im portant to the decision making progress, G erm any's economic interests in China
and India, and ongoing relationship w ith Russia, m ay have also contributed to
Germany's abstention. This variable, or argum ent, w ould theoretically fall into a realist
prediction or explanation as this may show Germ any's pursuit of possession goals,
acting based on national interests rather than com m unity based values. In th e past,
realists have argued th at Germany's petition for a p erm an e n t seat in th e UNSC can be
seen as the pursuit of possession goals. Ironically, Germ any's abstention and behavior in
th e Libya case may have serious consequences both in term s of Germ any's fight fo r a
perm anent seat as well as for the relationship w ith th e U.S. The case o f Libya highlighted
Germany's insecure view tow ards its role in th e international com m unity. W h ile being a
powerful nation by most definitions, Germ any's behavior once m ore highlighted how
uncom fortable Germans truly are in projecting and exerting power. W h ile this notion
stems from yesteryear's 'German question', which should be resolved through
Germany's responsible behavior since W W II, the m ost recent puzzling observations in
German foreign policy, term ed "deviations" and "inconsistencies", m ay also be
attributed to a potential disinterest by Germ any to be a foreign policy leader. Either
way, the case of Libya, along w ith the ongoing European economic crisis and exchanges

19 Ibid.
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w ith Greece, on top of Germ any's rethinking of nuclear pow er, severely contributes to a
loss in predictability and credibility. W h ile analysts and scholars criticize Germ any's
problem atic relationship to the concept of pow er, the fact th a t G erm any perhaps
calculatedly decides not to take on a leadership role is left o u t of th e discussion. Based
on Germany's foreign and security policy choices in the past, which w e re still part of
shaping and constructing a norm ative fram ew o rk based on historical m em ory, today's
foreign policy choices are also influenced by national interests.

The Use o f Force Debates: A Sequential Case
Taking into consideration security arrangem ents, such as collective defense
organizations (i.e. NATO), states form coalitions in order to balance against threats
collectively. The definitions of threats hereby vary greatly and although m ultilateral
action w ith deployed NATO troops occurred before Kosovo, the intervention in Kosovo
marked the first tim e th a t this collective defense organization used force in order to
intervene in a sovereign country's internal affairs. The intervention itself sparked
discussion in the field of international relations surrounding the question of legitimacy,
international law, and security norms. A liberalist explanation of th e intervention of
Kosovo emphasizes the concept o f cooperation by w ay o f m ilitary coalition in order to
preserve and enforce peace and order w hile emphasizing the im portance of
international law and norms. NATO m em bers agreed, in part, to com m it and respond
collectively to threats to th e system in place, and w hile Kosovo did not have full support,
th e idea of responsibility to the system was evident through support by several

186

m em ber-states. Unfortunately 'th e hour o f Europe' did not translate as such, and
Kosovo proved th a t the EU could not address th e problem w ith o u t th e support o f th e
U.S. This was much later recalled by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, in his m emoirs, w hen
he w rote th at Europe learned it could not solve conflicts on this scale alone.
The case of Kosovo certainly brought forth a new fo rm of interventionism ,
sometimes referred to as liberal interventionism as articulated publicly by Tony Blair.
Here, the main justification for this collective intervention was based on hum anitarian
reasons and the ethnic cleansing carried out by Milosevic. In term s o f collective security,
Kosovo also showed th at tw o powers, Russia and China, disagreed w ith the justification
th at the w ar was necessary in o rder to enforce peace and human rights. Kosovo also
showed that state-practiced m ilitary action, though m ultilaterally executed, can be
presented as supporting com m unity interest and security, to include human rights. A fter
the international community's failure to respond and pro tect in the gross atrocities and
genocide in Rwanda, an intervention in Kosovo was crucial and necessary. Both in
theory and practice, the intervention and th e use o f force was justified collectively
through coalitions of security arrangem ents, under the concept of "collective w ill". The
afterm ath of Kosovo fo r collective security shows th a t th e intervention was largely
dom inated by western actors, w ith China and Russia opposing intervention. NATO's use
of force has been viewed as a landm ark decision to intervene in hum anitarian issues,
although other arguments have been m ade th a t outlined NATO's decisions based upon
enforcing international security in th e Balkans region.
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The heavy influence of public opinion, com bined w ith the traditional 'culture o f
restraint' em ployed by German policy makers, clearly shows th a t in th e case of
Afghanistan, G erm any did not actively pursue policy input, instead acting only upon
requests by its allies. Further, in order to separate from th e com bat heavy, terrorist
seeking missions of the U.S. under OEF, G erm any focused on the reconstruction efforts
within ISAF. This alignment of, and behavior of policy choice and focus, shows
Germany's understanding o f th e ir use of pow er and security. Emphasizing th e
im portance of contributing to th e developm ent mission in Afghanistan and explaining
Germany's troop contribution as such to th e Germ an public shows how domestic
opinion drives and influences Germ an foreign and security policy. The rhetoric and
statements em ployed by policy makers, th e focus on hum anitarian efforts and
reconstruction, and the continued focus prom inence of th e rejection o f direct use of
force, highlights Germany's interests and approaches, in line with soft pow er theoretical
explanations. The afterm ath of th e Kunduz affair is still relevant to contem porary
German political discussions and continues to inform and influence th e use of force
debate.
The extensive study in D er Spiegel (Ein deutsches Verbrechen), com bined w ith a
movie and several television segments and talk shows surrounding th e air strike th a t
resulted in over one hundred civilian casualties in Afghanistan, contributes to th e
construction o f new mem ories and experiences which are used to m ake foreign policy
decisions. The bombing o f Kunduz remains the "bloodiest Germ an m ilitary operation
since W W II", and the controversial political repercussions which still dom inate the

media are certain to contribute to th e dialogue o f Bundeswehr deploym ent
indefinitely.20 A fter Germ an federal attorneys did not charge Colonel Klein in 2009 w ith
th e m urder of civilians, the district court in th e city o f Bonn in Decem ber 2013 rejected a
lawsuit brought forth by th e victims of th e attack. The attorneys o f th e victims sued th e
Federal Republic of Germ any fo r 9 0,0 00 euro in com pensation per victim o f th e attack.21
Thus far, Germ any has paid over half million Euros in reparations due to th e Kunduz
attack. W hile the excusal o f Colonel Klein's call was m et w ith different reactions
nationally and internationally, it is im portant to note th a t th e reason given was due to
th e rules of engagem ent which "allow ed an attack in this case".22 This ruling directly
contributes to the use of force dialogue in furthering th e German understanding of out
o f area operations, arm ed conflict, and th e legality o f m ilitary action. The ruling and the
dismissal for additional compensation to th e victims o f th e Kunduz affair, com bined w ith
th e ongoing debates in G erm any surrounding th e attack, emphasizes th e im portant
repercussions and effect o f the event on Germ an foreign and security policy.
Germany's behavior and shift from its allies' position seemed all to o fam iliar, and
comparisons betw een the Iraq invasion in 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 and th e Libya vote w ere
inevitable. The striking and im portant difference though is th e legitimacy and
m ultilateral support o f the latter. W hile rhetorically, and in print, referring to th e 'N ein'
of Iraq during th e headlines of th e Libya case, journalists attem p ted to find parallels o f
th e tw o in order to strengthen th e position th a t G erm any, y e t again, has abandoned its

20 Von Dem m er e t al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen."
21 "Prozess in Bonn: Gericht W eist Klage Von Kunduz-Opfern Ab," SpiegelOnline, Decem ber 11, 2013.
22 Ibid.
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allies under the pretense o f enduring pacifism. W h ile the internal and external debates
surrounding th e use of force in both cases m ay have similar aspects, th e factual data
and variables involved in th e decision making process is quite different. This
differentiation and prerequisite o f influential variables in th e Libya case precisely
confuses scholars w ho struggle w ith explaining Germ any's behavior both theoretically
and practically. The Iraq case showed Germ any's c o m m itm en t to its role concept as a
civilian pow er most distinctively, by voting "No" on th e basis of m ultilateral approaches
and legitimacy and using soft pow er approaches to influence international relations and
foreign policy diplomatically.

Discussion
Historical m em ory is deeply im bedded in Germ an culture and identity, thus
difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is th e re fo re ritualized
and perpetuated in Germ an foreign and security policy. H ow then exactly can th e
changes be explained? The change and continuity debate has been ongoing fo r decades;
the recent developments o f Libya and G erm any's Iran policy has resulted in G erm an
security scholars calling Germany's policy "inconsistent", pointing to drastic changes.
W hile these recent developm ents appear to be inconsistent on the surface, this study
argues th a t there is no new status quo. Perhaps G erm any hovers betw een old and new
ideas depending on the issue area; som etim es acting "m ore realist", but always
considering the im portance of the past. Germ any's decision to abstain from th e vote can
be explained under the um brella of m em ory comprised o f W W II legacy and recent
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m em ory surrounding m ilitary operations. The uncertainty o f how an established no-fly
zone would affect and influence th e Libyan crisis was m onum ental in th e Germ an
decision. Historically, the same scenario has resulted in m ilitary interventions using
force and ground troops. Germ any simply did n o t feel com fortable w ith this potential
scenario which could easily result in m ore civilian casualties, prolonged c o m m itm en t to
reconstruction efforts, and bloodshed o f Germ an soldiers involved in Libya's civil w ar.
German domestic opposition to the ongoing w ar in Afghanistan, and th e horrendous
afterm ath of th e Kunduz affair, fu rth e r contributed to th e governm ent's resistance to
actively engage in a potential ou t o f area m ilitary mission in Libya. The ruling coalition
therefore had a m otivation to abstain (or oppose) as an affirm ative vote may have
resulted in an electoral defeat.
W hile UNSC resolution 1973 was created as a m easure to protect civilians in
Libya, th e actual form ulation extends beyond th e no-fly zone to several m ilitary
measures allow ed under Article 4. This precise form ulation, despite th e fact th a t the
operation was not rhetorically referred to as 'w a r', significantly contributed to
Germany's decision. The inclusion o f possible m ilitarily and forceful interventions
translated into a fear by G erm an politicians of aerial bombing missions w ith potential
collateral dam age.23 Rainer Stinner (FDP), in defending Germany's position and
behavior, argued th at the use o f force in th e Libya mission would m ean a forceful
intervention o f a civil war, and w hile G erm any collectively agrees th a t Gaddafi must go,
not "everyone w ho fights against Gaddafi on the streets" can be seen as protector of

23 "Interview w ith Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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democracy and human rights.24 Addressing th e criticism th a t Germany, through
W esterw elle, rhetorically supported th e freedom m ovem ents observed in th e Arab
world, including in Libya, yet refused to vote on contribution of troops to th e area,
Stinner argues th a t Germany never prom ised to intervene in a civil w ar. The Libyan case
showed th a t not only W W II legacy influences decision m aking for o u t o f area
operations, but also more recent m em ory and experience. The drawn out w ar in
Afghanistan (and Iraq), w ith diverging missions o f hum anitarian efforts and
reconstruction and developm ent, paved th e w ay fo r argum ents against m ilitary
intervention mission in Libya. Germ an policy makers feared th a t th e lack o f plans for
Libya's future would result in costly and lengthy missions similar to those in
Afghanistan.25
The question of w here Germ an foreign policy is headed in light o f th e Libya case
arises w hen taking into consideration th e other tw o im portant pillars of Germ an foreign
policy: Germany's economic position against bailouts, and th e rethinking of nuclear
power. W hile leaving the Euro or th e EU is unthinkable, Germany's abstention from th e
vote calls into question Germany's responsibility and predictability as a security exporter
and reliable partner fo r the transatlantic security relationship. Considering th e evidence
in the Libya case, and examining th e statem ents, justification, and factual data, history is
too compelling fo r Germany to have a new status quo on its foreign and security policy.
M otives of self-interest are evident, which complicates previously held views of

24 Ibid.
25 The German minister for economic cooperation argued th a t the coalition of th e willing does not have a
concept o f the fu tu re for Libya.

192

Germ any as a civilian power. The willingness to use force unilaterally, w ith o u t
international legitimization, as arguably observed during th e Kosovo case, was an
isolated decision which follow ed a num ber of m ismanaged inactions leading up to
Germany's use o f force. W hile im portant concepts in Germ any's strategic culture w e re
critically reinterpreted rhetorically during th a t tim e , the m ore recent cases, and
especially the case of Libya, shows a reversal and emphasis on previously held norms.
The reinforcing o f the role o f historic m em ory-norm culture in the rhetorical analysis
shows a continuity of previously held policy norms. G erm any's behavior in th e Libya
case is certainly less m ultilaterally oriented than previous instances involving th e use of
force; however, this does not constitute a role change. The Libya case simply highlighted
which norms are most influential for Germ an foreign policy in this given policy area.
Germany's willingness to act (Gestaltungswille), in th e policy area surrounding o u t o f
area operations was most evident during th e Kosovo case.
Despite th e shift observed in the abstention, most evident w ith G erm any's siding
along the BRIC countries, th e Libya case is not an instance o f change in Germ an foreign
policy. Rather, it shows continued and sequential action, marked by fe w adjustm ents
and learning processes. Namely, Germ any's reaction to its external environm en t can
account for slight shifts in policy orientations. The im portance of dom estic issues over
foreign policy issues is also evident when analyzing instances of use o f force debates. In
several cases, and arguably in most foreign policy issue areas, domestic opinion plays a
vital role in influencing and shaping policy makers. This analysis of causal elem ents o f
historical m em ory on German foreign policy behavior highlights th e influential
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im portance of Germany's W W II legacy on contem porary domestic politics, international
structures, and institutions, by inform ing choices, positions, and rhetoric in instances
w here th e use of force is debated politically. The media analysis shows an overall
struggle and difficulty to adequately explain and understand Germ any's behavior.
A common fram ew ork in which G erm any's abstention can be discussed and
debated theoretically does not exist. This confusion and com plexity led to th e argum ent
th at German foreign policy is, at worst, undergoing an "identity crisis" and m arked by
"inconsistency", and a t best, has simply "changed". W hile G erm any can certainly afford
to act based on national interests, the Libya case may simply highlight Germ any's
disinterest to take a leadership role in regional and global security policies. This
disinterest or assumption th a t Germ any can som ehow escape its responsibilities can
fu rth er be attributed to th e changing international security environm ent. W hile
Germ any eagerly focused on showing responsibility and predictability during and
im m ediately a fte r the Cold W ar, today's environm ent does not forcefully 'ask' of
Germ any to act. This case was certainly not m arked by shockingly d iffe re n t and changing
positions, but simply highlighted th e enduring im portance o f historical m em ory on
contem porary policy. The only tru e change observed in Germany's security policy in
recent years is the change in conscription, which can be categorized and explained as
assimilation to th e policies of o th e r EU m em bers.
Consensus was reached not to intervene m ilitarily in another state's internal
conflict. In th e past, Germany decided exactly th a t, and Kosovo was seen as a new
orientation o f Germ an foreign and security policy. Kosovo led to th e scholarly debate of
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'Germ any as a normal actor', in which Germ any's pow er and responsibility to act was
highlighted and analyzed. In th e case o f Kosovo, th e variable of com m itting to partners
and the international com m unity may have been crucial, but Germany's allow ing o f th e
use of force in the Kosovo case remains an anom aly. To show responsibility, in th e
Kosovo case, was the determ ining factor, w h ereby historical m em ory inform ed this
decision by reinterpreting the concept o f 'never again' in term s to never again allow
genocide. The similarities betw een th e Kosovo case, on th e grounds o f hum anitarian
intervention, and Libya, has led to a m ultitude o f discussions, drawing comparisons and
concluding th a t Germany's abstention fo r Libya is not only unforgivable but also
unexplainable. The findings above show th a t historical m em ory significantly influenced
th e Libya decision, w hereby th e concept of 'never again' was interpreted in its
traditional meaning; to not com m it Germ an troops to m ilitary interventions. The o th e r
determ ining factor, the influence o f Germ any's dom estic opinion, has been constructed,
shaped, and form ed through th e prom inence o f Germ any's W W II legacy in th e
contem porary Germ an mindset. The norms and beliefs th a t dom inated in Kosovo and
Libya are th erefore not conflicting, but w e re ranked differently, in o rder o f im portance
for each case at the tim e. Further, Kosovo was view ed as p art of Europe, th e re fo re
allowing a NATO operation, w hile the rem aining cases under review are outside o f th e
borders of Europe.26 Another plausible explanation for th e variation betw een Kosovo

26 W hile Afghanistan is also outside o f European borders, Germany's tro o p deploym ent to th e area was
marked by specific and strict deploym ent caveats.
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and Libya is th at Germany may simply tre a t foreign policy issues on a case by case basis,
w hereby the Libya case occurred during a tim e o f Bundeswehr reform .
W hile there are obvious deviations from th e rhetoric used in each case under
review, the strongest articulation of Germ any's choices, position, and behavior can be
found in the Kosovo and Iraq cases. Also stem m ing from historical m em ory, th e rhetoric
employed by Joschka Fischer during Kosovo was d etrim en tal in justifying and explaining
th e obvious shift in German foreign policy. Here, Germ any's strong rhetoric of
com m itm ent, responsibility, and predictability matched Germany's action and policies.
Similarly, Chancellor Schroder's and Joschka Fischer's strong rhetoric against an invasion
of Iraq m atched Germany's policy choices. W hile th e rhetoric in all cases was relatively
strong, Germany's rhetorical c o m m itm en t to alliance solidarity in th e Libya case was not
matched with actual support. The National/Econom ic Interests variable, especially in the
Libya case, highlighted Germany's cost analysis during a tim e of Bundeswehr reform ,
when Germany's military professionalized. True to checkbook diplomacy o f th e past,
German policy makers highlighted the 5 ,0 0 0 Syrian refugees taken in by G erm any, m ore
than any other country in the EU, and over 1 2,000 m ore political asylum seekers from
Syria and Libya.
The shift in policy through Kosovo, represented a reinterpretation o f Germ any's
use of power, understanding of pow er, and role in the international com m unity.
Scholars, w hile debating Germ any's status as a 'civilian pow er' argued th a t G erm any's
norms, traditionally defined G erm any's interests. Despite this shift, some scholars,
shortly after Kosovo, predicted Germ any's continuity and adherence to post-W W II
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norms and values: “Germany will continue to be guided by its old principles, and it will
continue to try to reconcile them as much as possible w ith th e new exigencies o f
radically different security environm ent. Policies on th e use o f force w ill continue to be
cautious and restrained..."27 This struggle to reconcile old principles w ith new dem ands
has continued to be problem atic in contem porary Germ an foreign policy debates, and
points to Germany's unique position and need to fully analyze, discuss, and act upon
today's security environm ent. Cases involving out of area operations and th e use o f
force also highlight how G erm any views its responsibility to its alliance partners. W h ile
showing solidarity and com m itm ent is an im portant pillar o f Germ any's post-w ar
identity, the Iraq case highlights in which areas G erm any is willing to oppose its (m ajor)
allies. W hile peaceful disarm am ent procedures and th e overall fighting o f terrorism are
reconcilable w ith German interests, th e national interest term s under which th e U.S.
policy makers fram ed their arguments fo r th e invasion o f Iraq, proved to be problem atic
and conflicting with Germany's com m itm en t to ideationally based policy choices.

Scholarly Findings and Opinion
Germany's use and understanding o f p ow er is an im portant aspect o f an overall
analysis to German foreign and security policy. The cases selected to highlight one policy
area, th e use o f force debates in G erm an politics, account fo r a variation in results,
behavior, and environm ent. The Kosovo case, during a Red-Green coalition, dram atically
changed how out of area operations w ere view ed, discussed, and subsequently

27 Mauil, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 77.
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analyzed, providing an exam ple of restructure, reinterpretation, and increased
responsibility. The Iraq case emphasized Germany's com m itm ent to legitim ized,
sanctioned approaches backed by th e UN, w hile Afghanistan solidified Germ any's
assurance to m ultilateral approaches. Libya initially throw s o ff the tra jec to ry o f
Germany's foreign policy evolution, but a fte r closer exam ination, several variables and
calculations can account fo r Germany's behavior. Security scholars have debated th e
puzzle of Germany's changing, yet stagnant, foreign policy over the past tw o decades,
beginning w ith the Kosovo case. Since then, tw o argum entative them es o f analyses have
em erged: explanations focused on dom estic influence and policy driven by electoral
concerns, or behavior bound and dictated by Germany's continued 'culture o f restraint'.
According to Germ an security scholars, Germ any's policy choices during th e Iraq
case showed an increased "self-centeredness", not adequately explained by th e tw o
them es.28 According to Harnisch, Germ any's policies during th e out o f area operations
debates for Iraq reflect th a t of a status quo power; a reaction to a drastic change in th e
international security environm ent, but not dram atically different to th e Kosovo and
Afghanistan cases, during which th e Schroder governm ent to o k steps to direct dom estic
consensus in order to fulfill international expectations o f Germ any to include
responsibility and alliance solidarity.29 Iraq here differed in th a t the coalition
governm ent at the tim e was unable to combine th e influence of dom estic opinion and
alliance expectations, w hile Germany's o th er m ilitary com m itm ents abroad contributed

28 Sebastian Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," G erm an Politics 13, no. 1
(2004): 23.
29 "German Non-Proliferation Policy and th e Iraq Conflict," German Politics 13, no. 1 (2004): 24.
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to the "No" vote as did the lack o f consensus am ong EU m em bers in th e case. Iraq,
according to some authors, should th e re fo re be seen as a case th a t reflects G erm any's
struggle to bridge its external and internal pressures, not one th a t presented and
unprecedented vote. Similarly, scholars argue fo r nearly tw e n ty years th a t G erm any's
foreign policy choices involving the use o f force have, and will continue to be, influenced
by a m ixture of both Germany's political tradition, the culture of restraint, and budget
constraints.30
On the other hand, Germ any's abstention from Libya appears to th ro w o ff
analytical examination of Germ any's foreign policy trajectory. Representing a 'puzzling'
phenom ena, Germany's abstention was certainly not presented, view ed, and tre a te d as
just an abstention; Germany's behavior, w hile initially questionable and shocking, can
be explained. Germ any did no t decide to block UNSC Resolution 1973, but instead chose
to abstain, based on strategic and political incentives.31 Initial scholarly reaction from
Germ any detailed the path to th e establishm ent o f th e no-fly zone by emphasizing th e
initial opposition by the U.S.; especially by defense m inister Robert Gates. W hile the
reactions from Berlin focused on the lack of solidarity and resulting international
isolation rather than Germany's refusal to m ilitarily participate in "protecting Libyan
civilians", this case certainly highlighted Germ any's need to fully debate and rethink its
foreign policy choices involving the use o f force.32 The startling facts surrounding an

30 Carl Hodge, "Germany and th e Limits of Soft Security," European Security 7, no. 3 (1998).
31 Patrick Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," Survival 54, no. 3 (2012): 106.
32 Svenja Sinjen, "Der Preis Der Freiheit. Fall Libyen: Was W ir Neu Denken Mussen," In ternatio n ale Politik
3(2011): 82. Own translation.
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intervention in Libya, which, on the surface, appear to present the ideal case to w arran t
Germ an Bundeswehr participation: sanctioned by the UNSC, international and regional
support, alliance solidarity and m ultilateral approaches, and most im portantly, hum an
rights abuses, w ere simply not enough to convince the m ajority th a t th e possibility o f
civilian casualties and consequences o f a m ilitary intervention in Libya outw eigh the
benefit of the "chance o f a dem ocratic process".33 W hile th e choice not to participate in
Operation Unified Protector resulted in isolation from Germ any's closest allies, overall
only fifteen NATO states supported UNSC Resolution 1 9 7 3 .34 W hile disagreeing on th e
variety of reasons behind Germany's abstention, most scholars agree th a t th e decision
reflects Germany's lack of "strategic orientation" and lack o f interests in foreign policy,
calling for a critical need to "rethink, discuss, and revive" Germany's foreign policy role
concept.35
Scholarly exam ination on contem porary Germ an foreign and security policy
usually focuses on strategic security, political behavior, and policy action in light o f th e
changing security environm ent. Theoretical focus here emphasizes th e use o f pow er,
specifically Germany's use of institutional pow er to shape and influence its external
environm ent. In the field o f international relations, analyses pointing to constructivist
notions of collective m em ory, cultural identity, and norms-based behavior in Germ an
foreign policy are grouped in an outlier o f sorts, w ith publications appearing in

33 August Pradetto, "Der Andere Preis Der Freiheit," ibid.4: 59. Own translation.
34 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.
35 Hanns Maull, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos," Zeitschrift f u r Politikwissenschaft 21, no. 1
(2011): 117. own translation.
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Germany-specific journals, or w eaved amongst them es o f historic and identity studies.
W hile the aforem entioned research is im portant, W W II history undoubtedly affects
Germ an foreign policy approaches, especially areas involving the use o f force. As such,
inquiries into history should yield results and arguments detailing how and when history
informs Germ an foreign policy, not th a t it does. Reviewing Germany's behavior over the
four selected cases, Kosovo directly conflicted w ith Germ any's traditional role concept,
while Iraq sparked debates of a renew ed 'G erm an Question' and Germ any's Sonderweg.
Some German scholars have th e re fo re argued th a t collective m em ory of W W II has
changed into tw o strands used to explain and justify Germ any's behavior: on th e one
hand providing a reason fo r restraint (Iraq and Libya) and on the o th e r hand a
justification fo r Germany's increased role as a responsible partner (Kosovo and
Afghanistan).36 Policy makers have used W W II references in a non-linear w ay since
Kosovo, depending on the context, to justify, instrum entalize, and "as a convenient tool
to lend argum entative force to a variety o f positions".37 Furtherm ore, Germ any's
com m itm ent to diplomatic approaches will continue to dom inate Germ any's behavior in
cases involving the use of force. Germ any's allies need to understand th a t m ilitary
action will remain a last resort, "by choice, not by default".38
Power, and Germany's rejection of national power, is detailed in scholarly
analyses interpreting how security and th re a t is perceived by Germany. Germ any's
36 Ruth W ittlinger and M artin Larose, "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective M em o ry and German
Foreign Policy," German Politics 16, no. 4 (2007).
37 "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective M e m o ry and German Foreign Policy," Germ an Politics 16, no.
4 (2007): 492.
38 Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005):
79.
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security interests have been pursued w ithin an institutional fram ew ork in order to
shape and direct EU security identity w hile rem aining 'tru e ' to the culture of restraint in
term s o f the projection of pow er.39 From G erm any's 'policy o f responsibility', 'tam ed
pow er7, and 'G erm any as a civilian pow er', scholars have focused on how Germ any's use
and understanding o f power has changed and transform ed over th e past four decades.
Others focus on 'th e German way' and the 'G erm an question', detailing the
consequences of how the 'NO ' during Iraq has shaped, influenced, and prevented
Germany's exercise of power; how ever, th e observed 'changes' in Germ any's foreign
policy in regards to out of area operations point to sequential cases w ithin Germ any's
traditional foreign policy pattern. According to some authors, controversial and much
discussed cases such as Iraq may simply be at odds w ith one or m ore core concepts o f
Germ an foreign policy: m ultilateral fram ew orks, civilized international order, and no use
o f force.40

Summary
The operationalization of this case study included explanatory variables to
account fo r variance among th e selected cases, w ith a focus on Libya. This study
examined th e deviation from rhetoric and policy and found th a t rhetoric, for the most
part, remained continuous across tim e w hile policies changed gradually but rem ained
sequential. The variable of historical m em ory can account fo r matching and continuous

39 Ham pton, "Living in a W orld o f Dangers and Strangers," 86.
40 Peter Rudolf, "The M yth of th e 'German W ay': Germ an Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,"
Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 145.
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rhetoric and policy, while dom estic opinion and alliance solidarity fu rth e r influenced
foreign policy choices involving o u t o f area operations. The variables selected fu rth e r
highlight the importance o f rhetoric in G erm an foreign and security policy by providing a
comprehensive fram ew ork to analyze, understand, and predict Germany's behavior.
Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are not cases o f tem porary impacts; th e y are
consistent within a pattern of Germ an foreign and security policy and clearly show
Germany's understanding and use o f pow er (soft pow er, through institutions) which, at
tim es, is heavily influence by historical m em ory and guided by norms-based approaches.
This is especially accurate in instances o f th e use o f m ilitary force. Instead, G erm any has
continuously advocated out o f area operations guided by legitimacy, cooperation, and
multilateralism; however, policy is also influenced and shaped by aspects of national
interests as may be the case fo r Iran. In analyzing how or w hether Germ any's foreign
policy is changing and examining this process of change from the old status quo to a
potentially new one, the possibility th a t G erm any's behavior is a m ere reaction to its
external environm ent must be considered. The current economic problem s observed in
Europe, and elsewhere in th e w orld, directly strengthen Germany's relationship w ith
Russia and China, thus also influencing Germ any's security-related policy in issue areas
involving both countries. Germ any's strong economic ties to Libya in th e past (as w ell as
Iran) may account for w hat has been called Germ any's "inconsistent" foreign policy
behavior. As Duffield notes, Germ an foreign policy behavior greatly depends on th e
international environm ent and th e Germ an response to it.41 Progress and change in

41 John S. Duffield, W orld Power Forsaken : Political Culture, International Institutions, an d German
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German foreign and security policy has, is, and will continue to be tied to past
experience and emphasize the enduring pow er o f historical m em ory.
Beyond the intricate details th a t influenced Germ any's abstention, and beyond
justification and explanation, this case highlights th e lack o f agreem ent am ong th e EU's
regional powers, especially in th e realm o f foreign and security policy. This shifting and
disagreement of m ajor political issues, including economic measures pertaining to th e
EU financial crisis, dem onstrate Germ any's focus on dom estic and national goals. W hile
this may be viewed as a change in G erm any's foreign policy approach, it is neither
sudden nor drastic and can be explained and understood through several variables.
Historical m em ory, domestic factors, and national interests have always contributed to
Germany's foreign and security policies. The Libya case, as a sequential case o f use o f
force debates, simply categorized some variables over others, w hile dem onstrating
Germany's strategic reaction to th e international environm ent. Undoubtedly, norms
continue to guide and direct Germ an foreign policy. This case study showed which
norms and interests dom inated th e use o f force debate and are ranked higher by policy
makers in decisions th at call fo r Germ an tro o p deploym ent. Historical m em ory enters
use o f force discussions before, during, and a fte r m ajor policy decisions, and influences,
confirms, and informs the status quo. Further, an action fro m G erm any in regards to
m ilitary interventions and the use o f force, will continue to be present in political
debates, requiring tim e, analysis, and fully cooperated diplom atic discussions w ith

Security Policy a fte r Unification (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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Germany's allies. It is unlikely th a t G erm any will drastically change its view to w a rd use
of force cases, especially when pressured to act quickly. Germ any's historic past is
simply too relevant not to shape th e fu tu re o f Germ an foreign policy. Future constraints
on Germany's ability to project and exercise pow er are on th e horizon as th e
international security environm ent continues to change.

CASE II: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN
The question th a t directed th e analysis of this case study was also guided by th e
hypotheses th at German foreign policy e ith e r is or is not determ ined by historical
m em ory. Applying th e same variables to exam ine Germ any's behavior during the
negotiations tow ards Iran's nuclear program will not only highlight a d iffe re n t area of
Germany's foreign policy but also detail and account fo r variance in rhetoric and action.
W hile th e case of Iran presents a single observation, th e period of negotiations spanned
over several years accounting fo r a variance o f relationships, alliances, and an everchanging security environm ent. Germ any's rhetorical com m itm en t to its allies
condemning a nuclear arm ed Iran was not m et w ith policy action. Specifically, G erm any
refused and opposed stronger sanctions, siding w ith Russia and China. W hich variables
can explain Germany's foreign policy behavior in this case and account fo r th e obvious
conflict of rhetoric and action?
A fter the EU3+3 negotiations and th e UN resolution in 2008, th e election of
President Obama initially lessened th e focus on sanctions and opened th e doors fo r new
diplom atic efforts by Germany. In 2009, Gerhard Schroder visited Tehran and renew ed
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Germ an-lranian relations, especially in th e economic realm .42 By June o f 2009, Basell
Polyolefine, a German firm , signed a € 8 2 5 million contract, supported by Schroder w ho
believed in "seizing and not missing" business opportunities with Iran.43 W h ile th e
numbers appear high and Germ any certainly has economic interests in Iran, arguing th a t
Germany's refusal for stronger sanctions is only based on th e G erm an-lranian business
relationship would be an overstatem ent. The highest G erm an exports to Iran w ere in
2005 and 2010 and have since been steadily declining. Energy security and Germ any's
gas relationship with Iran and Russia also influences Germ any's behavior, which would
fall into the variable o f national/econom ic interests.
It is also im portant to review Germ any's stance tow ards nuclear w eapons in
general. W hile Germ any is legally forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons, G erm any has a
long history o f using nuclear energy. Beyond this, several tactical nuclear weapons
(TNWs) are positioned in Germ any, which has resulted in controversial calls fo r th e ir
removal in recent years. Interestingly, a 2006 survey showed th at only 12 percent o f the
German population was aw are o f the U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in G erm any.44
Further, a 2005 poll by the German newspaper D e r Spiegel showed th a t 76 percent of
th e German population would support th e rem oval o f tactical nuclear weapons

42 "Iran-Germ any Ties Entering New Chapter, Especially in Gas Sector," Tehran Times, February 22, 2009,
accessed December 10, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .im ra .o rg .il/s to ry .p h p 3 ? id = 4 2 9 1 9 .
43 Reiner Hermann, "Deutsch-Emiratische Dynamic," Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, June 10, 2009,
accessed December 10, 2013,
http://fazarchiv.faz.net/docum ent/show SingleD oc/FAZ FD 1200906102302074?
44 "Nuclear W eapons in Europe: Survey Results in Five European Countries," Greenpeace International,
M ay 26, 2006.

stationed in Germ any.45 Several Germ an non-governm ental organizations have
continuously campaigned fo r a G erm any w ith o u t nuclear weapons, w ith som e civil
society groups pressuring th e Germ an governm ent to call fo r the rem oval o f Am erican
tactical nuclear weapons.46 This pressure was first evident w ithin the governm ent in
1998, w hen Joschka Fischer proposed a 'no first use doctrine' as a pathw ay to rem ove
tactical nuclear weapons from Germ any; a proposal not w ell received w ith th e U.S. and
th e United Kingdom. In 2005, a petition was issued to th e Germ an Bundestag which
called for the w ithdraw al once m ore in order to strengthen th e nonproliferation
regim e.47 Beyond the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germ any, th e Germ an
governm ent is currently rethinking its ow n nuclear pow er program. The Fukushima
catastrophe has affected Germ any's views tow ards nuclear energy. Chancellor M erkel
has closed 41 percent of Germ any's nuclear energy reactors and proposes a com plete
closure w ithin a decade. This move is supported by the vast m ajority of G erm ans and all
political parties.
This case study of Germ any's foreign policy behavior in the case o f th e Iranian
nuclear program sheds light on how historical m em ory enters German political debates
in a global policy issue area, nonproliferation. W hile historical m em ory is revisited by
politicians in this case rhetorically, it is not the strongest influential variable th a t
determ ines Germany's policy behavior. Historical m em ory and W W II legacy was only

45 "Atom waffen: Ausstieg Ankiindigen," D er Spiegel, M ay 2, 2005.
46 w w w .ato m w affen frei.d e, "Unsere Zukuft - A tom w affenfrei."
47 "Glaubwurdigkeit Des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes Starken - Us-Nuklearwaffen Aus
Deutschland A bziehen-15/5257," ed. Deutscher Bundestag.
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introduced in context of potential m ilitary action in th e case o f Iran. Specifically, th e
concepts of 'never again w ar' and 'w ith peaceful means only' have been used to justify,
explain, and advocate for sanctions instead o f m ilitary actions, th erefore strengthening
th e diplomatic process proposed by Germ any. Alliance solidarity, an other variable
selected fo r analysis, was present in th a t G erm any initially aligned itself along w ith th e
EU voice and its coalition partners. Despite this, G erm any continuously advocated a
softer approach, eventually opposing th e stronger sanctions which w ere suggested by
Germany's allies. This prom pted international partners to call on Germ any to show
m ore responsible behavior. Furtherm ore, Germ any's refusal fo r stronger sanctions also
placed Germ any on th e side w ith Russia and China. W h ile dom estic opinion strongly
affects Germ an foreign and security policy, th e case o f Iran's nuclear program did not
result in the outpour of significant dom estic opinion. An overw helm ing m ajority of
Germans opposed a nuclear-arm ed Iran, yet only half w ould support possible m ilitary
action to prevent a nuclear-arm ed Iran. Even in this case, it is doubtful th a t th e G erm an
public would support said m ilitary actions by com m itting Germ an soldiers and
resources. This can partly be explained by Germ any's long standing history and
relationship w ith Iran. The below table shows th e variables selected fo r analysis in this
case and details the strength, presence, and ability to influence and shape Germ an
foreign and security policy tow ards Iran's nuclear program o f each.
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Table 3: Application of Variables; Case II
German Foreign Policy towards Iran's Nuclear Program. 2003-2013
Historical Memory/WWII
Legacy

Slightly Present.
Rhetorical m ention of 'never again war" and 'w ith peaceful means
only' which can account for Germany's emphasis on diplomatic
measures.

Alliance
SoIidarity/NATO/EU/EU3+3

Slightly Present.
Solidarity in term s of aligning along with EU voice
initially/Rhetorical com m itm ent.
Eventually: advocacy o f softer approach and opposition to severe
sanctions.
"N ew Constellation" o f Russia-China-Germany

Domestic Influence

Slightly Present.
Cultural history and tourism w ith Iran and dom estic opposition
against any form o f m ilitary option for Iran (yet 96 % of Germans
oppose a nuclear-arm ed Iran).

National/Economic Interests

Present.
Economic ties and interest through trade and export (although
steadily declining). G erm any argued that imposed sanctions did not
harm th e mullahs, instead only Germ an business suffered as the
gaps left by sanctions w ere filled by China and Russia. National and
economic interests through a strengthened relationship w ith Russia
(and China), especially in regards to energy security.

Rhetoric

Present but varied.
German leaders advocated severe sanctions rhetorically while
emphasizing no m ilitary actions. Rhetoric was m e t with inaction.
"W an del durch Handel" and "Keeping business and politics
separate" was used rhetorically against stronger sanctions.
Overall, rhetorical co m m itm en t to alliance solidarity, condemning
nuclear-arm ed Iran.

The strongest variable fo r influencing G erm an foreign policy tow ards Iran's
nuclear program appears to be the im portance o f th e G erm an-lranian tra d e relationship
in the realm o f national interests. This im portance fu rth er increases due to th e Russia-
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Germany-lran energy security nexus. Germ any continuously advocated fo r a softer
approach to sanctions, pointing to th e fact th a t sanctions did not harm Iran directly as
m arket gaps w ere filled by China, Russia, and other countries. Instead, th e sanctions
hurt the German business industry, although not severely, resulting in some dom estic
responses towards th e economic sanctions. M o re specifically, slogans such as "Change
through Trade" and "Keep business and politics separate" w ere used to show opposition
to the sanctions imposed on Iran. Although national and economic interests are not th e
sole explanatory variable fo r Germ any's foreign policy behavior tow ards th e Iranian
nuclear program, differences betw een the Iranian and Libyan case show Germ any's
discontent with economic sanctions fo r Iran. W hile refusing strong sanctions and
working through legal loopholes in th e Iran case, G erm any publicly called for stronger
sanctions for Libya, perhaps because G erm any does not have the same econom ic
interests in Libya.

Findings
Rhetorically, German politicians articulated a varied position tow ards a nuclear
Iran. W hile the IAEA report in 2011 prom pted Guido W esterw elle to argue th a t severe
sanctions w ere inevitable unless cooperation occurs, he simultaneously em phasized
th a t Germany would not support any m ilitary action. Chancellor M erkel similarly
com m ented th a t a nuclear bomb in Iran would be unacceptable and m e t w ith tough
economic sanctions. Over th e past ten years, G erm an policy makers showed alliance
solidarity and consensus by rhetorically condem ning Iran's nuclear program ; how ever,
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Germany's rhetorical com m itm ent did not match G erm any's policy /nactions. W hen
possible sanctions w ere discussed in coalition settings such as the UNSC, G erm any
publicly refused and opposed stronger sanctions. This inaction has resulted in several
scholarly and media critiques, m ainly pointing to G erm any's inconsistent foreign policy.
The international com m unity points to Germ any's failure to show alliance solidarity
through responsible behavior and questions Germ any's role as a global pow er. This has
contributed to the overall debate w ithin international relations on how to explain
Germany's continued and changed foreign policy behavior theoretically w hile
establishing a predictable pattern for future Germ an policy choices.
Germany's behavior in th e case o f Iran's nuclear program did not show a
significant change in policy or shift tow ards a new status quo. Germany's inaction and
disinterest w ith foreign policy-related issue areas has been constant, w hile the
m ultilateral and diplom atic approach taken at th e beginning aligns w ith Germ any's
norm-consistent behavior. Scholarly and media analyses group Germ any's behavior,
specifically opposing stronger sanctions and voting along Russia and China, as
irresponsible and problematic. In recent years, and exam ining Germany's foreign policy
behavior comprehensively, scholars question Germ any's role as a civilian pow er,
particularly due to policies based on national interest. Taking into consideration
Germany's business interest in Iran and G erm any's role during the econom ic crisis in
Europe, analysts have pointed to Germ any's policies based on national interests and
overall changing towards a geo-econom ic pow er. Some analysts have even argued th a t
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Germany's national interests-based behavior in recent years shows a gradual change in
policy and is in line w ith realist explanations fo r foreign policy choices.
Taking into consideration th e variables chosen fo r this case study, m otives of
self-interests, specifically national and economic interests, can account fo r Germ any's
behavior, inaction, and advocacy fo r softer approaches tow ards Iran's nuclear program .
W hile the m ajority of scholars and m edia experts grouped Germ an inaction as
'surprising' and 'shocking', this case is certainly not an instance of direct change in policy
behavior. Germany's policy behavior in the Iran case has been continuous and partially
adjusted, based on national interests and th e external security environm ent, w hile th e
rhetoric tow ards alliance solidarity, antim ilitarism , and diplom atic approaches has
remained unchanged. Domestic opinion, w hile strong, was not as evident in this case as
within the policy area involving the use o f force. How ever, in relation to the use o f force,
a 2013 domestic opinion poll showed th a t G erm any and Slovakia had th e lowest
approval rate fo r the use o f force fo r Iran in all o f Europe at 32 percent, w hile an option
o f accepting a nuclear Iran if m ilitary force was th e only alternative action was favored
the most by Germ any with 51 percent.48
W hile historical m em ory was used rhetorically to push diplomacy over potential
m ilitary intervention, historical m em ory did not directly shape Germ an foreign policy
choices in the case o f Iran. Further, w hile G erm any's emphasis on economic interests,
especially during the Greece bailouts, was analyzed as a return to realist policy behavior
by some analysts, historical m em ory may have constrained Germ any's ability to project

48 "Transatlantic Trends," 33.
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and exercise pow er only in regards to potential m ilitary interventions. This rhetorical
and policy com m itm ent to W W II legacies and culture o f restraint does not lim it G erm an
power; it serves German policy makers in justifying and explaining policy choices in all
realms of foreign policy w here G erm any m a y o r m ay not have interest. Historical
m em ory enters th e discussion once potential m ilitary action is debated. Historical
m em ory then assumes the role of restraining policy action, th erefore confirm ing th e
status quo. Historical memory has the most im pact on Germ an foreign and security
policy when dealing with use o f force situations, which is not the case fo r Iran. Despite
the som ew hat restraining side-effect, Germ any's refusal fo r stronger economic
sanctions and constant advocacy o f softer and constructive diplom atic approaches is in
line w ith Germany's idea o f power.

Economic and National Interest
It is im portant to consider th e G erm an-lranian economic relationship in g reater
detail. During the first half of 2013, Germ an exports to Iran fell by 33 percent in
comparison to previous years w hile im ports from Iran to Germ any decreased by 26
percent.49 The bilateral trade volum e fo r 2 01 2 considered o f €2.528 billion in exports to
Iran and € 71 0 million in imports from Iran.50 According to th e German D ep artm en t o f
State, Germ an banks operating in Iran have not taken on new business since 2007. The
below table details th e bilateral tra d e betw een G erm any and Iran fro m 2 0 0 7 -2 0 1 3 .

49 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," own translation.
50 Ibid.
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Table 4: German Exports to Iran

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 (1*J4)

Imports from Iran
€583 Million
€593 Million
€537 Million
€916 Million
€712 Million
€313 Million
€157 Million
...:..........1 ..... .5i
D epartm ent o f State website)

Exports to Iran
€3.604 Billion
€3.924 Billion
€3.714 Billion
€3.804 Billion
€3.087 Billion
€2.528 Billion
€1.040 Billion

(Source: Data taken from the German

1

This table reflects a strong decrease in G erm an exports to Iran since th e sanctions in
Decem ber 2006, and a second round o f UN and EU sanctions in June and July o f 2 01 0 .
The EU sanctions w ere then fu rth er increased in 2 01 1 . W hile the historical high in
Germ an exports to Iran, before sanctions, in 2005 reached € 4 .4 Billion, this num ber only
accounts fo r 0.6 percent o f the to tal value o f Germ an foreign exports th a t year (€ 7 2 0
Billion). The m ore recent years o f th e G erm an-lranian tra d e relationship paints a similar
picture in comparison to Germany's total exports and im ports, depicted in th e table
below.

51 Ibid.
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Table 5: German Exports and Imports

Total
German
Exports
(Billion)
2009 €803
2010 €952
2011 €1,061

German
Exports
to Iran
(Billion)

Total
German
Imports
(Billion)

German
Imports
from Iran
(Million)

€3.71
€3.8
€3.0

€664
€797
€902

€537
€916
€712

Value of
exports to
Iran to total
German
exports
0.462%
0.399%
0.283%

(Source: German D epartm ent o f State and German Federal Statistic Office,

Value of
imports from
Iran to overall
German
imports
0.081%
0.115%
0.079%
— ..............
Ministry o f Finance)

W hile the overall exports to Iran in comparison to Germ any's to ta l foreign tra d e
only accounted for a relatively small percentage, G erm any has been Iran's main trading
partner fo r over a decade, closely follow ed by China. A fter th e initial rounds of
sanctions, German businesses w idely critiqued th e G erm an governm ent fo r supporting
UN sanctions, arguing for a separation o f politics and business. During this tim e , th e
Director of the Federation o f Germ an W holesale and Trade, publicly spoke out against
unilateral sanctions against Iran, adding his concern th a t Germ an companies w ere
increasingly losing business to Asia.53 O ther officials, to include Jurgen Thum ann, head
o f the Federation of German Industries, cautioned against th e sanctions, arguing th a t
Germ an companies lost lucrative Iranian contracts established over long-standing
business relationships due to th e political pressure of the EU. Specifically, m edium sized
Germ an companies w ere most affected by th e sanctions against Iran. As echoed by
o th er political officials, the m ajority o f the business industry argued th a t conflicts over

52 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland; "Economic Overview Germany: M a rk e t, Productivity, Innovation," ed.
Germany Trade and Invest (2013).
53 "German-lranian Trade up 7.8 Perecnt," Payvand Iran News, Decem ber 2,2008.
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Iran's nuclear program should be solved through diplom atic and political m eans, not
economic sanctions. China's exports to Iran have steadily risen with th e sanctions, w hile
Germ any decreased exports since 2006. Further, th e United Arab Emirates has
increased its exports to Iran, surpassing G erm any in 2 0 0 8 /2 0 0 9 . In 2007, G erm any
announced the desire to o ffer carrots to Iran, a proposal which was shut dow n.
Internally w ithin the EU, soft approaches took a m ajority hold, but w ere dismissed w hen
th e U.S. intervened.54 The EU's decision in July 2 0 1 0 to m ake sanctions m andatory
across entire sectors fu rth er com plicated internal EU division. This, com bined w ith th e
EU's gradual change from negotiator to th e right-hand 'body' of th e U.S. eventually
stalled negotiations.

Discussion
As previously m entioned, th e economic interest variable for G erm any's behavior
in regards to the Germ an-lranian trade relationship is not significant enough to argue
th a t Germany's policies have been influenced greatly. G erm an exports to Iran w ere at a
high in 2005 w ith € 720 billion, just 0 .6 percent o f G erm any's total export.55 Therefo re,
to make an argum ent solely on this trade relationship w ould be flaw ed. Some analysts
argue th a t Germany's adherence to policies th a t are opposed by th e U.S. falls into th e
category of soft balancing; an a tte m p t to level or balance American pow er. O thers take
a m ore cynical position and explain th a t by aligning w ith Iran, Germ any secures a

54 Sauer, "Struggling on th e W orld Scene: An over-Am bitious Eu Versus a Com m itted Iran."
55 Kuntzel, "Berlin, th e Ayatollahs, and th e Bomb."

potentially im portant position in th e fu tu re o f a nuclear hegem onic Iran. Despite these
possible explanations for Germ any's behavior, th e most plausible explanation is a
combination of norms-based behavior and national interests-based behavior. On th e
one hand, Germany has an established foreign policy, continued and constructed over
th e past sixty years and marked by non-confrontational approaches. These approaches,
to-date, are "fool proof" policy approaches, used in the past w ithout significant
repercussions or push backs. On th e o th er hand, Germ any, as an economic super pow er
in Europe, has a high interest in rem aining economically strong. Thus, securing fu tu re
alliances and relationships with countries such as China and Russia, enables G erm any to
'play the field' w hile remaining som ew hat neutral in controversial situations. Economic
and national interests in this case, and arguably possession goals, have an overw helm ing
effect on Germany's foreign and security policy.
W hile Germany's initial involvem ent in th e negotiations w ith Iran in 2003 w ere
certainly a sign of assuming a leadership role, even showing willingness to act
(Gestaltungswille), the progression o f th e negotiations over th e years resulted in 'old
policies' and consistent behavior. The change observed was m erely a shift of
orientation, or th e new constellation o f China-Russia-Germany, which can be explained
as a reaction to the external environm ent. The changing security environm ent and
international structure, w ith the U.S.'s pivot to Asia and slow w ithdraw al fro m th e
European continent, resulted in G erm any also refocusing its interest and goals. Beyond
this, Germany, as most other countries, may simply tre a t foreign policy issues on a case
by case basis. The questions asked of Germ any's behavior by the international
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com munity, to include Germany's ability to project and use pow er and G erm any's ability
to act responsibly, are not asked of o th er regional powers. Germ any's need to show
responsible behavior and W W II guilt are brought into contem porary foreign policy
discussions continuously due to a desire to categorize Germ any, hopefully as a norm al,
responsible actor. Germany's unwillingness to support U.S. polices, refusal to consider
m ilitary action, and focus on economic interests w hile adhering to W W II legacy
approaches, may also point to Germ any's disinterest in foreign and security policyrelated issues beyond 'checkbook diplom acy'. G erm any simply does not have th e desire
to assume an international leadership role.
The economic data which shows th e trade relationship and G erm any's total
exports to Iran cannot fully account fo r Germ any's strong opposition for sanctions
against Iran. W hile Germ an businesses and economic experts w arned against increased
sanctions, Germany has traditionally adopted a d ifferen t political approach not focused
on sanctions, while the U.S. uses sanctions as a d efault policy tool. Deviation from policy
occurred when Germany opposed stronger sanctions w hile rhetorically continuing to
condemn a nuclear-armed Iran and vowing to support and defend Israel. In the case of
Iran, Germany's continuous rhetoric did not necessarily m atch policy approaches, yet
sanctions do not fit into Germ any's role concept. Beyond this, Germ any's historical
legacies in the Gulf regions have resulted in a leadership role for over th irty decades.
Specifically, Germany negotiated several bilateral agreem ents w ith Russia in th e 1 9 7 0 's,
focused around the concept o f 'w andel durch handel'. As such, G erm any has becom e a
global actor in economic term s, having interests in political stability in th e M id d le East.
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Beyond this, due to Germany's own prescribed nonproliferation stance on a global scale,
Germ any has condemned Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition. Consolidating long-term
strategic cooperation in the region w ith Iran, and w ith Russia and China, is a t th e
forefront o f Germany's foreign policy interests, thus making stability in Iran a crucial
factor. Germany's behavior during the negotiations w ith Iran, exem plify G erm any's
value based and interests driven foreign policy choices.

Summary
The recent relationship betw een the EU and Iran can be sum m arized as an
evolving dialogue th a t includes a constructive dialogue o f securitization o f th e issue
while employing a policy o f diplomacy and sanctions, w h ereby the option o f m ilitary
action was discussed. The possibility of w a r does not fall into Europe's norm ative pow er
approach, and EU policy makers th erefo re tried to avoid this escalation a t all cost,
instead im plem enting strong sanctions under th e coercive diplomacy fram ew ork.
Throughout the process, the E3,EU-3, and EU3+3 have shown a collective voice by
condemning a nuclear armed Iran, outlining strategic decision approaches on th e basis
o f justifications through Iran's actions. The EU's identity as a foreign policy actor and
global pow er has been elevated through the negotiations w ith Iran w hile staying tru e to
its principles of transparency, norm ative rules and goals, and mostly non-proliferation
rhetoric. According scholars, the EU's actions w ithin fram ing the coercive approach as
part of a norm ative path, has m ade the EU exclusivist w hile failing to address th e
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security concerns o f regional actors and portraying a asym m etric picture o f th re a t
analysis.
By examining how alliance solidarity, historical m em ory, national interests, and
domestic influence shape Germ an foreign policy in th e case o f Iran, this case sheds light
on an area of German foreign policy involving global issues. In hopes o f a global zero,
Germany's constructed nonproliferation identity contributes to Germ any's norm s-based
approach in both advocating diplom atic measures as w ell as opposing a nuclear
weapons program by Iran. Despite Germ any's rhetorical com m itm ent, G erm any has
openly opposed stronger sanctions, siding w ith Russia. W hile Germany's trade
relationship with Iran presents the potential to influence Germ any's decision in this
case, Germany's export to Iran in relation to Germ any's to tal foreign trade is not
significant enough to make a strong argum ent fo r economic based reasons. H ow ever,
Germany's economic relationship w ith Russia and China may account fo r Germ any's
overall behavior in both th e case of Libya and Iran. National interests, including energy
security and similar possession goals, contribute to G erm any's overall foreign policy
strategy w hile rhetorically com m itting to continuous and previous patterns o f norm sbased approaches. This case added to an understanding of Germany's foreign policy
choices and rhetoric used in regards to Germ any's own prescribed nonproliferation
com m itm ents and norms. Further, this analysis highlighted which factors d eterm in e
rhetorical action and practices in regards to nuclear proliferation issues by G erm any
while emphasizing th e im portance o f economic and national interests, especially w hen
such interests conflict with com ponents of G erm an foreign policy norms, such as
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alliance solidarity. Unlike in foreign policy issue areas involving the use o f force, this case
illustrates th a t historical m em ory alone does not have th e strongest affect o f policy
decisions.

COMPARISON OF CASES OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
The tw o policy areas under review , out of area operations and nuclear
nonproliferation, present tw o different cases th a t are shaped and influenced by several
variables. W hile obvious variations exist, both policy areas highlighted th e international
com m unity's expectation of G erm any in critical situations. In the m ore recent cases o f
Libya and during the past fe w years o f th e Iranian nuclear program, Germ any's
abstention from th e vote and opposition fo r stronger sanctions resulted in a m ultitud e
o f media arguments and analyses referring to Germ any's foreign policy as irresponsible,
unpredictable, and inconsistent. W hile the Kosovo case was significant in reinterp retin g
Germany's approach to the cases involving th e use of force, Iraq, Libya, and Iran all
stand for instances in which Germ any ultim ately chose a path different from G erm any's
traditional alliance members. W hile Germ any's contribution in the Afghanistan w a r has
been used to emphasize alliance solidarity, deploym ent caveats, dom estic opposition,
and controversial political debates w ithin G erm any hardly make Afghanistan an exam ple
o f Germany's full com m itm ent to th e alliance. Rhetorically, German policy makers
showed com m itm ent in all cases, except Iraq. U nfortunately, the Iraq case resulted in a
distanced relationship betw een G erm any and th e U.S., also 'paralyzing' European
security strategy and policy. The Libya case highlighted this afterm ath clearly as did th e
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latter half of the negotiations w ith Iran am ong th e EU3+3. Further, Germ any's position
aligned w ith Russia's position in the cases o f Iraq, Libya, and Iran, prom pting the
description: 'the new constellation o f Russia-China-Germany'. W hile Germany's
employed rhetoric was strong across all cases, rhetoric was m ore controversial and
m ore prom inently debated in cases involving th e use of force. In all cases, rhetorical
references to W W II legacy was used to explain and justify policy action. Similarly, in the
cases involving out of area operations and direct implications for Germany's
Bundeswehr, domestic opinion and opposition was strong and certainly contributed to
Germany's behavior. Although the cases involving th e use o f force w ere rhetorically
placed under th e umbrella of historical m em ory, economic factors including th e cost of
w ar and benefit analyses o f m ilitary intervention w ere present across all cases.
The m ajor variation in the analysis o f these tw o policy areas lies in the central
focus of Germany's interests. Or, perhaps, th e presented central focus of interests.
W hile Germ any's behavior in all cases was explained through norms-based approaches
th a t directly fall w ithin Germany's prescribed pattern o f foreign policy, a national and
economic interest argum ent is certainly valid in cases w h ere G erm any showed breaks
w ith alliances, instead aligning w ith Russia. Although G erm any has always interp reted its
powerful position in economic term s, Germany's national interest and economically
focused behavior during th e abstention in Libya and opposition to stronger sanctions in
Iran has confused some scholars and analysts. According to some scholars, this recent
behavior shows Germany's lack o f responsibility. W hile this m ay be accurate in term s of
Germany's position as a security exporter, Germ any's behavior can be seen as a reaction
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to the ever-changing international security environm ent. W ith Germ any's long-standing
relationship w ith Russia present throughout the m ajority o f these cases, and in light o f
Germany's energy dependency on Russia in the fu tu re, it is im portant to analyze this
factor in m ore detail.
Germany's siding w ith Russia and China in both cases, during th e abstention
from the Libya vote and by opposing tougher sanction on Iran, has resulted in much
criticism and debate. On th e fo re fro n t o f critique is Germ any's acceptance o f Russia's
authoritarian tactics and China's human rights abuses. O ften referred to in scholarly
analyses as either 'bear-huggers' or 'bear-hunters', G erm any views and accepts Russia's
and China's unfortunate regime traits as "a tem porary price for stability" by focusing on
change through trade tow ards a liberal free m arket dem ocracy.55 W hile the Libya case
highlighted Germany's relationship w ith Russia, prom pting analysts, journalists, and
scholars to focus on Germany's betrayal o f its past allies, th e German-Russian
relationship has been critical for Germ any's foreign policy choices fo r several decades.
During the Schroder governm ent, G erm any supported a much critiqued tre a ty on th e
North Stream gas pipeline, w hile also building th e German-French-Russian opposition to
th e 2003 invasion o f Iraq.57 W hile supporting a m ore reserved approach tow ards Russia,
Chancellor M erkel has a known "special relationship" w ith Russia. Beyond G erm any's
dependence on Russia as an energy exporter, Germ any is also Russia's largest trading

56 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104. Also discussed in: Constanze Stelzenm uller,
"Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009).
57 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104.
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partner.58 This puts Germ any in a difficult position in navigating political issues w ith
Russia, acting as a m ediator betw een Russian and NATO interests fu rth e r com plicated
by m ilitary "threats" as observed in the 2 00 8 w ar betw een Russia and Georgia. G erm any
has adopted an approach o f ‘Annaherung durch Verflechtung', or "Rapprochem ent
through economic interlocking" in order to engage, shape, and influence Russia-EUNATO relations.59 At the fo re fro n t of Germ any's policy makers, the M inister o f Foreign
Affairs, Frank-W alter Steinm eier em phasized the significance of a 'strategic partnership'
w ith Russia, advocating continued engagem ent w ith Russia and emphasizing th e
im portance of cooperation with Russia. This approach has resulted in policies geared
towards "democracy transfer, energy cooperation, and conflict resolution fo r Central
Asia and the Caucasus".60 Similarly, Germ any's tra d e relationship w ith China has steadily
increased over the past five years. W hile th e m ajority of Germ an foreign exports, 60
percent remain in the Eurozone, Germ an exports to China increased by over 70 percent
betw een 2 0 0 9 -2 01 0 .61 Experts predict th a t exports will continue to rise, especially as EU
enlargem ent policy has posed problems in coordinating and im plem enting tra d e
agreem ents w ith France. These hurdles to international tra d e in turn m otivate G erm any
to pursue "special relationships" w ith China and Russia.62
Beyond Germ any and Russia's com bined energy and trade interests, RussianGerman cultural history fu rth er contributes to this special relationship in which
58 Stelzenmuller, "Germany's Russia Question: A N ew Ostpolitik fo r Europe," 90.
59 "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik fo r Europe," 94.
60 Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Q uarterly 30, no. 2
(2007): 141.
61 Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," ibid.34, no. 3 (2011): 36.
62 "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," The Washington Q uarterly 34, no. 3 (2011).

224

Germ any continuously accepts and considers Russia's interests in several foreign policy
areas over the past decade. This consideration is evident through several policy issue
areas to include nuclear strategy and missile defense.63 Historically, W illy Brandt's
Ostpolitik aided in progressing and developing th e relationship of th e W est to East
Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union during th e 1970's w hile Helm ut Kohl, during th e
1990's similarly looked to Russia's role in Europe.64 The relationship betw een Russia and
th e EU took a turn in 2006 when Russia did not ratify th e Energy Charter, raising gas
prices, and using Europe's reliance o f Russia's energy to influence political outcom es.
Russia has therefore presented a much debated factor in EU politics, resulting in
diverging positions from traditional policies of containm ent to constructive
engagem ent.65 Despite this, political analysts are convinced th at "there is no realistic
scenario available in which Russian natural gas is not a dom inant fe a tu re o f European
energy supply", especially for G erm any due to Nord Stream , the pipeline running from
Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea.66 Critics w ithin th e EU have pointed to th e
problems surrounding the launch o f Nord Stream in 2011, specifically th e fe a r th a t th e
EU may become too dependent on Russian energy imports, in turn giving Russia political
leverage over im portant disputes. Form er Chancellor Schroder, in an in terview w ith th e
Germ an newspaper Handelsblatt addressed these critiques arguing th a t w hile 25
percent of EU gas imports come from Russia, 60 percent o f Russia's to tal gas exports are

63 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally."
64 Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship."
65 Ibid.
66 Tim Boersma, "European Energy Security and th e Role o f Russia," The German M a rs h a ll Fund o f the
United States, July 2013, 2.
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received by the EU, making Russia depen dent on th e EU.67 In January 2 01 4 , th e EU and
Russia agreed on another gas pipeline, South Stream , set to fulfill 15 percent o f Europe's
natural gas requirem ent by 2 01 8 .68 As previously argued, Germ any's focus on costly
renew able energy sources combined w ith recent approaches of rethinking and reducing
Germany's nuclear energy, fu rth er contributes to Germ any's interests in energy security
and continued partnership w ith Russia. Despite this, G erm any is far from depending on
Russia fo r energy. A t this point, th e Russian-German energy relationship can be
understood as almost symm etrically in terdep endent and m utually beneficial, especially
w ith new and emerging energy markets globally.
As most countries, Germ any considers cost-benefit analyses and risks associated
w ith m ilitary action. This was especially tru e fo r th e Libya case, during which G erm an
politicians expressed fear o f prolonged engagem ent and com m itm ent sim ilar to
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most o f these cases also contribute to G erm any's partners
expecting the 'Nein' from the onset of new foreign policy issue areas, especially
surrounding the use o f force. This stance is then interpreted by Germ an critics as w ell as
th e international com m unity as a continuous refusal to support out o f area operations
militarily, regardless o f th e case; also recently evident in th e cases o f Syria and M a li.69

67 "In Der Energiepolitik Sind GroBe Fehler Gem acht W o rd en"-ln terview with Gerhard Schroder,"
Handelsblatt, August 1, 2011, own translation. Accessed January 21, 2014,
http://w w w .handelsblatt.com /politik/deutschland/altkanzler-schroeder-im -interview -in-derenergiepolitik-sind-grosse-fehler-gem acht-w orden/4452406.htm l.
68 "Eu Gives Gazprom Preliminary 'Ok' for South Stream Gas Pipeline," RT News, January 20, 2014,
accessed January 22, 2014, h ttp ://rt.co m /bu siness/eu-gazp ro m -sou th -stream -881/.
69 Germany opposed military intervention in Syria and only agreed to engagem ent w ith M ali once ensured
th at no military com m itm ent from G erm any was necessary. Bittner et al., "W ir Tun Doch Nix..." own
translation.

Germany's abstention from th e vote fo r Libya can be seen as a sequential case of a
com m itm ent to non-intervention. G erm any's position aligned with Russia's; Russian
President Vladim ir Putin condem ned any m ilitary intervention of Libya and th re a te n ed
to veto UNSC sanctions against Syria.70 Beyond this constellation, some scholars have
attributed Germany's recent behavior in these cases to a lack of strategic consideration.
In the past, Germ any acted as a negotiator w ithin NATO and the EU, striving for
consensus and agreem ent, whereas th e Germ any of th e past decade turn ed into a "naysayer", choosing the status quo "strategy by default" w ithin NATO.71 The m ore
controversial cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran also highlight th e internal struggle in
G erm any to consolidate and clarify Germ any's strategy w ithin the international world
order. This fu rth er reflects on and transcends to disagreements w ithin the EU over
e ith er supporting a more "pluralist w orld o f m ultiple and som etim es com peting sets of
values or a liberal world of dem ocracy".72
Overall, w hile domestic issues in G erm any have trum ped foreign policy issues in
th e 2000s, including the pension system, federalism , and th e labor m arket, dom estic
influence on controversial foreign policy areas involving the use o f force directs
G erm any policy makers' position. Germ any's policies reflect the lack o f domestic,
financial, and political support com bined w ith an ever increasing unwillingness to take

70 "Putin: Libya Intervention Is Like 'Crusades’," Huffington Post, March 21, 2011. It is im p o rtan t to note
th a t Russia and Syria have an im portant trade relationship; over th e span o fte n years, Russia exported
$1.5 billion in arms to Syria. For more on this, please see "W hy Russia Supports Assad," The N e w York
Times, February 9, 2012.
71 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.
72 Sten Rynning, "Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Com bat th e Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons," European Security 16, no. 3 -4 (2007): 284.
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financial and m ilitary risks. Especially in th e case o f Libya, Germany's contribution to an
intervention w ould have resulted in a potentially heavy burden for th e purpose of
fulfilling a foreign policy objective, regardless how im perative this objective m ay be to
alliance solidarity and international peace. This consideration is a com bination of
factors, beliefs, and norms, which have survived th e structural changes of th e past tw o
to three decades. John Duffield's argum ent, m ade over ten years ago, still holds tru e in
spite of Germany's recent political behavior: "Germ an society as a w hole and Germ an
political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, w idely
shared, and rather elaborate set o f beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to
national security policy, which w e re little altered by unification. The existence o f this
political culture has contributed to a high degree o f consensus on security issues since

1990 " 7 3
On a side note, and within th e overall th e m e of historical m em ory on which this
dissertation is based upon, it is im portant to m ention th a t Germany's historical m em ory
is not only used by Germ any to justify and explain foreign policy behavior, but has also
been used by the international com m unity to point to and rem ind G erm any o f its
horrendous past. This was most recently evident during th e Greek d e b t crisis and Angela
M erkel's behavior during the bailout. According to some scholars, historical m em orybased rhetoric has been em ployed to direct and influence Germ an policy w h ile also

73 Duffield, W orld Power Forsaken: Political Culture, In ternatio n al Institutions, an d Germ an Security Policy
a fte r Unification, 61. This consensus is certainly not evident internally, especially th e Bundestag debates
during and after th e Libya abstention. Despite this, a m ajority vote was reached in all cases, th e refo re
arguable reflecting an overall consensus for G erm any tow ards these security issues.
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presenting Germ any as an unreliable partner. W hile 'the Germ an question', at one
point, was resolved with th e help o f th e U.S., th e case o f Libya and th e opposition to
stronger sanctions for Iran resulted in a renew ed asking, inquiry, and analysis o f
w hether Germ any can be trusted to be a responsible ally. Them atically throughout
these analyses, th e domestic influence variable is present, especially in relation to
German elections. Scholars w onder w h e th e r Germ any's behavior in some cases is a
direct result o f th e M erkel governm ent pressure to conform to electorate dem ands.
Parallels of foreign policy behavior to G erm an elections are certainly evident. M o re
specifically, during the height o f th e Greek sovereign debt crisis o f 2010, Chancellor
Merkel focused on the election in th e state o f North Rhine-W estphalia, w hile the
elections of Baden-W urtenberg in M arch 2011 coincided w ith the case o f Libya.74
Despite this potential factor, Germ any's behavior involving th e use o f force, and even
th e potential for m ilitary action in th e Iran case, is rhetorically explained through
Germany's adherence to post-W W II legacy o f restraint, antim ilitarism , constructive
engagem ent, and the diplomatic dialogue. Economic and national interests reasons are
not given to justify policy choices.

APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Despite th e structural changes o f th e end o f th e Cold W ar, Germ an foreign policy
has been marked by a large degree of continuity. This has puzzled scholars and resulted
in an ongoing debate about Germany's use o f pow er, Germ any as a civilian pow er, and

74 Cohen, "M erkel in Miniature."
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Germany as a norm al power, w hile attem pting to group Germ any's foreign policy
approaches into theoretical fram ew orks. As discussed in chapter th re e o f this
dissertation, scholars w ithin the field o f international relations continue to struggle to
analytically explain, account, and predict Germ any's behavior. I argue th a t this is mainly
due to Germany's history, which continues to guide foreign policy choices despite
structural changes. Germ an identity and culture directly shape and influence the
perception and interests o f policy makers and th e dom estic population, and in tu rn, th e
external environm ent. As G erm any has entirely reconstructed its identity and policy
approach after W W II, a distinct set of values and beliefs w ithin political culture
em erged. M ore specifically, and mostly relevant to this analysis is Germ any's culture of
restraint which poses an im portant aspect and obstacle to Germ any's national security
policy. This culture o f restraint has, is, and continues to lim it and influence Germ any's
ability to project and use pow er internationally. As such, instead o f focusing on
traditional projection of pow er through m ilitary capabilities, G erm any placed great
value on continuity, transparency, and restraint w hile advocating m ultilateral
approaches.75 How then can Germ any's recent behavior, breaking th e alliance solidarity
of previous years, be explained theoretically? Is Germ any pursuing possession goals and
national interests as explained by realism? This section will address th e scholarly input
of theoretical analyses described in th e third chapter and apply the concepts fo r the
selected theories, structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to th e cases

75 Of course, some of these restraints are due to th e afterm ath o f W W II and limits placed on Germ any by
the alliance.

230

selected for this dissertation in order to fu rth e r an understanding o f G erm any's foreign
policy role concept.
The interaction of structure and agency is evident w hen analyzing G erm any's
behavior in a variety of foreign and security policy areas. G erm any as a 'civilian po w er',
has worked within these structures and through institutional approaches to shape its
external environm ent. W hile th e historical institutional approach points to G erm any's
path-dependency, sociological institutionalism outlines Germ any's 'logic of
appropriateness' within a civilian pow er fra m e w o rk .76 The first decade a fte r unification,
scholars focused on conceptions o f Germ any's use of pow er, explaining and
understanding the use th e re o f w ithin a civilian pow er and institutional fram ew o rk.
Kosovo called for a reinterpretation on th e use o f force, w h ile Iraq resulted in debates of
soft-balancing and changed national interests. Constructivism can highlight fo r th e
im portance of historical m em ory, identity, culture, and norms in shaping Germ an
foreign policy behavior, but does not fully account for variations in cases, such as Libya.
Scholars have therefore struggled to apply theoretical fram ew orks to th e political
culture of Germany, resulting in the continuous em ergence o f 'the G erm an question'.
W hile structure has appeared to dictate and direct Germ an behavior in m ilitary policy
areas, agency, especially in the realm o f shaping th e developm ent o f th e EU, is also
evident. Germany's Ostpolitik is an exam ple an exam ple o f agency in th a t, w hile
Ostpolitik also aligned with Europapolitik o f th e tim e, specific Eastern Treaties

76 Tom Dyson, "Civilian Power and 'H istory-M aking1Decisions: German Agenda-Setting on Europe,"
European Security 11, no. 1 (2002).
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elim inated Germany's reliance on interlocutors w hen engaging Eastern European
countries, w hile simultaneously giving W est Germ any a decision-granting leadership
role.77 Beyond structure and agency, th e crucial im portance o f the external
environm ent, inclusive of constraints, has a causal effect on how G erm any operates,
behaves, and votes internationally.
Scholars theoretically explain and understand th e m ajority o f Germ an behavior
through the evolution of Germany's role concept as th e 'good citizen' based on th e 'rule
o f appropriateness'.78 Also focusing on the influence o f th e external environm ent and
structure on German foreign policy, some scholars theoretically exam ine Germ any's
policy in relation to those of the U.S., explaining G erm any's 'bandwagoning' and 'softbalancing' adjustments in the past w hile pointing to the inherently conflicting identity
and role concepts in the direction of U.S. and Germ an leadership approaches. M ost
scholars agree th at a shift in course to return to traditional pow er politics by G erm any is
highly unlikely. M oreover, w ithin a theoretical fram ew ork, a review o f th e cases
selected for this dissertation fu rth er emphasizes th e inability o f international relations
theories to fully explain and account fo r th e observed variance in G erm an foreign and
security policy. Understanding and exclaiming Germ any's behavior in Iraq, Libya, and
during the economic crisis as a 'sudden change' in Germ any's foreign policy would be
highly overstated. Theoretically, Germ any's behavior can be understood through an
examination o f how closely Germ any matches its prescribed role concepts.

77 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 43.
78 Harald Muller, "Germany and W m d Proliferation," The Nonproliferation Review (2003): 18.
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Constructivism, by emphasizing the im portance o f identity, norm , and constructed
patterns o f foreign policy, can account fo r several cases. First and forem ost, th e Iraq
case did not show a return to traditional pow er politics and (soft) balancing m easures,
but serves as a prim e example o f G erm any acting based on historically established
norms, m arked by a more independent foreign policy approach. M o re specifically, th e
concept of 'never alone' and to operate w ithin a m ultilateral fram ew ork o f allies
combined w ith the role o f the UN in legitimizing th e use of force, emphasizes Germ any's
traditional pattern o f foreign policy application and im portance th e re o f fo r policy areas
involving m ilitary operation.79
The EU's approach to Iran's nuclear program , theoretically explained through th e
concept o f coercive diplomacy, along w ith nonproliferation theory and th e idea of
'norm ative pow er Europe' fu rth er contribute to th e explanation of th e EU's and
Germany's action tow ard Iran, w ith an underlying urgency to avoid cost at all tim es
w hile also staunchly opposing nuclear proliferation by Iran. Several scholars analyzing
th e EU's policies, point to issues o f legitimacy, especially in regards to NPT agreem ents
and the double-standards applied to certain countries. Tom Sauer's analysis o f coercive
diplomacy practices by the EU tow ard Iran's nuclear program provide a theoretical
fram ew ork for understanding and explaining the EU's foreign policy choices over th e
past ten years in regards to Iran. Germany's relationship w ith Russia, and aligning of
position w ith Russia in the cases of Iraq, Iran, and Libya, can be understood through
economic and liberal instutionalist term s. Nam ely, Keohane and Nye's articulation of

79 Dettke, Germany Says "No". The Iraq W a r and the Future o f German Foreign an d Security Policy.
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interdependence, th e "relationship am ong economics, politics, and patterns o f
institutionalized cooperation" in com bination w ith pow er and interests, can shed light
on Germany's and Russia's m utual dependency on each o th er.80 The cost o f hurting and
severing this relationship would result in m ajor economic and political losses fo r both
countries, while continued cooperation and engagem ent can prolong th e shadow of the
future, as outlined by institutionalism. W h ile Germ any certainly has several such
relationships, Libya, Iraq, and Iran showed Germany's will to break w ith long-term
alliance members. Germany's use o f constructive diplomacy and emphasis on trade can
be seen as tools to shape politics by having leverage in specific policy areas. As such,
Germ any has been able to assume the role o f negotiator and m ediator w hile shaping its
external environm ent, specifically the EU, through strategic diplomacy and econom ic
influence in line with Joseph's Nye theoretical articulation o f 'soft pow er' approaches.81
M ost scholars who theoretically exam ine Germ any's foreign policy agree th a t
Germ any confounds neorealism .82 As discussed previously, scholars a tte m p t to com bine
approaches or form ulate news schools o f thought geared at accounting fo r th e variance
betw een th e changing international environm ent and Germany's prescribed continuity,
in both rhetoric and action. In recent years, Germ any has altered its policy approach
gradually while political rhetoric rem ained unchanged. Frank Schimmelfennig discusses
and explains this phenom enon, fo r th e enlargem en t of the EU, through th e concept o f
80 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power an d Interdependence: W orld Politics in Transition, 3rd ed.
(N ew York: Longman, 2001).
81 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The M eans to Success in W orld Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs,
2004).
82 John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: W h y Germany Confounds Neorealism,"
International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999).
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th e 'com m unity trap' o f liberal norms and rhetorical action'.83 Once political elites have
com m itted to com munity through rhetoric, outlined identity, ideas, and norms have to
remain constant. As such, policy makers vote and behave w ithin this com m unity in
order to ensure legitimacy and protect reputation. W h e th e r or not Germ an policy
makers at this point internalize th e com ponents th a t constitute Germ an identity,
strategic culture, and W W II legacy is alm ost irrelevant to the theoretical explanation of
these cases, as causality extends to collective com m unity values fo r all G erm an citizens.
Indeed, Germ an identity has been constructed fo r several years and a denial o f th e
influence o f such identity and linking to th e culture of restraint would critically
underm ine any plausible explanation fo r Germ any's foreign policy behavior. The
im portance o f the cultural approach in international relations theories is exem plified by
th e case of Germany.
The continuity in rhetoric, as a critical discourse, is em ployed by G erm an policy
makers to justify and explain behavior based on th e norm ative principles adopted a fte r
W W II. In previous years, and in th e cases under review fo r this dissertation, this rhetoric
has not m atched Germany's policy action entirely. W hile rhetorical c o m m itm en t to
alliance solidarity occurred in all cases except Iraq and is part of Germ any's constructed
norms, other norms, such as Germ any's dom estically accepted norm o f antim ilitarism ,
resulted in a conflict in norms, causing 'inconsistent' policies. According to some

83 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Com m unity Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and th e Eastern
Enlargement of th e European Union," ibid.55, no. 1 (2001).
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scholars, these sets o f beliefs tru m p any drive fo r leadership, or great pow er relevance
in foreign and security policy.
Germany's behavior opposing any m ilitary com m itm ent and th e use of force by
Germ an soldiers has been the norm fo r over ten years, regardless of location and case.
W hile the reasons given by German policy makers differed in each case slightly, th e
underlining tone refers back to political decisions fa r preceding th e cases in question.84
W hile this may be frustrating and difficult to understand and explain, Germ any's
behavior, Germ an politicians' mindset, and Germ any's domestic opinion continues to be
influenced and guided by pacifism and m ilitary culture o f restraint due to fears o f
militarizing foreign policy. The gradual transform ation o f Germany's foreign policy,
regardless o f influential variable, can also be explained through the constructivist notion
th a t norms and prescribed patterns o f behavior can change: patterns of rhetoric, policy,
or behavior th a t seem to differ from continuous foreign policy th at has traditionally
been in line w ith Germany's norms are, over tim e, reinterpreted. This can be measured
by Germany's willingness to use force unilaterally and w ith o u t international legitim acy
in the Kosovo case. Further, in o rder fo r G erm any to agree and adopt the policies o f its
allies, especially in the case of Iran, Libya, and Iraq, G erm any's approaches have to m ake
a realist turn which conflicts w ith Germ any's role concepts. A problem w ithin the
constructivist theory o f international relations has been explaining why, how, and w hen
political norms em erge. Further, it is difficult to analyze w hy certain actors conform to

84 Bittner et al., "W ir Tun Doch Nix...".
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constructed norms despite m aterial constraints.85 O ther scholars argue th a t for
Germany, these constraints are not m aterial or structural, rather norm ative only, as
Germany's Nazi past became an exam ple o f violating norm s, which can be analyzed
theoretically through system level variables.86
Germany's recent international behavior has prom pted a valid question: Is
Germ any becoming more 'realist'? Germ any's relationship w ith Russia and China,
Germany's position as the third largest arms exporter, and Germany's behavior during
Iraq, Libya, Iran, and the European economic crisis all pose interesting cases to
Germany's focus on national interests. M o reo ver, w hile G erm any has traditionally
pursued milieu goals, it most specifically served Germ an interests over those o f Europe,
especially w ithin the economic realm .87 Further, a realist notion o f balancing or soft
balancing approaches employed by G erm any is flaw ed. G erm any is not focused on
balancing U.S. power, rather, G erm any's policies are an adopted reaction to the
changing platform of alliances in order to continue Germ any's role and ability to
negotiate its interests. The variable o f 'alliance solidarity' is therefo re a preference
route, but far from unconditional, as exem plified by the cases selected fo r this
dissertation.
Scholars using th e neorealist, or structural realist approach explain and predict
Germany's foreign policy behavior in relation to its pow er, through pow er politics w hile

85 Krebs and Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Pow er or Political Rhetoric."
86 James Sperling, "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Pow er in Post C old-W ar
Europe," British Journal o f Political Science 31, no. 2 (2001).
87 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f th e Berlin Republic: The Very M odel o f a Post-Modern M a jo r Power? A
Review Essay".
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the liberalist theory of international relations focuses on sub-systemic determ inants to
foreign and security policy behavior.88 The underlying argum ent o f the school o f
liberalism is th a t th e interests of dom estic actors shape and influence policy, w hile
constructivism claims that behavior is shaped by social norms, m ore specifically, valuebased collective ideas about 'appropriate behavior' rather than a logic of
consequentially.89 In order to evaluate each theory's ability to explain, account, and
predict Germany's foreign policy behavior, th e below table will depict th e theoretical
argum ent and prediction and th e weaknesses in relation to th e cases selected fo r this
analysis.

88 Rittberger, Germ an Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.
89 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories an d Case Studies, 105.
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Table 6: Theoretical Analysis of German Foreign Policy
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Table 6: Continued
Kosovo
(Combat
troops)
Constructivism
Emphasis on
socialnorms
and beliefs

Prediction/Expe
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Source: The prediction criteria was adopted from a 2001 publication by Volker Rittberger focusing on
Kosovo).90

Structural realism cannot account fo r Germ any's readiness to participate in out
of area operations (Kosovo and Afghanistan) w hile fu rth er integrating th e Bundeswehr
into NATO. Liberalism can also not fully explain Germ any's participation in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Constructivism would predict Germ an participation in Libya, fulfilling th e
norms fo r human intervention and th e legitimacy o f law; how ever, constructivism w ould
also account for the socially-constructed Germ an identity o f antim ilitarism th a t would
prevent domestic support from com m itting Germ an soldiers to an operation in Libya. As
such, constructivism focuses on norms-consistent policies influenced by societal norms,
liberalism emphasizes the causal effect o f dom estic interests and preferences on gainseeking policy approaches, w hile structural realism focuses on how G erm any's pow er

90 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories an d Case Studies, 176.
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position influences an autonom y seeking-based foreign policy.91 Similarly to Ostpolitik,
policies involving the use o f force, reflects a continuous social process influenced by the
norms adopted by policy makers and dom estic population and theoretically explained
by constructivism.92
Structural realism fails alm ost entirely in explaining and correctly predicting
German behavior, w hile liberalism also cannot account fo r Germ any's participation in
out of area operations. Liberalism correctly emphasizes Germ any's focus on foreign
trade policy and the influence o f dom estic interests on foreign and security policy.
Constructivism can largely account fo r th e cases under review by emphasizing
Germany's distinctive political culture and norms-based behavior. For th e case o f Libya,
constructivism would predict participation o f Germ an troops based on th e strong
peacekeeping character o f the mission based on hum an rights violations, com bined w ith
international legitimacy through UNSC Resolution 1973, and m ultilateral participation.
The m ajority o f th e cases under review fall into th e pattern o f value-based and
interests-driven foreign policy behavior explained theoretically through norm sconsistent foreign policy approaches. This behavior can be understood through the
constructivist notion o f appropriate behavior based on shared values and dom estic
expectation. Further, constructivist scholars use non-m aterial factors, such as culture,
ideas, and values, to explain and predict Germ any's foreign policy behavior, succeeding

91 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.
92 For m ore on Ostpolitik, continuity, and th e constructivist approach, see Joost Kleuters, "Between
Continuity and Change: Ostpolitik and th e Constructivist Approach Revisited," Germ an Politics 18, no. 4
(2009).
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in most cases under review. This, combined w ith th e influence of dom estic interests, not
th e distribution of power, can theoretically account fo r som e of Germ any's policy
approaches. Falling under the constructivist notion o f norms, culture, and identity,
historical m em ory continues to shape and influence both rhetoric and action. Despite
some initial changes in Germany's foreign policy beginning w ith the out o f area
operations in Kosovo, and most recently, w hen G erm any abolished conscription in 2011,
the majority o f the cases under review w ere m arked by continuity w ith slight changes,
w hereby none of the theories selected can fully account fo r Germany's behavior.93

Summary
Germany's recent behavior in international politics has led some scholars to
suggest th a t a de-Europeanization has occurred in G erm any's approach to foreign and
security policy. For both policy areas, out o f area operations and nuclear
nonproliferation, the cases under review highlight Germ any's approach of value-based
and interests-driven foreign policy. The m ethodology applied to the cases focused on
the im portance o f fo u r selected independent variables: alliance solidarity, historical
m em ory and W W II legacy, domestic influence, and national and economic interests. The
values that drive and shape German foreign policy can be attributed to G erm any's
difficult past, directly resulting in a continuous c o m m itm en t to the culture o f restraint.
Values, culture, and norms are difficult to com prom ise, especially w hen involving

93 Conscription was suspended in July 2011. Per Germany's constitution, conscription may be legally
reintroduced.
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domestic opinion, and fu rth er prove to be non-negotiable a t times. This is specifically
evident in cases involving G erm an Bundeswehr participation for m ilitary intervention. As
such, Germ any has largely adhered to its policy approaches o f antim ilitarism , shying
away from participating in out o f area operations w hile simultaneously only
strengthening alliance solidarity through rhetorical com m itm ent. These case studies
fu rth er highlighted Germany's singularity and distinctive intersection of guilt and
responsibility in relation to the dem ands of th e current international security
environm ent.
W h a t then does this mean fo r G erm any as a potentially 'norm al' actor and how
can we theoretically understand Germ any's actions? Germ any's behavior can certainly
not be compared to France or G reat Britain. Some scholars argue th a t to G erm any and
Germans, the definition o f security is "inconsistent w ith even the w eakest form o f th e
realist argum ent" w hile others explain th a t th e shifts in Germ an foreign policy after
Kosovo have been political and symbolic rather than m ilitarily.94 Germ any's view and
understanding o f its pow er is still heavily debated; on th e one hand som e scholars
declare th a t Germ any is not 'norm al' due to Germ any's past and Germ an elites'
unwillingness to act on national interests w hile on the o th e r hand scholars argue th a t
Germany's behavior has becom e indeed 'norm al' as part o f th e institutionalization

94 Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The Germ an P re d ic a m e n t: M em o ry and Pow er in th e N ew Europe
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 11. M aull, "Germ any and th e Use o f Force: Still a 'Civilian
Power1?."
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within the EU.95 As such, th e theoretical debate about Germ any's foreign policy a fte r
unification addressed how Germ any's changing pow er position influences international
politics. Scholars w ondered w h eth er Germ any's approaches could still be understood in
'civilian pow er' term s, or w h e th e r Germ any would becom e a 'norm al' pow er. The cases
reviewed for this dissertation showed th a t G erm an pow er is still defined largely in term s
o f its post-W W II norm including a com m itm en t to m ultilateral approaches and
adherence to the culture of restraint. H ow ever, G erm any's abstention in th e Libya case,
opposition to stronger sanctions fo r Iran, and recent behavior during th e bailout crisis in
Europe, show instances w here national and economic interests w ere considered and
prioritized, therefore acting m ore 'norm al', especially due to Germany's relationship
w ith Russia.
Germany's relationship w ith Russia and China and 'siding' w ith Russia in th ree
cases, Iraq, Libya, and the opposition to stronger sanctions for Iran, highlight Germ any's
economic consideration w hen debating foreign policy areas. W hile G erm any's foreign
and security behavior show definite changes, which are likely to continue, these changes
should not be attributed to G erm any practicing or exercising pow er in realist term s.
Germany's 'changed' and 'surprising' behavior in recent issue areas can be explained as
a reaction to changing external security environm ent. This is also reflected by th e
changing environm ent within th e EU, to include th e EU G row th and Stability Pact and

95 M ary N. Hampton, "The Past, Present, and th e Perhaps. Is G erm any a 'Normal Power'?," Security
Studies 10, no. 2 (2001). Katzenstein, Tamed Power: G erm any in Europe. Regina Karp, "Germany: A
'Norm al' Global Actor?," German Politics 18, no. 1 (2009).
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the strengthened relationship to Russia and China due to economic problem s.96
Germ any has therefore examined its foreign policy approaches based on economic
considerations and defined its national interests in economic term s w hile justifying th e
lack of m ilitary participation internationally through historical m em ory-based
explanations. Some analysts have pointed to these economic considerations, especially
when detailing th e difficulty in explaining and understanding Germany's foreign policy
theoretically in recent years. Germany's pursuit o f national and economic interests both
internationally and in Europe, combined w ith a continued unwillingness to use force,
w ere summarized as an exam ple o f "a geo-econom ic pow er".97 The reciprocal
m anipulation betw een the Germ an state and the business world in w hich G erm an firm s
directly lobby to the governm ent fo r policies which advance their interests and then
contributes to economic grow th, shed light on Germ any's geo-econom ic pow er
approach towards international politics.98
W hile Germany's civilian pow er identity was particularly strong during th e
1 9 9 0 's, th e breaks w ith m ultilateralism in the past decade along w ith Germ any's use of
its institutional pow er to reach national interests based goals w eakened th e civilian
pow er concept as a fram ew ork to understand G erm an foreign and security policy.
Germ any' special relationship w ith Russia and China, Germ any's focus on national
interests outlined in economic concepts, and Germany's careful choosing of

96 Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and th e Shadow o f the Past," SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (Sum m erFall 2005).
97 Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power."
98 Ibid.

multilaterally-based policies continue to em phasize th a t Germ any m ay indeed be
changing into a 'norm al' actor, w ith th e one exception o f Germany's refusal to
participate in out of area m ilitary operations. The analysis and application o f th e
selected variables shows th at alliance solidarity is im portant and evident through
rhetorical com m itm ent. Further, w hile historical m em ory can account fo r G erm any's
rhetoric and action during several cases involving the use o f force, th e historical
m em ory variable was only present rhetorically during th e case of Iran. M o reo ver,
historical m em ory entered the political discussion in th e Iran case w hen m ilitary options
w ere debated, thus not determ ining all areas o f Germ an foreign policy. A comparison of
both cases highlighted Germany's national interests, specifically G erm any's focus on
economic goals. M oreover, Germ any understands and exercises pow er through an
institutional fram ew ork w ith a focus on m aintaining and growing economic pow er
through previous alliances or n ew er relationships. Theoretically, Germ an foreign policy
is difficult to analyze and understand. Constructivism, w ith a focus on norm ative
explanations, can account for Germ any's emphasis of culture, beliefs, and norms in
foreign policy approaches, but lacks in explaining th e case o f Libya fully.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

SUMMARY
This dissertation exam ined how and when historical m em ory has influenced,
shaped, and informed contem porary Germ an foreign and security policy and rhetoric by
examining cases within tw o policy areas. The first policy area, out o f area operations
and the use o f force, showed th a t cases are still largely explained and justified based on
th e culture o f restraint, referring back to historical m em ory and W W II legacy. This is
evident in policy makers' use o f rhetoric as w ell as policy action, which has rem ained
antim ilitaristic in nature. W hile this dissertation hypothesized that G erm any has a
ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determ ined by historical m em ory,
several other independent variables besides historical m em ory w ere included in the
research. Alliance solidarity and com m itm ent to m ultilateral organizations was evident
in Kosovo and Afghanistan w hile rhetorical com m itm ent to Germ any's alliance occurred
in Libya. The case of Iraq proved to be th e first case w ith a clear break w ith Germ any's
alliance. The domestic influence variable accounted fo r th e im portance o f Germ an
public opinion, especially during political debates surrounding use o f force cases.
Germany's national interests, in both policy areas, w ere m arked by economic
strongholds, reflecting Germany's view and use o f institutional pow er to serve Germ an
goals. The cost and benefit of com m itting Germ an troops was certainly included in all
cases, especially in light of current Bundeswehr reform s. The research into ou t o f area
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operations also included an analysis of Germ any's engagem ent and responsibility. Here,
th e case of Afghanistan was used to highlight Germ any's involvem ent in international
conflicts. Furtherm ore, rhetoric was analyzed and exam ined in all cases, w hile th e policy
action in each case was grouped into categories o f change.
This dissertation argued th a t use o f force cases are sequential and fall into
Germany's prescribed pattern of foreign and security policy and reflects Germ any's and
understanding o f power. Germ any's behavior can be explained as a reaction to its
external environm ent w hereby selective use of historical m em ory has becom e
instrum ental in explaining, informing, and justifying foreign policy choices fo r out of
area operations. Historical m em ory was not th e most influential variable in the policy
area involving nuclear nonproliferation in the case of Iran. Here, historical m em ory was
only considered in relation to potential m ilitary options. Domestic influence, although
not as strong as during cases involving th e use o f force, was influential in th e Iran case
by focusing on th e separation of politics and business. W hile similarities b e tw ee n th e
policy areas and cases are evident, Germ an policy makers may simply tre a t foreign
policy issues on a case by case basis. Furtherm ore, Germ any's relationship w ith Russia,
and China, was highlighted in the cases o f Iraq, Libya, and Iran and falls into th e category
o f national and economic interests. Here, an argum ent can be made fo r an adjustm ent
to policy in order to serve Germ any's interests. The evidence in all cases showed th a t
th e re are certain ritualized recourses, often inform ed by historical m em ory and o th er
tim es influenced by national interests.
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An argum ent was made th a t Germ any m ay not be interested in taking a
leadership role in foreign policy issue areas, especially in use of force cases. G erm any
uses institutional pow er to shape th e outcom e o f policies and to influence behavior in
cases of interests to Germ any, usually w ithin the economic realm. This dissertation also
examined the validity of international relations theories to explain and predict Germ an
foreign policy, and found th a t no theory entirely encompasses the state o f Germ an
politics. Constructivism, w ith its focus on norms-based behavior, can account fo r th e
influence o f historical m em ory on contem porary G erm an foreign and security policy, but
lacks in explaining Germany's abstention on the vote o f Libya. This research included an
exam ination o f scholarly and m edia analysis about G erm any's continuity and change in
each case. W hile the m ajority of scholars criticize Germ any's recent behavior, referring
to recent policies as an 'identity crisis', others argue th a t G erm any can afford to act
based on national interests.
The cases o f Libya and Iran fu rth e r showed the difficulty over EU policy,
reflecting an overall split over EU goals. The most recent discontent w ith Germ any's
behavior was catapulted w ith Germany's abstention from Libya, arguably th e most
controversial of all decisions under review. The Libya case also showed th e potential
effects of insufficient diplom atic dialogue. M o re specifically, Germany's decision to
abstain was m ade before, and unknowingly of, the United State's changed position to
establish a no-fly zone. As such, it is im portant to re m em b e r th at G erm any certainly
continues to consider its W estern alliances. W h e th e r G erm any would have changed its
vote in light of new inform ation is up to debate; how ever, Germ any, m ore than any
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oth er country, needs the ability to fully debate and weigh its options in cases involving
th e use o f force. Historical m em ory, th e culture o f restraint, and th e intersection of
responsibility and guilt are sure to rem ain in place w hen out of area operations are
debated w ithin th e Bundestag.
This dissertation argued th a t an understanding o f German foreign and security
policy, especially in regards to out o f area m ilitary operations, must include the elem ent
o f historical m em ory. Germany's history is simply to o compelling to ignore. The issue of
historical m em ory is very much alive in contem porary G erm an culture and politics,
evident through the m ultitude o f television shows, movies, and book releases.1 In most
cases, th e holocaust is treated as a singularity. This study emphasizes th a t th e enduring
influence of Germany's shameful past results in certain ritualized recourses in political
behavior. Therefore, there is no new status quo in Germ an foreign and security policy.
Rather, th e slight change th a t Germ an foreign policy is undergoing is still in process.
German foreign policy is headed tow ards an era o f self-serving interests w hile keeping
w ithin th e fram ew ork of th e European Union. Germ an interests are sure to rem ain
economically driven while policies involving th e use o f force are destined to result in
lengthy debates, marked by past experiences. Germ any's difficulty in resolving its guilt
w ith the demands o f responsibility are also likely to continue, especially fo r out of area
operations. Here, domestic opinion and influence certainly affect how policy makers

1 Most recently, in 2013, th e th ree parts, w idely view ed, TV miniseries, "Our mothers, our fathers"
(Unsere M u tter, Unsere Vater) resulted in much controversy, praise, and criticism. The series tells the
story o f five German friends during th e ir tim e in Nazi G erm any and W W II. The series was released in th e
U.S. in January 2014 under the title Generation W ar.
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behave internationally. This is highlighted by the lack o f rhetorical descriptions o f w a r in
German political com m entary, inclusive o f the rare use of th e word 'w ar' (Krieg) itself.
Instead, German policy makers refer to operations in Afghanistan and elsew here as
'arm ed conflict' and 'hum anitarian intervention' w hile focusing on Germ any's
developm ent and peace keeping role. As such, this study showed and argued th a t cases
involving the use o f force, nam ely Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya fall into a linear
sequence of foreign policy pattern, not m arked by significant changes or revolutionary
alteration of previously held ideas.
Historical m em ory and ritualized rhetoric is used depending on policy area,
allowing Germany to present reason, argum ent, and justification to a variety of
international security challenges, eith er to support or oppose m ilitary involvem ent by
German soldiers. As such, political necessities m ay be converted into and explained by
normative beliefs. Germany's use o f force, beyond ability and capability, is sure to
remain a question o f political will and required to be debated thoroughly. This dem ands
tim e and cooperation among allies, transparency, and continued m ultilateral
communication. Furtherm ore, W W II legacies are no longer solely owned by Germ ans,
but have become an international historical m em ory, held and rem em bered differently
worldwide. It is im portant to note th a t 'G erm an questions' have been raised precisely in
m oments when Germany's policies w ere m arked by slight changes, rather than
continuity. Beginning w ith unification, refusing m ilitary action in Iraq and Libya,
deploym ent caveats in Afghanistan, opposition to tough er sanctions fo r Iran, and
G erm any's behavior during the Greek debt crisis, all contributed to international
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criticism for Germany's European vocation and international responsibility. M edal
award ceremonies fo r Germ an soldiers and Germ any's patriotic presence during the
2006 W orld Cup were further critiqued and analyzed as 'nationalistic'. These 'changes'
in policy or behavior, although slight, resulted in th e questioning o f several im portan t
political concepts: Germany's responsibility, predictability, and reliability. These
questions, critiques, and analyses are certainly not asked o f other nations; evidence of
Germ any's complex political existence.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
W ith a focus on historical m em ory, culture, and norm ative behavior, path
dependency may limit research on Germany's foreign and security policy. Specifically,
path dependency outlines th at certain decisions, or behaviors, often affect subsequent
decisions. Path dependency can th e re fo re aid in explaining th e costs o f a reversal in
policy, especially when specific institutional arrangem ents are in place.2 W ith in the
chapter detailing Germany's behavior and policy tow ards Iran's nuclear program ,
difficulties arose when separating the G erm an voice from the EU voice. Distinct Germ an
policies only became evident w hen open opposition to stronger sanctions occurred.
Similarly, consensus in this dissertation m eant an official consensus o f Germ an policy
makers reached after Bundestag debates. A t tim es this dissertation considered th e
conflicting internal political debates, especially over th e use of force; how ever, th e

2 M argaret Levi, "A Model, a M ethod, a M ap: Rational Choice in Com parative and Historical Analysis," in
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. M ark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman
(Cambridge University Press: 1997).
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influence of norms and ideas on political decision-making remains difficult to measure.
To overcome this lim itation, this study focused on political rhetoric and statem ents
directly relating to Germany's culture o f restraint.
International relations theories have struggled to fully understand, explain, and
predict German foreign policy behavior, resulting in a lengthy and active debate about
Germany's use and projection o f pow er a fte r unification. The Kosovo case m arked an
im portant point in Germany's political history, w hen consensus was reached to m ilitarily
intervene in another country's internal conflict w ith o u t th e legitimacy of th e United
Nations. This action tem porarily redefined th e im portant concept o f 'never again', w hile
propelling Germany's status as a security exporter and responsible actor. The breaks
w ith the alliance in the case of Iraq and Libya showed th a t th e use o f force remains a
highly controversial topic that must be debated thoroughly within the Bundestag before
a consensus is reached. Even th e n , internal differences w ith in each case fu rth e r
complicate Germany's voice. Throughout all cases w here th e use of force was politically
debated, Germ any faced the critical intersection o f guilt and responsibility in both
accommodating Germany's traditions w hile balancing th e security dem ands o f th e 2 1 st
century. In these cases, historical m em ory influenced and shaped foreign policy as part
o f the socially constructed norms th a t guide and inform dom estic opinion w hile serving
as an explanation and validation o f policy /naction.
Apart from this analysis, it is also interesting to note th e entirely separate
exam ination o f guilt and responsibility in use of force debates when exam ining
generational changes w ithin the Bundestag. W hile Schroder noted th a t his generation
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was not plagued w ith the guilt o f his parents' generation, th e actual debates and votes
w ithin the Bundestag, especially fo r th e cases of Iraq and Libya, show just how strongly
historical m em ory continues to affect younger generations o f policy m akers. This
precisely dem onstrates how historical m em ory has contributed to th e construction o f a
distinct German culture and identity, m arked by antim ilitarism , guilt, and firm norms.
Despite this, Germ an foreign policy is certainly undergoing changes, evident by stronger
rhetoric and policy behavior th a t places Germ an interests before those of th e EU. This
dissertation searched for inform ation and corroboration w h ile presenting th e academic
debate and then provided for a link to policy. Further, this research highlighted th e
difficulty in explaining Germany's foreign policy behavior theoretically. Rather than
arguing th a t historical m em ory influences G erm an foreign policy and rhetoric, this
dissertation focused on how historical m em ory accomplishes this.
The im portance of historical m em ory is evident in politicians' continued m ention
of history and history's lessons, congruent across all cases under review . This is partly
due to Germany's feared m ilitarization o f foreign policy. U nfortunately, Germ any's
tension betw een identity and role complicates Germ an foreign policy. Germ any's
political and cultural identity, com bined w ith a dem anding role as a responsible security
exporter has resulted in stagnant or inactive policy choices. W hile this dissertation
explained and showed why and how Germ any's policy behavior is m arked by inaction at
tim es, the purpose of this research was not to judge policy behavior. Instead, this
research offers alternative explanations to th e puzzling and shocking responses fro m the
international com m unity of analysts and scholars in light o f Germany's recent behavior.
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Germany's recent behavior should not prom pt analysts and journalists to w o n d e r
w h ether Germany has intentions o f returning to traditional conceptions of M ach tp o litik;
however, an inquiry into Germ any's intentions behind interest-based behavior resulting
in a decreased role in responsibility in Europe is valid and necessary.

THE FUTURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
During the initial stages o f this dissertation research, in the spring o f 2012, no
scholarly research provided a detailed analysis on the case o f Libya. N ow , th re e years
after Germany's abstention from UNSCR 1973, it would be interesting to research how
precisely this policy inaction affects G erm any both internally w ithin the EU an
internationally as a global pow er. W h a t does the Libya case mean fo r th e fu tu re of
Germany, NATO, and the EU? An initial inquiry offers no 'real' consequences of
Germany's abstention besides an influx o f criticism from both sides of th e Atlantic. The
Libya case also propelled the idea o f th e 'n ew constellation' o f Germany-China-Russia.
Further research into th e economic effects and benefits o f this relationship m ay serve in
answering questions about the trajectory of Germ any's foreign policy. W h ile this
dissertation considered identity and identity studies as a crucial tool to understanding
and explain German foreign policy, th e fluidity of identity and culture is, o f course,
difficult to measure. Throughout the analyses o f political rhetoric and official
statem ents, this analysis reflected the statem ents m ade based on references to
historical and collective memories. The field of international relations, and specifically
German politics would benefit greatly from an in-depth study of ideational and cultural
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influences on rhetoric, policy action, and political practice. W hile th e past decade
provided much research and analysis fo r scholars to exam ine Germany's political
parties, specifically the red-green dynamic, fu tu re research should certainly include a
m ore comprehensive analysis to political debates.
In recent years, analyses about Germ an foreign policy have veered fro m a focus
on th e puzzling continuity despite changes o f increased pow er, to a 'change through
continuity'. Further, Germ any as a 'norm al' actor continues to be an unresolved area of
discussion, especially in light o f Germ any's recent national interests-based behavior.
Political rhetoric in Germany remains an im portant ele m e n t to explain, advocate, and
justify Germany's foreign policy choices. As such, fu tu re research should provide insight
into the continued influence o f historical m em ory, and o th e r factors, on political
rhetoric which serves as a vehicle fo r Germ any's continued, o r changing, strategic
culture. In 2010, tw e n ty years a fte r Germ an unification, several journals, to include
German Politics and German Politics & Society, published articles th a t addressed this
change through continuity in light o f Germ an identity and foreign policy. One o f th e
articles within this special issue by W illiam Peterson, adequately asked, "Does G erm any
still have a European Vocation?" The author concludes th a t governm ental policy is "less
European than in th e past" and th a t Germ any's European vocation is decreasing and will
continue to do so w hile also m aintaining a c o m m itm en t to th e basic fram ew orks of th e
EU.3

3 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.
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In closing, it is interesting to note th e various statem ents m ade about Germ any's
responsibility and guilt during the Munich Security Conference in early 2 01 4 by G erm an
President Joachim Gauck and Germ any's new defense m inister Ursula von der Leyen.
Both politicians stressed th e im portance fo r Germ any to play a m ore decisive role in
resolving international conflicts. Gauck also m entioned the im portance o f shaking o ff
Germany's "sense of guilt stem ming from W W II", stating th a t "Germ any will never
support any purely m ilitary solution, but will also approach issues w ith political
judiciousness and explore all possible diplom atic options. How ever, w hen th e last
resort, o f sending in the Bundeswehr, comes to be discussed, Germany should not say
'no' on principles, nor should it say 'yes' unthinkingly."4 Similarly, Ursula von der Leyen
argues th a t "to sit and w ait" is not an option, adding th a t if Germ any has th e means and
capabilities to act; Germ any has an obligation and responsibility to engage. On th e o th er
hand, the defense minister, in an in terview w ith G erm an newspaper D er Spiegel,
explained her support for the Libya decision, outlining th e lack of th e European voice.
W hile arguing fo r the need of closer EU cooperation and a defined defense and security
strategy, von der Leyen explained th a t Germ any is engaged in a dozen missions
w orldw ide, which demands both a m ilitary and financial e ffo rt, yet G erm any's allies
"only rem em ber Germany's reluctance, th e product o f Germany's restraint".5 Echoing
these expressions, in an interview in January 2014, foreign minister Frank-W alter
4 "Gauck Opens Munich Security Conference w ith Call for M o re Germ an Engagement," Deutsche Welle,
January 31, 2014, accessed February 5, 2014, h ttp ://w w w .dw .de/gauck-opens-m unich-securityconference-w ith-call-for-m ore-germ an-engagem ent/a-17399048.
5 Rene Pfister and Gordon Repinski, "German Defense M inister: 'W e Can't Look Away'," Spiegel Online,
January 28, 2014, accessed February 2, 2014, h ttp ://w w w .s p ie g e l.d e /in te rn a tio n a l/g e rm a n y /in terview w ith-germ an-defense-m inister-ursula-von-der-leyen-a-945818.htm l.
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Steinmeier explained th at the international com m unity rightly expects G erm any to
intervene.6 These recent statem ents not only em phasize th e lack o f understanding of
Germany's parliam ent-controlled m ilitary by the international com m unity, but fu rth e r
highlighted the internal differences w ithin th e EU. G erm any's a tte m p t and difficulty in
resolving the intersection o f guilt and responsibility is likely to persist as previously held
norms continue to contextualize contem porary security demands. Similarly,
com parative analysis involving historical m em ory can explain current foreign policy
choices o f other states. W hile Germ any's history is certainly special, it is not unique.
Countries have suffered humiliations which are evident in contem porary foreign policy
choices. As such, successes and failures o f th e past will continue to play an im p o rt role
in current policy choices.

6 "Es W ird Zu Recht Von Uns Erwartet, Dass W ir Uns Einmischen," Suddeutschen Zeitung, January 30,
2014, accessed February 2, 2014, h ttp ://w w w .au sw aertig esam t.de/D E/lnfoservice/P resse/lnterview s/14/140130-B M _S Z.htm l.
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